Supraconscious

This paper tries to identify the missing link in between human consciousness and unconsciousness processes as precursors of self-development. Further through boundless and countless holistic representation to reality projecting upon the worst humanitarian crisis it offers an insight to derive the desirable solution to it, mainly with human-environment consciousness

Relativity of a Free Will Concept Depending on Both Conscious Indeterminism and Unconscious Determinism

Free will is difficult to classify with respect to determinism or indeterminism, and its phenomenology in consciousness often shows both aspects. Initially, it is felt as unlimited and indeterminate will power, with the potentiality of multiple choices. Thereafter, reductive deliberation is led by determinism to the final decision, which realises only one of the potential choices. The reductive deliberation phase tries to find out the best alternative and simultaneously satisfying vague motivations, contextual conditions and personal preferences. The essential sense of free will is the introduction of personal preferences, which allows a higher diversity of reactions to vague motivations. With an oversimplified model of determinism as a chain of events, incompatibilists define “free” as “undetermined” so that determinism becomes incompatible with any free choice between alternatives. In consciousness, free will requires a more complex model of network determinism as well as the consideration of unconsciousness as a causal factor. When “free” defined as “undetermined” is applied to the context of consciousness, it should be reinterpreted as “unconscious of being determined” or not aware of underlying determinism. Lacking information on determinism generates a feeling of “free” in consciousness and, therefore, gives the impression of indeterminism. Lacking information may be induced by an uncertain future without determined events—an unconscious past with biological reactions suddenly emerging from the unconsciousness or an unknown present unable to distinguish determinism of complex events. Therefore, at the level of human consciousness, the experience of free will is associated with apparent indeterminism although it is based on unconscious determinism. The concepts of compatibilism and incompatibilism are only two different aspects of the same phenomenon and correspond to consciousness and unconsciousness. Nevertheless, they can be considered together with a free will concept based on relativity depending on two different reference frames—the first person’s experience frame or the Laplace’s demon frame with knowledge on every molecule of the universe. Only relativity of the free will concept avoids the contradiction between “free” and “unfree” for the same phenomenon and could be a compromise for considering compatibilism and incompatibilism equally

Assessment of the effectiveness of head only and back-of-the-head electrical stunning of chickens

The study assesses the effectiveness of reversible head-only and back-of-the-head electrical stunning of chickens using 130–950 mA per bird at 50 Hz AC

Chaos-modified detrended moving average methodology for monitoring the depth of anaesthesia

This paper proposes a new method to monitor the depth of anaesthesia (DoA) based on the EEG signal. This approach firstly uses discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to to remove the spikes and the low frequency noise from raw EEG signals. After de-noising the EEG signals, the modified Hurst parameter is proposed with two new indices (CDoA and CsDoA), to estimate the anaesthesia states of the patients. To reduce the fluctuation of the new DoA index, a combination of Modified Chaos and Modifying Detrended Moving Average is used (MC-DMA). Analyses of variance (ANOVA) for C-MDMA and BIS distributions are presented The results indicate that the C-MDMA distributions at each anaesthesia state level are significantly different and the C-MDMA can distinguish five depths of anaesthesia. Compared with BIS trends, MC-DMA trend is close to BIS trend covering the whole scale from 100 to 0 with a full recording time

Assessment of the effectiveness of head only and back-of-the-head electrical stunning of chickens

The study assesses the effectiveness of reversible head-only and back-of-the-head electrical stunning of chickens using 130–950 mA per bird at 50 Hz AC

Modelling general anaesthesia as a first-order phase transition in the cortex

Since 1997 we have been developing a theoretical foundation for general anaesthesia. We have been able to demonstrate that the abrupt change in brain state broughton by anaesthetic drugs can be characterized as a first-order phase transition in the population-average membrane voltage of the cortical neurons. The theory predicts that, as the critical point of phase-change into unconsciousness is approached, the electrical fluctuations in cortical activity will grow strongly in amplitude while slowing in frequency, becoming more correlated both in time and in space. Thus the bio-electrical change of brain-state has deep similarities with thermodynamic phase changes of classical physics. The theory further predicts the existence of a second critical point, hysteretically separated from the first, corresponding to the return path from comatose unconsciousness back to normal responsiveness. There is a steadily accumulating body of clinical evidence in support of all of the phasetransition predictions: low-frequency power surge in EEG activity; increased correlation time and correlation length in EEG fluctuations; hysteresis separation, with respect to drug concentration, between the point of induction and the point of emergence

Personhood, consciousness, and god : how to be a proper pantheist

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018In this paper I develop a theory of personhood which leaves open the possibility of construing the universe as a person. If successful, it removes one bar to endorsing pantheism. I do this by examining a rising school of thought on personhood, on which persons, or selves, are understood as identical to episodes of consciousness. Through a critique of this experiential approach to personhood, I develop a theory of self as constituted of qualitative mental contents, but where these contents are also capable of unconscious existence. On this theory, though we can be conscious of our selves, consciousness turns out to be inessential to personhood. This move, I then argue, provides resources for responding to the pantheist’s problem of God’s person.Peer reviewedFinal Accepted Versio