PS-TRUST: Provably Secure Solution for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions

Truthful spectrum auctions have been extensively studied in recent years. Truthfulness makes bidders bid their true valuations, simplifying greatly the analysis of auctions. However, revealing one's true valuation causes severe privacy disclosure to the auctioneer and other bidders. To make things worse, previous work on secure spectrum auctions does not provide adequate security. In this paper, based on TRUST, we propose PS-TRUST, a provably secure solution for truthful double spectrum auctions. Besides maintaining the properties of truthfulness and special spectrum reuse of TRUST, PS-TRUST achieves provable security against semi-honest adversaries in the sense of cryptography. Specifically, PS-TRUST reveals nothing about the bids to anyone in the auction, except the auction result. To the best of our knowledge, PS-TRUST is the first provably secure solution for spectrum auctions. Furthermore, experimental results show that the computation and communication overhead of PS-TRUST is modest, and its practical applications are feasible.Comment: 9 pages, 4 figures, submitted to Infocom 201

Characterizing the interplay between information and strength in Blotto games

In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to randomness. One of the two players knows the valuations with certainty. The other knows only a distribution on the battlefield realizations. However, the informed player has fewer resources to allocate. We characterize unique equilibrium payoffs in a two battlefield setup of the Colonel Blotto game. We then focus on a three battlefield setup in the General Lotto game, a popular variant of the Colonel Blotto game. We characterize the unique equilibrium payoffs and mixed equilibrium strategies. We quantify the value of information - the difference in equilibrium payoff between the asymmetric information game and complete information game. We find information strictly improves the informed player's performance guarantee. However, the magnitude of improvement varies with the informed player's strength as well as the game parameters. Our analysis highlights the interplay between strength and information in adversarial environments.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures. Accepted for presentation at 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 201

Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in metric games

We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with separable metric strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such metric game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension G is payoff secure. We also establish that if a uniformly payoff secure metric game G has compact strategy spaces, and if its mixed extension G has reciprocally upper semicontinuous payoffs, then G has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. We provide several economic examples of metric games satisfying uniform payoff security.Uniform payoff security, Nash equilibrium, discontinuous games, mixed extension.

Advanced and Secure Online Web-Based Auction System

The advance and secure online auctioning system is a versatile approach for facilitating lot-based online auctioning system. In this paper, we will describe how to build a safe and online advance auction website. The system has been built to be extremely scalable and capable of serving huge groups of bidders in a promotional event. You may browse deals and put bids on a secure server using the online auction system. The service provider is responsible for all shipping costs. The goal is to create a user-friendly auctioning platform where any goods may be auctioned and where bidders and sellers can receive value-added services. The items will be verified, and the site will provide a secure and safe experience for online users. Auction system is further divide into two different easy platforms in which one is special designed for only the developers to maintain and update the system according the current requirements and demands while another is specific for user-end platform. It is very efficient, secure and reliable for all types of bidders, buyer and sellers. Because of its reliability, efficiency and secure platform, it is not wrong to say that this auction system is unique and can differs from all other system which are also developed and designed for the purpose of auctioning

Determining Utility System Value of Demand Flexibility From Grid-interactive Efficient Buildings

This report focuses on ways current methods and practices that establish the value to electric utility systems of distributed energy resource (DER) investments can be enhanced to determine the value of demand flexibility in grid-interactive efficient buildings that can provide grid services. The report introduces key valuation concepts that are applicable to demand flexibility that these buildings can provide and links to other documents that describe these concepts and their implementation in more detail.The scope of this report is limited to the valuation of economic benefits to the utility system. These are the foundational values on which other benefits (and costs) can be built. Establishing the economic value to the grid of demand flexibility provides the information needed to design programs, market rules, and rates that align the economic interest of utility customers with building owners and occupants. By nature, DERs directly impact customers and provide societal benefits external to the utility system. Jurisdictions can use utility system benefits and costs as the foundation of their economic analysis but align their primary cost-effectiveness metric with all applicable policy objectives, which may include customer and societal (non-utility system) impacts.This report suggests enhancements to current methods and practices that state and local policymakers, public utility commissions, state energy offices, utilities, state utility consumer representatives, and other stakeholders might support. These enhancements can improve the consistency and robustness of economic valuation of demand flexibility for grid services. The report concludes with a discussion of considerations for prioritizing implementation of these improvements