A Total Solution on Negotiation with Integrative Perspectives-Using Computer Aided Negotiation Software

談判是無所不見的重要學門，牽扯到各式各樣的專業及談判者的個性，在複雜且難以捉摸的談判學中，本研究將提出如何合理地模型化談判策略，以達到雙贏為前提，利用電腦及談判理論有效地解決談判問題。 本研究先簡單地介紹談判理論及專有名詞，接著以Seneca個案為例，描述個案內容並理性地站在各自角度分析各項議題，然後引進電腦輔助談判系統作為創造價值最大化的工具，最終針對較難解決的議題，以仲裁及夏普立值作為公正解決問題的方針，整套研究流程目的為提出整體談判解決方案。國立臺灣大學管理學院商學研究所碩士論文……………………………… i立臺灣大學碩士學位論文口試委員會審定書…………………………… ii謝 ………………………………………………………………… iii要 ………………………………………………………………… iv錄 ………………………………………………………………… v目錄 ………………………………………………………………… vii目錄 ………………………………………………………………… ix一章 緒論…………………………………………………………… 1.1 研究動機……………………………………………………… 1.2 研究問題……………………………………………………… 2.3 研究途徑及研究方法………………………………………… 3.4 研究架構……………………………………………………… 4二章 基礎談判理論………………………………………………… 5.1 輔助談判的分析理論………………………………………… 5.1.1 決策分析……………………………………………………… 5.1.2 行為決策理論………………………………………………… 8.1.3 賽局理論……………………………………………………… 9.2 談判理論專有名詞介紹……………………………………… 10.2.1 BATNA ……………………………………………………… 10.2.2 Reservation Price……………………………………………… 12.2.3 ZOPA ………………………………………………………… 13.2.4 Anchoring …………………………………………………… 14.2.5 Pareto efficiency …………………………………………… 15.2.6 Side payment ………………………………………………… 17.3 談判類型區分………………………………………………… 19.3.1 整合型談判與分配型談判…………………………………… 19.3.2 關係型談判與交易型談判…………………………………… 21三章 以Seneca為例導入談判理論進行簡易分析 ……………… 23.1 Seneca(A)(B)個案簡介 ……………………………………… 23.1.1 Stevens, the VP of Assembly division………………………… 24.1.2 Monosoff, the VP of data device division …………………… 26.1.3 Thompson, the VP of marketing division …………………… 28.2 以談判理論思維分析問題…………………………………… 30.2.1 決策分析：The PrOACT way of thought …………………… 30.2.2 Some organization question…………………………………… 34.2.3 分析主議題並找出各談判者之BATNA與Reservation Price … 36.2.4 分析三方角色立場 …………………………………………… 41.2.5 談判優勢初步分析 …………………………………………… 43 四章 以CAN解決問題之挑戰並提出建議……………………… 46.1 應用柏拉圖效率之概念使分配結果保持總價值最大化 …… 46.2. 談判軟體(CAN)理論基礎及應用……………………………… 49.2.1 Template design………………………………………………… 49.2.2 最佳談判路徑之數理模型推導…………………………… … 52.3 現存CAN遇到之挑戰及本研究之建議及心得…………… 56.3.1 現存CAN之挑戰……………………………………………… 56.3.2 現存CAN遇到之其他質疑及本研究之認知………………… 66五章 細算Seneca創造之價值並提出總體解決方案 ……………… 69.1 以CAN為工具，多角度模擬Seneca個案之最佳談判路徑… 69.1.1 以調停人或仲裁者之中立第三方角度 ……………………… 69.1.2 以談判者或操縱者之涉及自身利參賽者之角度 …………… 74.1.3 CAN之優勢與實用價值……………………………………… 78.2 以整合型談判觀點找出談判之價值並找出創造性選擇 …… 79.3 針對難題提出解決方案 ……………………………………… 81.3.1 Relationship …………………………………………………… 81.3.2 Arbitration …………………………………………………… 83.3.3 Coalition build and Shapley Value …………………………… 85.4 小結與建議 …………………………………………………… 91六章 結論 …………………………………………………………… 92.1 研究發現 ……………………………………………………… 93.2 研究貢獻 ……………………………………………………… 94.3 研究期許 ……………………………………………………… 95考文獻 ………………………………………………………………… 9

The Road toward the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)- An Analysis of Two Level Games and Asymmetric Negotiation Theory

歐盟與加拿大在2014年9月完成雙邊自由貿易協定談判（The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA）。對歐盟來說，《歐加自由貿易協定》是歐盟第一個與七大工業國所簽訂的自由貿易協定；對加拿大來說，這是該國有史以來最具野心的貿易協定，因此本協定對於雙方的重要性不言可喻。雖然目前已有許多學者對《歐加自由貿易協定》進行分析，但現有的研究成果多集中於歐加簽署協定之動機、目的，以及對產業可能造成的衝擊，而缺乏對於談判過程、談判策略之研究，因此本文希望彌補這樣的缺口，以談判理論，來分析《歐加自由貿易協定》。 本文將分為兩大部分：首先，透過「雙層賽局理論」分析在談判中，歐盟與加拿大政府所面臨的國內外限制，以及雙方政府採取什麼樣的策略，突破這些挑戰；第二部分，將以「不對稱談判理論」分析《歐加自由貿易協定》談判中，權力要素如何影響談判，及加拿大是否能透過談判策略的應用，克服權力差距，爭取最大的談判利益。 本文發現，歐盟與加拿大政府之談判策略，符合雙層賽局理論之分析，雙方分別透過自縛、暗盤交易、議題連結、反射等策略，回應談判中的國內外限制；且《歐加自由貿易協定》之談判結果，亦符合不對稱談判理論中的立論，綜合國力並非決定談判結果之關鍵要素，雙方對於「議題權力」之掌握與否，才是決定談判輸贏的最重要原因。EU and Canada completed CETA negotiation in September 2014. There is abundant research studying this ambitious FTA, but most of them put their emphasis on the incentive of signing CETA, or the potential economic impact for both entities, literally none of current studies focus on the negotiation process. This paper hopes to fill up the gap by using negotiation theory to analyze CETA. This paper is divided into two parts. First, it uses Putnam’s “two-level game theory” as the main research framework in order to see the governments’ strategies in the negotiation. This paper verifies the model and finds out that the governments used cutting slack, side payment, issue linkage, and reverberation to deal with domestic and international restricts in the negotiation. Second, the paper takes advantage of Habeeb’s “asymmetry negotiation theory” and find out that by holding “issue specific power,” Canada was able to overcome power weakness and win the negotiation in the particular issue

中國大陸的村莊治理與公共財供給: 一個政治經濟分析

[[abstract]]本研究以談判理論為基礎，探討「後農業稅時代」中國大陸農村基層治理問題。在農村推行基層選舉的背景下，村民委員會選舉強化了村莊的自治能力；另一方面，取消農業稅雖然在某種程度上減輕了農民的負擔，但卻惡化了鄉鎮財政能力。兩種作用相互影響，使得村莊公共財的總供給未必增加，村莊治理也未必更加完善。因此，於相同議題的文獻中，便可能出現不同的實證結果。透過本文的模型分析發現，基層選舉與取消農業稅對於村莊公共財總供給的影響，取決於村莊的所得規模。經濟較富裕、鄉村工商業較發達的社區，即使稅費改革後來自鄉鎮政府的公共財投資下降，村莊公共財總供給也未必會減少；相反地，經濟貧困的社區，其公共財總供給則會因來自鄉鎮政府的公共財投資下降而陷入停滯。 The main purpose of this paper is to delve into the issue of village governance in the era of agriculture reform in rural China. We view village governance as a bargaining between villagers' committee and township government by virtue of Nash bargaining theory. The abrogation agriculture tax mitigates the burden upon Chinese farmers, but it exacerbates township government's public finance. Therefore, grass-roots democracy intensifies and enlarges villages' self-governance but it is not a necessary result to improve village governance due to the insufficient supply of local public goods. We indicate that the level of the supply of local public goods depends on the income of villages in the terms of our model. The rich village will attain much public investment than the poor counterpart even if they all confront the financial predicament descended from township government after the reform of agriculture tax

The role of marital bargaining in the retirement-consumption decision: evidence using food intake data.

Lundberg et al. (2003)主張的婚姻談判理論指出退休家庭消費驟降現象是由於夫妻間的相對談判能力在丈夫退休後出現變化而造成。而且該下跌的幅度取決於二人年齡的差異。本論文考慮到 Aguiar and Hurst (2005)的評論消費應該被視為支出和時間的輸出，嘗試修改 Lundberg et al. (2003)的婚姻談判模型，並從食物攝取量的角度重新探討它在退休消費決策中所扮演的角色。我利用美國全國食品調查的食品消費支出和攝取量數據，結果發現儘管退休已婚夫婦的消費支出有下降跡象，但無論是已婚還是單身家庭均沒有減少消費的數量或降低消費的品質。此外，我發現並無任何證據顯示在已婚家庭組別中，夫婦間年齡差距較大的家庭會傾向於丈夫退休後削減更多消費或支出。這些結果與理論預期不符合。因此，認為婚姻談判理論能充分解釋已婚家庭退休消費行為的推斷還是言之過早。The Marital Bargaining Theory proposed by Lundberg et al. (2003) suggests that a discontinuity in consumption expenditure at retirement is attributable to the change in the relative bargaining power of husbands and wives upon the husband's retirement, and that the extent of such a decline depends upon age differences in couples. This thesis responds to Aguiar and Hurst (2005)'s critique that consumption should be regarded as an outcome of market expenses and time. With this taken into consideration, I attempt to rewrite the marital bargaining model and reexamine its role in the retirement-consumption decision empirically from the perspective of food intake. By exploiting data on food expenditures and intake from U.S nationwide food surveys, I show that despite a drop in expenditures for married couples, neither married nor single households experience a decline in consumption associated with retirement in terms of food quantity and quality. Also, I find no evidence that married couples with big age gaps suffer from a larger decline in either expenditures or consumption relative to those who are closer in age. These results are inconsistent with a modified model of marital bargaining. It is thus premature to conclude that the Marital Bargaining Theory plays an important role in explaining the retirement-consumption behavior of married couples.Detailed summary in vernacular field only.Wong, Lok Sze.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83).Abstracts also in Chinese.Abstract --- p.ii摘要 --- p.iiiAcknowledgements --- p.ivChapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.4Chapter 3. --- Data --- p.13Chapter 3.1 --- Survey Description --- p.13Chapter 3.2 --- Sample Selection --- p.18Chapter 3.3 --- Summary Statistics --- p.20Chapter 4. --- Change in Expenditure and Time use at Retirement --- p.21Chapter 5. --- Modified Model of Marital Bargaining --- p.26Chapter 6. --- Methodology for Consumption Analysis --- p.32Chapter 7. --- Comparison of the CSFII and NHANES Estimates --- p.37Chapter 8. --- Retirement-Consumption Behaviors across Married Couples --- p.40Chapter 9. --- Discussion and Implication --- p.47Chapter 10. --- Conclusion --- p.50Chapter Figure 1: --- Retirement Rates by Age in the CSFII --- p.52Chapter Table 1: --- Demographic Statistics of Male Household Heads Aged Between 57 and 71 in the CSFII and NHANES by Marital Status --- p.53Chapter Table 2: --- Descriptive Statistics of Self-Reported Health Status and Specific Health Conditions of Male Household Heads Aged Between 57 and 71 in the CSFII and NHANES by Marital Status --- p.54Chapter Table 3: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Log Food Expenditure and Shopping Frequency Upon Retirement by Marital Status --- p.55Chapter Table 4: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Log Food Expenditure and Shopping Frequency Upon Retirement for Married Couples by Difference in Age --- p.56Chapter Table 5: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Log Food Expenditure and Shopping Frequency Upon Retirement for Married Couples by Difference in Age (Three Groups) --- p.57Chapter Table 6: --- Comparison of Predictions Between Standard and Modified Marital Bargaining Models --- p.58Chapter Table 7: --- Comparison of Regression Results for Average Population Between the CSFII and NHANES (Nutritional Compositions) --- p.59Chapter Table 8: --- Comparison of Regression Results for Average Population Between the CSFII and NHANES (Propensity to Consume Food Categories) --- p.60Chapter Table 9: --- Comparison of Regression Results for Average Population Between the CSFII and NHANES (Propensity to Eat Away from Home) --- p.61Chapter Table 10: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Nutritional Compositions Upon Retirement by Marital Status --- p.62Chapter Table 11: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Propensity to Consume Food Categories Upon Retirement by Marital Status --- p.63Chapter Table 12: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Propensity to Eat Away from Home Upon Retirement by Marital Status --- p.64Chapter Table 13: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Nutritional Compositions Upon Retirement for Married Couples by Difference in Age (Three Groups) --- p.65Chapter Table 14: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Propensity to Consume Food Categories Upon Retirement for Married Couples by Difference in Age (Three Groups) --- p.66Chapter Table 15: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Propensity to Eat Away from Home Upon Retirement for Married Couples by Difference in Age (Three Groups) --- p.67Chapter Table 16: --- Comparison of Empirical Results and Predictions of Two Models, With and Without Change in Bargaining Power Within Marriage, for Married Couple Households --- p.68Chapter Appendix Table 1: --- The Median Annual Household Incomes in the 1999-2008 CPS March Supplement and the Corresponding Income Ranges in the NHANES --- p.69Chapter Appendix Table 2: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Nutritional Compositions Upon Retirement for Married Couples by Difference in Age (Non-Household Head) --- p.70Chapter Appendix Table 3: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Propensity to Consume Food Categories Upon Retirement for Married Couples by Difference in Age (Non-Household Head) --- p.71Chapter Appendix Table 4: --- Instrumental Variable Regression of Changes in Propensity to Eat Away from Home Upon Retirement for Married Couples by Difference in Age (Non-Household Head) --- p.72Chapter Appendix: --- Proof 1 --- p.73Chapter Appendix: --- Proof 2 --- p.76References --- p.8

A study on the Game and Negotiate theory pply in Application Project issue

知識經濟的年代造成競爭更激烈，改變更快速，而企業的運作常需依賴資訊科技的引進以配合企業業務的改變與成長 ; 但資訊科技與資訊服務的引進與委外，也常因客觀市場的成熟度不夠而產生許多糾紛。唯糾紛的處理可以是衝突的化解也可能是未來合作的開始。正因為資訊專案是一種專業且複雜的委外服務交易，當糾紛發生時雙方因為資訊價值效用不同而產生許多解決方案的組合時，就可將賽局與談判理論加上策略行動，應用於資訊專案糾紛處理中以塑造雙方長期合作的形勢，並進行整合式談判已求得解決方案中雙方的最優方案。其間不僅常可創造出更多的互補利益更可增進雙方長期合作關係。研究提出 “資訊案委糾紛競合策略”，架構出資訊專案委外糾紛處理方案的選擇策略，並詳細說明如何利用策略行動以達到資訊專案糾紛處理策略的最佳解決方式(即互動競合式糾紛處理)。後提出 “資訊專案糾紛處理架構”，歸類出四大靜態構面(三大基礎要素，九大考慮要素，談判代表與立場，談判構面與項目)與一大動態構面(處理程序與最優化) ，將資訊專案糾紛處理時事前的準備分析與進行中的程序與目標做一結構化的分析與整理，使資訊專案糾紛處理不再如藝術創作般無可遵循。後再依資訊專案的價值產生源與特性，進行整理並提出 “資訊專案價值構面與項目”，以利談判時雙方對價值交換的收集與思考。訊專案糾紛解決過程中，雙方若能發揮合作精神，其整體所得一定是比各自為是，互相競爭的所得為高。唯有進行整合式談判，雙方互換資訊專案有形與無形效益項目，才可產生最優化，進而提高雙方所得。最後以一現實環境中資訊專案糾紛案例如何運用本研究提出的 (一)資訊專案糾紛競合策略 (二)資訊專案糾紛處理架構 (三)資訊專案價值構面與項目 於糾紛解決過程中在策略選擇，談判準備，談判項目上，得到最優的解決方案過程做一說明 。Information Technology become more and more important in this changing world . Same time , there are more and more Information Project fail or under conflict situation it may cause by Information services market is not a mature market or Software Project engineer completeness . Using Game Theory and Negotiate Theory in Conflict situation , People can increasing long term relationship and having Co-create value when parties Building trust through Integration Negotiate。 his Report try to layout a “ 4 Block Information Conflict resolution Strategy Map” , which help parties easier choice their conflict resolution strategy and clear distinguish. The situation stage。hen try to layout a “ Information Conflict Resolution Platform” This Platform will structure and procedure the pre-negotiate stage .Which collect negotiation relate factor and Conceptual those factor into 4 Phase : 3 Basic Corner Stone 。 9 Major Inference index。 Parties with Interest。 Negotiate item with Weigh。 . fter deeply analyze Information Services or Information Project Value , This report Suggest a “Information conflict Resolution Value Catalog and Item” , this strategy map can help parties create more difference interest and value .in order to general more difference combination solution for information project conflict resolution。 y using a real information conflict case , we understand that Co-work model will be the best solution in Information conflict resolution , Both parties not only receive the highest value and benefit but co-create new value within integrate negotiation 。目錄言 i 文摘要 ii文摘要 iii錄 iv 目錄 vi 目錄 vii 第一章　緒論 1第一節　研究背景與動機 1第二節　研究目的與流程 3.2.1 研究目的 3.2.2 研究流程 4第二章　文獻探討 5第一節　資訊專案效益與價值評估 5.1.1 資訊專案效益 5.1.2 資訊專案價值類別與評估 6.1.3 財務評估模式 11第二節　資訊專案糾紛起因與分類 14第三節　委外與爭議處理 17.3.1 資訊專案委外注意要項 17.3.2 投標議價程序 20.3.3 爭議處理程序 23第四節　賽局與談判理論 26.4.1 賽局元素 28.4.2 賽局分類 34.4.3 談判元素與型態 36.4.4 帕累托最優 (Pareto optimality) 與應用 39第五節　競爭結盟中背叛風險的避免 41第三章　資訊專案糾紛之競合策略與處理架構 44第一節　資訊專案糾紛競合策略 44.1.1 TYPE ( I ) : 獨立競爭模式 45.1.2 TYPE ( II ) : 互動競爭模式 46.1.3 TYPE ( III ) : 獨立競合模式 47.1.4 TYPE ( IV ) : 互動競合模式 48.1.5 由獨立競合模式移向互動競合模式 49第二節　資訊專案糾紛處理架構 52.2.1 三大基礎要素 53.2.2 九大考慮要素 54.2.3 談判代表與立場 56.2.4 談判項目與權重 57.2.5 處理程序與最優化 58第三節　資訊專案糾紛談判構面與項目 63.3.1 資訊專案有形成本 64.3.2 資訊專案交易價值 69.3.3 資訊專案無形效益 70.3.4 資訊專案轉置成本 73.3.5 資訊專案競爭壓力 74第四章　個案運用與分析 75第一節 資訊專案糾紛個案背景說明 75第二節　由不合作階段轉向合作階段 78第三節　合作尋求最優化階段 80.3.1 規劃權重與喜好 81.3.2 排序與最優化 82.3.3 合作項目分析與建議 83第五章　結論與建議 84第一節　研究結論 84第二節　後續建議 86參考文獻 87目

An Analysis of the Role and Participation of Small Island States in International Climate Negotiations

全球暖化與氣候變遷為本世紀人類所要面臨的重大挑戰，從1979年第一屆世界氣候變遷會議(WCC)至今國際氣候談判已受到各方高度的關注。國際氣候談判本身為國際多方談判，因為談判參與者眾多、談判議題範圍廣、牽涉到許多其他議題、並且有賴於科學證據的輔佐…等特性，造成過程與策略的複雜性。而參與談判的各國因為立場與目標的不同，使得達成共識促成合作的過程變的更加複雜，各國之間更難以達成共識。在各國家當中，受氣候影響最大的莫過於小島嶼國家以及低窪的海岸國家。據聯合國統計，全世界共有51個小島嶼開發中國家(Small Island Developing States, SIDS)與地區，這些國家加起來的溫室氣體排放不到全球的0.1%，但卻面臨氣候變化最劇烈的衝擊，威脅到最根本的安全及生存。這些島嶼國家本身權力弱小以及資源稀少，在國際談判上容易被邊緣化，要影響國際政策十分困難，如何在國際中發聲，並進一步影響國際氣候政策，為小島嶼國家的重大挑戰。過去研究談判多為雙邊談判，多邊談判是談判理論中發展較慢的領域，本文從多方談判的角度，分析在本身權力弱小、容易被邊緣化的小島嶼國家，如何在國際談判中參與以及影響國際建制，用以觀察小國如何在氣候變遷談判上發揮作用，與大國抗衡以及合作，捍衛自己本身的環境安全。本文將從國際氣候談判的背景脈絡下，分析小島嶼國家的共同特性、談判過程、參與談判的方式，以及分析小島嶼國家從1987-2005年間在國際氣候談判下參與方式與所扮演的角色。 首先回顧國際談判理論與其相關研究，整理歸納出國際談判研究的重要發展、談判的構成要件與分析談判的影響因素。接著，回顧國際氣候談判的相關研究，以了解在氣候談判中影響談判的重要議題與因素，最後，作者找出近年來國際間對於小島嶼國家氣候談判的相關研究，包含了科學性的分析、調適行動研究、以及小島嶼國家氣候談判的相關研究。 在第三章中，本文從國際氣候談判的背景分析，整理出全球氣候談判的主要歷史脈絡與重要建制，並且從中歸納出國際氣候談判的主要五點特性：國際多邊談判、以科學研究為基礎、議題連結與議題去階級化、公平性與正義為爭議焦點、以發展合作為核心。 在第四章中，分析小島嶼國家的性質，介紹小島嶼國家在多方談判中的結盟:「小島嶼國家聯盟」(AOSIS)，並整理歸納小島連盟談判的主要訴求和原則。最後從國際氣候談判的特性來分析小島嶼國家的策略運用。 第五章為本論文的研究重點，為小島嶼國家談判過程與談判論述的分析。在談判過程中，學生將談判過程分為三個階段：談判前置期、方案形成期、細節階段期，根據階段性任務的不同分析各階段小島嶼國家的各類行動與成果。在談判論述中，學生整理出了四個小島嶼國家最主要的談判論述，分別為：以科學研究為依據、將氣候議題從新框架、強調公平性與正義、訴諸人權與道德。 第六章的結論為本文的研究發現，整理分析出小島嶼國家在國際氣候談判下所面臨的困難與挑戰、所使用的參與方式、所倡議的談判論述以及在當中所扮演的角色。最後提出對於小島嶼國家在氣候談判中的未來展望。Global climate change is a crisis that emerged in the 20th century, and rising temperatures are causing abnormal phenomena. Heat waves, hurricanes and other catastrophes are rapidly changing and threatening human life. Global environmental problems pose significant diplomatic and legal challenges to the international community, the nature of these problems requires an unprecedented degree of international cooperation achieved through multilateral negotiation, but multilateral negotiation is a very complicated process and often fails to reach a consensus. An understanding of multilateral negotiation requires the consideration of many factors which might affect the process and the results of negotiation, such as numbers of participants, the wide range of actors and interest and the complexity of the issues. Furthermore, scientific uncertainty makes the negotiation of climate change more difficult. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was signed by some 153 countries in 1992, and Kyoto Protocol, which was signed in 1997, are two of the most important regime of climate change negotiation. For many small island states, climate change is an urgent problem that threatens their very survival; and goes directly to the roots of sustainability. According to United Nation (U.N.), there are 51 small island developing states and regions (SIDs) in the world; for these kind of low lying states, not only will their social-economic viability be compromised, but also the risks from sea level rise threaten their physical existence, as they would very easily be inundated by sea levels in excess of one meter above current levels. Because of their weak diplomatic power and scarce resources, these small island states are vulnerable to marginalization in international negotiations, and it’s difficult for them to influence the international policies. The threat of climate change has motivated 43 lowland and small island states to align themselves into the Alliance of the Small Island States(AOSIS), and the delegates of AOSIS have actively participated in international climate change conferences and informal sessions. The motive of this project is to find out how the small island states participated in international climate change conferences and negotiations from 1987 to 2005, and what kind of roles they played in the process. This thesis uses multilateral negotiation thesis to characterize, develop, and analyze the negotiation process and negotiation agreements. By analyzing the difficulties and challenges which the AOSIS face, the ways they participate, the issues and agreements they propose and the roles they play to know how relatively weaker states or alliances can be able to confront another party hat is militarily or economically more powerful to reach its objectives and how they impact the climate regimes

The Study of Piscatorial Negotiations Between Taiwan And Japan

台日漁業糾紛由來已久，不僅影響漁民生計至鉅，亦是政府對外主權宣示的指標性意義。國內各界對此漁權談判殷望甚切，尤其是漁場是漁民的命脈，絕對不容失去的國土，而日方並無共享漁場的意願。 筆者在此，深入了解並作分析台日兩國從觀點到處理態度，解決問題的策略，由談判理論角度去看整個台日漁權談判之發展始末。 研究結果發現，這些談判本質及政府立場堅決程度，採用的策略是決定整個談判成敗的關鍵。除此之外亦希望本文提供對台日漁權談判的諸多了解。The Taiwan and Japan Piscatorial Power dispute is long-standing. It not only greatly affects the fishermen's livelihood , also the represents significance declared by the government foreign sovereignty. The domestic party has great hope in this Piscatorial Power Negotiations, in particular the Piscatorial is fisherman''s life, does not allow to lose the territory, but the Japanese side does not wish to share the fishery. The author analyzes both countries from the viewpoint to the processing attitude deeply, solves the question strategy, looks at development of Taiwan and Japan Piscatorial power negotiations from beginning to end by the negotiations theory. The research result discovered that these negotiations essence and the government's firm position, the strategy is affected the negotiations success or failure. In addition, also hoped that this article provides many understandings to Taiwan and Japan Piscatorial power negotiations.第一章 緒論 第一節 研究動機………………………………………………………1 第二節 研究目的………………………………………………………3 第三節 研究問題………………………………………………………5 第四節 研究方法………………………………………………………6 第五節 研究架構………………………………………………………8 第六節 章節安排 ……………………………………………………11 第二章 文獻回顧 第一節 談判之研究途徑 ……………………………………………13 第二節 國際海洋法 …………………………………………………22 第三節 日本佔領釣魚台策略及法理依據分析 ……………………28 第三章 台、日兩國漁權爭議之發展 第一節 台日兩國政府之間釣魚台爭端沿革 ………………………34 第二節 台日兩國政府、民間立場及影響力 ………………………41 第三節 歷次台日兩國漁權談判過程 ………………………………46 第四章 二階賽局理論之談判分析 第一節 台日漁權談判之理論適用性 ………………………………62 第二節 前十五次雙方政府談判模式 ………………………………63 第三節 台日雙方談判的結構分析 …………………………………66 第伍章 結論與建議. 第一節 研究發現 ……………………………………………………75 第二節 政策建議與省 ………………………………………………77 參考書目 ………………………………………………………………84 圖 表 目 次 圖 1-1 中華民國第一批領海基線、領海及鄰接區外界圖…………4 圖 1-2 二階談判分析之圖形…………………………………………9 圖 3-1 台、日雙方對釣魚台群島名稱對照圖………………………38 圖3-2 台、日雙方不同認定之中線位置圖 …………………………52 圖 3-3 台日漁業談判爭執區域圖 ………………………………… 54 圖 4-1台日兩國漁權二階談判模式 …………………………………63 圖 4-2台日兩國漁權二階談判結構特性 ……………………………66 表 3-1 歷次台日漁業會談時間地點一覽 …………………………47 表 3-2 台日漁權前十四次談判內容整 ……………………………49 表 3-3 台日漁權第十五次談判內容整 …………………………57 表 3-4 台日雙方歷屆爭執焦點 ……………………………………59 表 3-5 釣魚台問題三地政府、民間立場態度 ……………………60 表 4-1 台日漁權談判面向歸屬表 …………………………………6

The Negotiation of Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: A Perspective of Two-Level Games

In 2003, there were only two members in the WTO who didn't have free trade agreements (FTA), and Korea was one of them. Nowadays, Korea has become the first country in the world that has signed FTA with America, European Union, and ASEAN. What is the reason that Korea progressed so much on the pace of concluding FTA? In order to figure out this question, the author wants to look at the FTA that Korea concluded with her third largest trade partner, America, and take it for example. Therefore, the author applied the Two Level Games Theory on the Korean-U.S.A Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Exploring into the win-set of Korea and America in the KORUS FTA, the negotiating and the ratifying process of KORUS FTA, and the means that both Korea and America adopted to make KORUS FTA comes into effect. The author adjusted Putnam's Two Level Games Theory, for the purpose of observing the negotiation of KORUS FTA, and taking win-set as the affecting key point. In this essay, author emphasized on analyzing the economic and politics factors of the win-set. Firstly, analyze the three composing elements of win-set, which are Korea and America's purposes of seeking FTA, the negotiating systems of FTA, and the stance of industrial interest group toward FTA. Secondly, probe into two key factors that affect the negotiation process, the comparative advantage and the negotiation tactic. Thirdly, observe the ways which statesman of Korea and America adopted, such as convincing, tying hands, compensation and reverberation, in order to get FTA ratified by the congress and come into effect. After exercised Two Level Games Theory to explore the successful experience of KORUS FTA, this research found that the element effecting the conclusion and implementation of FTA, including both economic aspect, such as comparative advantage; and the political aspect, such as negotiation and strategy tactics. Therefore, even the main purpose of concluding FTA is about reaching economic goal, political means is still an indispensable element.韓國在2003年時，仍是WTO會員國中尚未簽訂自由貿易協定（Free Trade Agreements，FTAs）的兩個國家之一，今日她卻成了全球第一個與美國、歐盟和東協皆成功簽訂FTA的國家。何以韓國在簽訂FTA的速度上，出現如此大幅的進展？為了解此問題，筆者希望以韓國與第三大貿易夥伴國美國所簽定的韓美FTA（KORUS FTA）為例，運用雙層賽局此一談判理論，分別從韓、美兩國在KORUS FTA中的勝利集合、簽訂FTA的談判經過、FTA的國會批准階段，以及兩國成功讓FTA生效的手段等方面進行探討。 筆者將普南的雙層賽局理論做了調整，使之更適用於觀察KORUS FTA談判。在經過調整的雙層賽局理論中，筆者同樣將「勝利集合」（win-set）視為影響FTA談判的關鍵，並將重點放在分析影響勝利集合的經濟和政治因素。首先針對影響勝利集合的三大構成要素，韓、美兩國洽簽FTA的目的、FTA的談判體制，與產業團體的立場進行分析。接著探討談判過程中影響FTA能否成功簽訂的兩大關鍵，「比較優勢」（comparative advantage）與談判策略。最後再觀察兩國政府官員為了使FTA獲得國會批准並生效，所使用的方式，如「說服」、「自縛」，與「補償」和「反射」等策略。 本研究運用雙層賽局理論來探究韓美FTA成功的經驗後發現，影響FTA簽訂與生效的因素，除了經濟上的比較優勢之外，尚有政治層面的談判策略因素。可見，即使在以達成經濟目的為主的FTA談判中，政治手段仍是不可或缺的要素。第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究途徑與方法 11 第三節 研究問題與假設 20 第四節 研究架構 21 第五節 研究範圍與限制 22 第六節 文獻回顧 24 第二章 FTA戰略及歷史 41 第一節 韓國的FTA戰略及歷史 41 第二節 美國的FTA戰略及歷史 51 第三節 韓國與美國的相似及相異處 68 第三章 KORUS FTA談判的勝利集合 73 第一節 韓國的勝利集合 73 第二節 美國的勝利集合 83 第三節 韓國與美國的勝利集合交集處 94 第四章 KORUS FTA談判階段的雙層賽局 101 第一節 談判過程中的國內限制與國際限制 101 第二節 談判過程的讓步與自縛 104 第三節 KORUS FTA談判的結果 113 第五章 受勝利集合影響的國會批准過程 129 第一節 使協定獲得批准並生效的策略 129 第二節 被迫重啟談判的KORUS FTA 136 第三節 終獲國會批准的FTA 151 第六章 結論 155 第一節 研究發現 155 第二節 雙層賽局理論在應用上的侷限 164 第三節 未來展望 166 參考資料 16