Warranted Diagnosis

A diagnostic process is an investigative process that takes a clinical picture as input and outputs a diagnosis. We propose a method for distinguishing diagnoses that are warranted from those that are not, based on the cognitive processes of which they are the outputs. Processes designed and vetted to reliably produce correct diagnoses will output what we shall call ‘warranted diagnoses’. The latter are diagnoses that should be trusted even if they later turn out to have been wrong. Our work is based on the recently developed Cognitive Process Ontology and further develops the Ontology of General Medical Science. It also has applications in fields such as intelligence, forensics, and predictive maintenance, all of which rely on vetted processes designed to secure the reliability of their outputs

Minimalism And The Limits Of Warranted Assertability Maneuvers

Contextualists and pragmatists agree that knowledge-denying sentences are contextually variable, in the sense that a knowledge-denying sentence might semantically express a false proposition in one context and a true proposition in another context, without any change in the properties traditionally viewed as necessary for knowledge. Minimalists deny both pragmatism and contextualism, and maintain that knowledge-denying sentences are not contextually variable. To defend their view from cases like DeRose and Stanley's high stakes bank case, minimalists like Patrick Rysiew, Jessica Brown, and Wayne Davis forward ‘warranted assertability maneuvers.’ The basic idea is that some knowledge-denying sentence seems contextually variable because we mistake what a speaker pragmatically conveys by uttering that sentence for what she literally says by uttering that sentence. In this paper, I raise problems for the warranted assertability maneuvers of Rysiew, Brown, and Davis, and then present a warranted assertability maneuver that should succeed if any warranted assertability maneuver will succeed. I then show how my warranted assertability maneuver fails, and how the problem with my warranted assertability maneuver generalizes to pragmatic responses in general. The upshot of my argument is that, in order to defend their view from cases like DeRose and Stanley's high stakes bank case, minimalists must prioritize the epistemological question whether the subjects in those cases know over linguistic questions about the pragmatics of various knowledge-denying sentences

Are Skeptical Doubts about Ground Warranted?

No. More carefully: apparently not. [This piece was published in the Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Ground (2020), edited by Michael J. Raven with the title "Anti-Skeptical Rejoinders", pp. 180-193

"State Policies and the Warranted Growth Rate"

This paper raises questions about austerity policies by investigating the effects of the state's tax and expenditure policies on the warranted growth rate. It proposes two mechanisms to raise the warranted growth rate in the event that there is long-run unemployment. First, it incorporates Pasinetti's taxation function into Harrod's growth framework to show how, with an unbalanced budget, an increase in any kind of tax rate, including the tax rate on profits, will raise the warranted path. Such a policy can be accompanied by an increase in aggregate government spending. Second, by introducing a public investment function and, following Keynes, by assuming that the government's expenditures are split into a current and a capital budget, it shows that an increase in capacity-augmenting investment by state enterprises can also raise the warranted path. In other words, judicious tax and expenditure policies provide the basis for increases in government spending, including a greater degree of capacity-augmenting public investment. The paper thus formalizes Keynes's proposals regarding the socialization of investment and shows how this can be accomplished via appropriate compositional changes in government spending and taxation policies.

Causation in perspective: are all causal claims equally warranted?

In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all causal claims would be equally warranted

Is the term "type-1.5 superconductivity" warranted by Ginzburg-Landau theory?

It is shown that within the Ginzburg-Landau (GL) approximation the order parameters Delta1(r, T) and Delta2(r, T) in two-band superconductors vary on the same length scale, the difference in the zero-T coherence lengths xi0_i ~vF_i/Delta_i(0), i = 1, 2 notwithstanding. This amounts to a single physical GL parameter kappa and the classic GL dichotomy: kappa < 1/sqrt(2) for type-I and kappa > 1/sqrt(2) for type-II.Comment: 5 pages, revised and extended version; previous title "Two-band superconductors near Tc" change

Non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs—changes in prescribing may be warranted

No abstract available