Meaning Use and Determination: The Underdetermination of Meaning by Use

Abstract

In section 189 of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s interlocutor asks: “But are the steps then not determined by the algebraic formula?” And Wittgenstein replies, “the question contains a mistake.” In the first part of this essay, I will argue that this question is a consequence of Wittgenstein’s attempt to elucidate the absurdity of the default idea of determination — Platonic determination — which suggests that an algebraic formula determines its infinite applications objectively for all time. Here I shall expose the problems with the Platonic conception of determination. Now if a question asked contains a mistake, then it should follow that at least one illicit assumption is necessary to asking it. In the second part of this essay I will try to make explicit this assumption. I will argue that Wittgenstein’s response to the question is a product of his attempt to articulate a conception of determination — naturalistic determination — independent of Platonic associations, and lying somewhere between the extremes of Platonism and conventionalism.' In the main, I hope to show that for Wittgenstein applications of a word might indeed be determined by its meaning. But I hope to illustrate that for Wittgenstein words can only be naturalistically determined. Though they may not be determined in virtue of their objective essence or inherent meaning, words can nonetheless determine future application in virtue of use, learning, norms and human nature. Wittgenstein’s position therefore hangs in the middle — between Platonism and conventionalism