Posttraumatic Stress in Light Rail Operators

The purpose of this study was to examine the prevalence of light rail operators who report rail-related traumatic events which result in fear, helplessness or horror. Completed surveys were returned by 69 (64%) of 112 eligible operators. Seventy-four percent of the surveys were returned by men while 23% were returned by women. Thirty-two ( 46%) operators reported having experienced an actual traumatic event while 12 (17%) indicated having experienced a threatened traumatic event. The most frequently occurring and stressful events reported by light rail operators included: hitting and killing, hitting, or nearly hitting pedestrians and vehicles while operating the train. Results suggest operators who reported no traumatic event fall asleep easier at night compared to operators who reported an actual traumatic event. Seven ( l 0%) operators who reported a traumatic event ( 4 actual, 3 threatened) met criteria for PTSD as measured by the Civilian Mississippi Scale-Revised (CMS-R). Operators who met PTSD criteria reported they experienced significantly higher on items that assessed: intrusive memories of the event as well as more feelings of distress or anxiety when reminded of the event. Additionally, they reported significantly higher on items that examined: attempts to avoid reminders of the event, feelings of guilt over things they did during the event, feeling alert or on guard, and difficulty getting emotionally close to others. Operators who met PTSD criteria also more frequently indicated thoughts about quitting or leaving work. Finally, a significant positive correlation was found between quantity of near misses and stress of near misses when the scores of all operators were examined. Female operators reported significantly higher levels of stress related to near misses compared to male operators. These findings underscore the importance of ongoing research of the stress and coping reported by operators which can be incorporated in the training of light rail operators and education of the public to reduce the occurrence and negative effects of rail-related trauma

The use of social media by train operating companies: A study case analysis

Social media increasingly provides a tool for public transport operators to interact with users and non-users of their services and collect user-generated data. The high variance of information produced by large user communities makes social media a significant player in service-oriented markets. Indeed, micro-blogging has spread to the transport field as a means to provide time-sensitive information and to engage customers. Nevertheless, there is a lack of understanding on the policies and extent to which micro-blogging is used by public transport operators as they engage with their customers. Social media is a tool that can be used for engagement, however there is no analysis of its application by private rail operators. This paper addresses a gap in understanding regarding the use of social media among passenger train operating companies. In particular, it provides a case study on Twitter use by rail operators in the specific context of the UK; chosen as private train operating companies are only responsible for operating services rather than infrastructure planning. Specific aims clarify (i) the level and the type of stakeholder engagement through social media by private rail operators in Britain and (ii) how they use the micro-blogging tool to engage with their stakeholders. An analysis of five study cases on the use of micro-blogging by British passenger train companies is presented. Twitter is chosen as the social media application in the study cases as it is the only social media platform used by all British rail operators, as well as being seen as an information sharing platform rather than a purely social application. The paper shows evidence that Twitter use by train operators in Britain reflects a mainly information sharing function, however their policies and tweets indicate the use of Twitter for two-way stakeholder engagement. Recommendations based on the study cases are provided, reflecting the best practices for Twitter use by transport operators

Regulation and Deregulation in the Japanese Rail Industry

Schienenfahrzeugbau, Regulierung, Deregulierung, Japan, Railway vehicles industry, Regulation, Deregulation

Effects of bus-based disruptive business models with limited capacity on rail monopolies: Social welfare implications

Long distance passenger transport markets are facing important changes as new entrants, e-Platform based bus services retailer (PBSR) operators, are challenging the railway incumbents applying judo economic strategies. Traditionally, European policymakers tended to favour railway services over road services in the long-haul markets, often leading the rail operators in monopolistic-alike positions. Recently, several countries deregulated their national intercity bus markets, gradually introducing intermodal competition in the sector. The competition led to important improvements in service quality, but it also had negative impacts on rail operators’ profitability, especially after PBSR operators started to work, due to their disruptive business model based on aggregative online platforms and production externalization. PBSR companies (e.g. Flixbus, BlaBlaBus) are characterized by high flexibility and low production costs, which use as advantage against the incumbents. The rail operators are instead characterized by high indivisibility, high production costs and, usually, big sizes. Losses in either revenues or market shares could easily force them into reducing services quantity or even exit the market. Our paper aims to analyse these new competitive relations in the intercity intermodal market, focusing on resulting impacts on market shares, demand satisfaction and social welfare. Since the bus operators present limited capacity due to technical feasibility (e.g. minimum headway) and the need to limit road congestion (to preserve service quality), the mobility right fulfilment is put in jeopardy. We modelled the competitive relations through game theory, excluding high speed rail from the perimeter to preserve service comparability. Profit levels and optimal social welfare are then studied through simulations. Results confirm that for increasing PBSR production capacity, railway operators tend to have fewer profits or be forced to leave the market, resulting in unsatisfied demand. Furthermore, from a social point of view, the rail monopoly seems to be, under specific circumstances, preferred to a duopoly

Rail Privatisation: The Economic Theory

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relevance of economic theory to the rail privatisation proposals contained in the Railways Act 1993. After a review of the latest rail privatisation literature four major themes emerged: (1) Contestability and Barriers to Entry. (2) Franchising. (3) Vertical Integration. (4) Horizontal Integration. Following a short review of the rail privatisation proposals the paper presents each theme in the context of the proposals. In conclusion, we highlight a number of future issues which will require monitoring and research in the future. In particular, we identify a number of hypotheses, put forward by both those in favour and against the Government's proposals, that should be tested

THE PROVISION OF RAIL SERVICE: THE IMPACT OF COMPETITION

Grain transportation is one of the most important economic issues for grain producers in the Northern Plains. The reliance on export markets and the long distances to port position means that transportation costs have a significant effect on the price received by farmers. In the prairie region of Canada, rail transportation is undergoing a major transformation that will affect the competitive positions of agriculture in both the United States and Canada and influence the direction of grain flows between the two countries. Rail rates are no longer legislated although a cap is still in place), restrictions on branch line abandonment have been lifted, and further deregulation of price and car allocation is being considered. Some parties, including the railways, argue that a completely deregulated system, similar to the U.S. system, is the only way to achieve transportation efficiencies. Other groups, supporting the status quo, argue that the regulation of rates is essential to control the monopoly power of the railways. There has been very little discussion of other policy options, with the exception of a limited discussion of nationalized railbeds. The U.S. experience provides a stark view of the likely outcome of deregulation. When railways are not faced with competition from other railways or from other forms of transportation such as barges, the evidence suggests railways will price freight services at or near truck competitive rates. Freight rates in Montana, where no effective rail and/or barge competition exists, are approximately twice those at Kansas City and Denver/Commerce City, where such competition exists. The current cost-based regulated rates in Western Canada are similar to those at Kansas City and Denver/Commerce City. Given similar distances to port and the existence of only two railways (and no likelihood of new entrants), deregulation in Western Canada is likely to result in freight rates closer to those in Montana than to the current regulated level. The increase in freight costs will result in transfers from producers to the railways, distort production incentives, and create losses elsewhere in the economy. While maintenance of a regulated freight rate structure would address the freight rate issue, other problems would result. The lack of price signals reduces incentives for industry participants to perform. Branch lines are less likely to be maintained in a regulated environment because railways may be unable to charge the extra amount necessary to make them viable. Railways may also disrupt the system - as a form of bargaining - to create pressure for deregulation. This report explores the option of the government encouraging entry into rail service provision. Just as telecommunication companies are required to allow competitors to use their phone lines, existing railways could be required to make their track and switching equipment available to rail operators who wish to run train service on a line, on the condition that the access price covers the infrastructure cost. The paper examines the case of the British railway system where the ownership of the track has been separated from the operation of the rail equipment and the provision of service, and explores the applicability of this model to grain transportation on the Great Plains. In Britain, ownership of the track rests with a company called Railtrack (although Railtrack was government-owned, it has been privatized). Railtrack leases access to thirty train operators for fees that are regulated by the Office of the Rail Regulator to cover maintenance costs and provide a return on investment. The thirty rail operators then compete to provide service to customers. This model and others similar to it need to be developed and articulated before they can be considered in the public policy forum. Nevertheless, given the importance of rail transportation to the grain industry in the Northern Plains, it is imperative that options such as these be investigated to address the very thorny issue of freight rate and entry regulation.barriers to entry, competition, grain handling, grain transportation, monopoly, railroads, regulation, Public Economics, K2, L1, L9, L5,

Competition in Rail Transport: A New Opportunity for Railways?

Throughout Europe, and in many other parts of the world, railways are suffering from declining market share and deteriorating financial performance; consequently there is renewed interest in deregulation and the introduction of competition into rail transport as a way of improving performance. An EC Directive now provides for access to rail infrastructure for third parties to run their own international trains in some circumstances. After a long debate, the British Government in July 1992 published a White Paper (New Opportunities for the Railways) which aimed to go much further. It would both open access to the infrastructure for any licensed operator and franchise out existing passenger services via a competitive bidding process; all freight services would be privatised outright. Draft legislation to implement these proposals, as well as a string of consultation documents on details have also been published, and an Interim Report from the Select Committee of Members of Parliament examining the proposals has appeared. This paper review the debate that is currently raging over the British government proposals. It considers the potential for innovation and cost savings which they offer, as well as the problems of increased transactions costs, lack of competitive bidding and other potential inefficiencies of the new system. The key issue of the charging regime for access to the infrastructure is also addressed. It is concluded that competition in the provision of freight services is desirable, but that passenger services present many more problems, and that the proposals need modification if they are to meet their objectives

A rail network performance metric to capture passenger experience

For passenger rail operators worldwide a common concern is to better understand and improve passenger experience. Based on factors including train movement times and crowding, the Journey Time Metric and Disutility Metric can be used to quantitatively assess the journey experience of individual passengers. However an assessment of overall network performance is also desirable. This paper presents a whole-network assessment metric that captures passenger experience by aggregating and normalizing individual journey assessments. The newly developed metric is validated against customer satisfaction data measured in passenger surveys of the London Underground Limited Victoria Line with a statistically significant correlation (P < 0.005) between the predictions and the measurements. It is found that there is a high degree of correlation (ρ = 1.00, P < 0.005) between the network scores calculated using the new whole-network assessment metric with either the Journey Time Metric or Disutility Metric despite their different formulations and countries of origin. Through development of the new metric it is identified that many commonly used network assessment metrics (e.g. Public Performance Measure and the end-to-end journey time of passengers) are insensitive to crucial aspects of passenger experience. The newly developed metric could be used by rail operators to better select strategies for improving passenger experience

Rail Policy in the European Community.

This paper begins by considering the reasons why the rail sector has long been considered a problem in European transport policy. These concern both the degree of government intervention and subsidy, which conflicts with the aim of a free international market, and the loss of market share even in those sectors- especially international traffic - in which rail should in principle be able to compete. It explains how the economic structure of rail transport leads to a case for public monopoly provision, with regulation and subsidy, but poses the problem of reconciling this with the need for efficient operation. The history of regulation and control of the rail sector, and of past Community attempts to reform it is then briefly considered before attention is turned to latest Commission proposals on rail policy. These consist essentially of four measures. Two concern the specific need to provide a framework to encourage the development of an international network of high speed passenger and combined freight trains, and the only doubt about these rests on whether they go far enough to exploit the potential of these important and rapidly growing sectors of the rail market. A third comprises a further attempt to clarify the relationship between government and railway, with increased financial autonomy, realistic balance sheets and clearer contractual arrangements regarding subsidies and can be generally welcomed. But the greatest doubts must rest on the proposals concerning separation of the infrastructure from the operations. Whilst the rationale is superficially attractive, many reasons are cited to doubt whether it would be an efficient way of organising railway services in practice. As a way of promoting new entry in specific areas of operation, such as international freight, whilst leaving the bulk of operations in the hands of integrated companies, it has more to commend it, but even here there is reason to doubt whether the results would be better than a vigorous pursuit of joint venture operations