Can Generic Products Be Disparaged? The Of and Concerning Requirement after Alar and the New Crop of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes

Under the group libel principle, a statement broadly critical of a large group generally cannot give rise to a defamation claim; it is said that such a statement does not refer to, or is not of and concerning, any particular individual. This Comment addresses the extent to which the of and concerning requirement and group libel principle apply to claims of product disparagement, a tort similar to defamation but encompassing pecuniary injury, as opposed to damage to reputation, resulting from false statements. In particular, this Comment examines whether speech generally critical of a generic product can give rise to disparagement liability. Recent statutes provide for such generic disparagement claims by agricultural producers, and one court, in the litigation resulting from the Alar controversy, has held the group libel rule does not bar such claims. This Comment concludes that, in most circumstances, the of and concerning requirement cannot be satisfied without a specific reference to the allegedly disparaged product and that generic disparagement claims usually should be barred, for both policy and constitutional reasons

Reputational Injury Without a Reputational Attack: Addressing Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm

This Note examines the unsettled relationship between defamation and negligence. The law of defamation, through the torts of libel and slander, constitutes a well-developed and complex body of state common law and constitutional considerations. However, some claims for reputational harm may fall outside of this framework, as the law of defamation does not account for all of the ways that an individual’s reputation may be injured. Thus, plaintiffs sometimes bring negligence claims to seek redress for damage to reputation. When a plaintiff brings a negligence claim for pure reputational harm, the court is faced with a variety of options for handling the claim. This Note argues that courts should adopt a multistep approach to handling such claims. The court should first determine whether the claim is communication-based or not. If it is a noncommunicative claim, it should be allowed to stand as a simple negligence claim. If, however, the claim is communication-based, it should be presumptively displaced by the torts of libel and slander

Washington Law Review, Index, Volume 71, 1996

Consists of indexes by author, title, subject, and case name