Optimal Initial Public O¤ering design with aftermarket trading.

We characterize the optimal pricing and allocation of shares in the presence of distinct adverse selection problems. Some investors have private information at the time of the IPO and sell their shares in the after-market upon facing liquidity needs. Others learn their private interest in the after-market, and sell their shares strategically. The optimal mechanism trades-o¤ informational rents and rents to strategic traders. Flipping facilitates truthful information revelation. When liquidity needs are likely, it is optimal to allocate all shares to investors informed at the IPO stage. Otherwise, some shares are allocated to those who trade strategically in the after-market.

The sequencing of stock market liberalization events and corporate financing decisions

We examine if the sequence of stock market liberalization events matters for corporate financing choices. We contrast firms who attain ‘investable’ status through domestic reforms with those who do so by issuing American Depository Receipt programs. We find that the first liberalization event prompts similar corporate responses regardless of the path followed. However, we find differential effects between firms who issue ADRs after realizing financial liberalization and those who use ADR initiations to achieve this status. Here, the sequence matters and the capital structure choices of the two groups are very different.Financing choices; Debt structure; Investability; Cross listing

On the robustness of international portfolio diversification benefits to regime-switching volatility

We examine if the benefits of international portfolio diversification are robust to time-varying asset return volatility. Since diversified portfolios are subject to common cross-country shocks, we focus on the transmission mechanism of such shocks in the presence of regime-switching volatility. Generally, market linkages are stable with little evidence of increased market interdependence in turbulent periods. Furthermore, risk reduction is consistently delivered for the US investor who holds foreign equity.Market comovement; Shift contagion; Financial market crises; International portfolio diversification; Regime switching

The Growth of Poor Children in China 1991-2000: Why Food Subsidies May Matter

height-for-age; child heath; growth; inequality; poverty; food subsidies; China

Investability and Firm Value

We study how investability, or openness to foreign equity investors, affects firm value in a sample of over 1,400 firms from 26 emerging markets. We find that, on average, investability is associated with a 9% valuation premium (as measured by Tobin's q). However, in firm-fixed effects regressions this valuation premium disappears, suggesting that investability does not have a causal effect on firm value. Analysis of the components of Tobin's q shows that firms that become investable experience significant increases in both market values and physical investment. These effects are strongest for firms that face country-level or firm-level financial constraints prior to becoming investableFinancial liberalization; Investability; Foreign investors; Tobin's q

Detecting shift and pure contagion in East Asian equity markets: A Unified Approach.

We test for contagion between pairs of East Asian equity markets over the period 1990-2007.We develop an econometric methodology that allows us to test for both 'shift'and 'pure' contagion within a unified framework. Using both Hong Kong and Thailand as potential shock sources, we find strong evidence of both types of contagion. Therefore during episodes of high-volatility, equity returns are influenced by changes in the transmission of common shocks and additionally by the diffusion of idiosyncratic shocks through linkages which do not exist during normal times.Shift contagion; Pure contagion; Financial market crises; Regime switching

MAKE-OR-BUY’ IN INTERNATIONAL OLIGOPOLY AND THE ROLE OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURE

We study how competitive pressure influences the make-or-buy decision that oligopolistic firms face between producing an intermediate component in-house or purchasing it from a domestic supplier. We model outsourcing as a bilateral relationship in which the supplier undertakes relationship-specific investments. A home and foreign firm compete in the home market. Firms’ mode of operation decision depends on cost and strategic considerations. Competitive pressure increases firms’ incentive to outsource. Consumer gains from trade liberalisation are enhanced when it leads to less outsourcing.Outsourcing, Vertical Integration, Trade Liberalisation, Oligopoly

An Efficient Estimator for Dealing with Missing Data on Explanatory Variables in a Probit Choice Model

A common approach to dealing with missing data in econometrics is to estimate the model on the common subset of data, by necessity throwing away potentially useful data. In this paper we consider a particular pattern of missing data on explanatory variables that often occurs in practice and develop a new efficient estimator for models where the dependent variable is binary. We derive exact formulae for the estimator and its asymptotic variance. Simulation results show that our estimator performs well when compared to popular alternatives, such as complete case analysis and multiple imputation. We then use our estimator to examine the portfolio allocation decision of Italian households using the Survey of Household Income and Wealth carried out by the Bank of ItalyMissing Data, Probit Model, Portfolio Allocation, Risk Aversion

Efficient Estimation of the Non-linear Volatility and Growth Model

Econometrics, Macroeconomics, Growth, Volatility

Tax uniformity: A commitment device for restraining opportunistic behaviour.

We investigate whether and to what extent uniform and differentiated tax systems diverge in their propensity to create distortionary opportunistic behavoiur. The set-up in which we carry out our analysis features polluting firms that are confronted with existence a Pigovian emission tax. Firms can invest in pollution abatement. We first show that the existence of emmission taxes, although optimally chosen, create strategic incentives for firms to distort their abatement investment. Second, we find that a system of differentiated emission taxes has a greater propensity to foster strategic distortions in abatement investment than a uniform emission tax regime.Uniform tax, Differentiated taxes, Emission tax, Short-run policy commitment, Pollution-abating investment, Strategic investment.