Ozone: Efficient Execution with Zero Timing Leakage for Modern Microarchitectures

Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A number of approaches to mitigate timing-based side-channel attacks have been proposed including cache partitioning, control-flow obfuscation and injecting timing noise into the outputs of code. While these techniques make timing-based side-channel attacks more difficult, they do not eliminate the risks. Prior techniques are either too specific or too expensive, and all leave remnants of the original timing side channel for later attackers to attempt to exploit. In this work, we show that the state-of-the-art techniques in timing side-channel protection, which limit timing leakage but do not eliminate it, still have significant vulnerabilities to timing-based side-channel attacks. To provide a means for total protection from timing-based side-channel attacks, we develop Ozone, the first zero timing leakage execution resource for a modern microarchitecture. Code in Ozone execute under a special hardware thread that gains exclusive access to a single core's resources for a fixed (and limited) number of cycles during which it cannot be interrupted. Memory access under Ozone thread execution is limited to a fixed size uncached scratchpad memory, and all Ozone threads begin execution with a known fixed microarchitectural state. We evaluate Ozone using a number of security sensitive kernels that have previously been targets of timing side-channel attacks, and show that Ozone eliminates timing leakage with minimal performance overhead

Timing Side-Channel Attacks on SSH

In most secure communication standards today, additional latency is kept to a minimum to preserve the Quality-of-Service. As a result, it is possible to mount side-channel attacks using timing analysis. In this thesis we discuss the viability of these attacks, and demonstrate them by inferring Hidden Markov Models of protocols. These Hidden Markov Models can be used to both detect protocol use and infer information about protocol state. We create experiments that use Markov models to generate traffic and show that we can accurately reconstruct models under many circumstances. We analyze what occurs when timing delays have enough jitter that we can not accurately assign packets to bins. Finally, we show that we can accurately identify the language used for cryptographically protected interactive sessions - Italian or English - on-line with as few as 77 symbols. A maximum-likelihood estimator, the forward-backward procedure, and confidence interval analysis are compared