Affective neuroscience, emotional regulation, and international relations

International relations (IR) has witnessed an emerging interest in neuroscience, particularly for its relevance to a now widespread scholarship on emotions. Contributing to this scholarship, this article draws on the subfields of affective neuroscience and neuropsychology, which remain largely unexplored in IR. Firstly, the article draws on affective neuroscience in illuminating affect's defining role in consciousness and omnipresence in social behavior, challenging the continuing elision of emotions in mainstream approaches. Secondly, it applies theories of depth neuropsychology, which suggest a neural predisposition originating in the brain's higher cortical regions to attenuate emotional arousal and limit affective consciousness. This predisposition works to preserve individuals' self-coherence, countering implicit assumptions about rationality and motivation within IR theory. Thirdly, it outlines three key implications for IR theory. It argues that affective neuroscience and neuropsychology offer a route towards deep theorizing of ontologies and motivations. It also leads to a reassessment of the social regulation of emotions, particularly as observed in institutions, including the state. It also suggests a productive engagement with constructivist and poststructuralist approaches by addressing the agency of the body in social relations. The article concludes by sketching the potential for a therapeutically-attuned approach to IR

Training models and status of clinical neuropsychologists in Europe: results of a survey on 30 countries

open10Objective: The aims of the study were to analyze the current European situation of specialist education and training within clinical neuropsychology, and the legal and professional status of clinical neuropsychologists in different European countries. Method: An online survey was prepared in 2016 by a Task Force established by the European Federation of Psychological Associations, and representatives of 30 countries gave their responses. Response rate was 76%. Results: Only three countries were reported to regulate the title of clinical neuropsychologist as well as the education and practice of clinical neuropsychologists by law. The most common university degree required to practice clinical neuropsychology was the master’s degree; a doctoral degree was required in two countries. The length of the specialist education after the master’s degree varied between 12 and 60 months. In one third of the countries, no commonly agreed upon model for specialist education existed. A more systematic training model and a longer duration of training were associated with independence in the work of clinical neuropsychologists. Conclusions: As legal regulation is mostly absent and training models differ, those actively practicing clinical neuropsychology in Europe have a very heterogeneous educational background and skill level. There is a need for a European standardization of specialist training in clinical neuropsychology. Guiding principles for establishing the common core requirements are presented.openHokkanen, Laura*; Lettner, Sandra; Barbosa, Fernando; Constantinou, Marios; Harper, Lauren; Kasten, Erich; Mondini, Sara; Persson, Bengt; Varako, Nataliya; Hessen, ErikHokkanen, Laura; Lettner, Sandra; Barbosa, Fernando; Constantinou, Marios; Harper, Lauren; Kasten, Erich; Mondini, Sara; Persson, Bengt; Varako, Nataliya; Hessen, Eri

Time to get rid of the 'Modular' in neuropsychology: A unified theory of anosognosia as aberrant predictive coding

Cognitive neuroscience, being more inclusive and ambitious in scope than cognitive neuropsychology, seems to have taken the place of the latter within the modern neurosciences. Nevertheless, recent advances in the neurosciences afford neuropsychology with epistemic possibilities that simply did not exist even 15 years ago. Human lesion studies still have an important role to play in shaping such possibilities, particularly when combined with other methods of enquiry. I first outline theoretical and methodological advances within the neurosciences that can inform and shape the rebirth of a dynamic, non‐modular neuropsychology. I then use an influential computational theory of brain function, the free energy principle, to suggest an unified account of anosognosia for hemiplegia as a research example of the potential for transition from a modular, cognitive neuropsychology to a dynamic, computational and even restorative neuropsychology. These and many other adjectives that can flexibly, take the place of ‘cognitive’ next to ‘neuropsychology’ will hopefully designate the much needed rebirth and demarcation of a field, neuropsychology itself, that has somehow lost its place within the modern neurosciences and yet seems to have a unique and important role to play in the future understanding of the brain

Imag(in)ing Neuro-Psychology: A Multi-Perspectival, Critical, Autoethnographic Study

Neuropsychology in the United States initially strove to diagnose brain damage. Recently, this diagnostic task has been largely usurped by the emergence of neuroimaging. Despite the encroachment upon the traditional territory of neuropsychology, neuropsychology has continued relatively unchanged. Personally encountering neuropsychology from the multiple positions of patient, family member, and training professional, I wondered about the forces operating that prevented neuropsychology from evolving. I speculated that unseen forces operated to keep neuropsychology stagnant and that the neuropsychologist\u27s function was largely unarticulated. I further speculated that the hidden functions involved very particular (problematic) relationships. This dissertation aims to begin to highlight those hidden forces in the service of creating more liberatory performances of neuropsychology. Using a multi-perspectival autoethnographic approach, and calling upon Judith Butler\u27s (1999) notion of performativity, I set out to explore the constructed role of neuropsychologists and neuropsychology patients. After exploring the position and function of the neuropsychologist, I sought to imagine new, more liberatory, performances of neuropsychology. With Butler\u27s (1999) performativity informing the way that I approach these questions, I turned to the experiences of my multiple selves on the neurobehavioral unit. I made use of the work of Foucault (1964, 1965, 1975) and Baudrillard (1995) in order to make sense of these experiences. I discovered that the neuropsychologist was valorized in contrast to the patient, repeating a process similar to that outlined in Foucault\u27s (1965) Madness and civilization. Further, I found that patients were stripped of the psychological and contextual, reminiscent of the living corpse characteristic of the anatomo-clinical phase in Foucault\u27s (1974) Birth of the clinic. I realized that neuroimaging was exalted to a god-like status, promising to ensure order and certainty. These false promises parallel the hyperreal of Baudrillard\u27s (1995) simulacra. Armed with this new understanding of the performances of neuropsychologists and their patients, I provide new performances – both fantasized and actual – that can offer hope to both neuropsychologist and neuropsychology patient

Wittgenstein and the memory debate

Original article can be found at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0732118X Copyright Elsevier Ltd. DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2008.04.015In this paper, I survey the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein’s elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein's reconceptions can be seen at work in its leading-edge practitioners. However, neuroscientists, generally, are finding memory difficult to demarcate from other cognitive and noncognitive processes, and I suggest this is largely due to their considering automatic responses as part of memory, termed nondeclarative or implicit memory. Taking my lead from Wittgenstein's On Certainty, I argue that there is only remembering where there is also some kind of mnemonic effort or attention, and therefore that so-called implicit memory is not memory at all, but a basic, noncognitive certainty.Peer reviewe

Twin Memory

In this article, I examine a new concept of “Twin Memory’ which has emerged in memory classification research of conscious and unconscious memory representations. It is to analyse the presence of twin memory among the various memory systems, and also to provide a platform for the twin memory “anatomy” in the field of cognitive science, neuropsychology and neuroscience

A developmental psychobiological approach to developmental neuropsychology.

Although both developmental psychobiology and developmental neuropsychology examine the interface between biological and psychological processes, they differ in conceptual framework. This article argues for the incorporation into developmental neuropsychology of certain aspects of the conceptual framework of developmental psychobiology. Three principles of dynamic psychobiological interaction are described and applied to four issues in neuropsychology (handedness, sex differences in behavior, critical periods, and modularity of structure–function relations). Then, it is proposed that developmental psychobiology can make four direct contributions to developmental neuropsychology. Finally, it is argued that the value of the conceptual framework provided by developmental psychobiology depends, in part, on how well it translates into procedures that can be applied in the clinical settings of the developmental neuropsychologist

Is Cognitive Neuropsychology Plausible? The Perils of Sitting on a One-Legged Stool

We distinguish between strong and weak cognitive neuropsychology, with the former attempting to provide direct insights into the nature of information processing and the latter having the more modest goal of providing constraints on such theories. We argue that strong cognitive neuropsychology, although possible, is unlikely to succeed and that researchers will fare better by combining behavioral, computational, and neural investigations. Arguments offered by Caramazza (1992) in defense of strong neuropsychology are analyzed, and examples are offered to illustrate the power of alternative points of view.Psycholog

The neuropsychology needs of a hyper-acute stroke unit

BACKGROUND AND AIM: Guidelines recommend routine assessment and management of mood and cognition after stroke, but little is known about the value or feasibility of providing neuropsychology input during the hyper-acute period. We aimed to identify and describe the extent and nature of neuropsychological needs and to investigate the feasibility of providing direct neuropsychology input within a hyper-acute setting. METHODS: Over a 7-month period, Multidisciplinary Team (MDT) members of a central London Hyper-Acute Stroke Unit (HASU) identified stroke patients who they believed would benefit from neuropsychology input, and categorised the nature of neuropsychology intervention required. We examined the demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients identified and the type of intervention required. RESULTS: 23% of patients (101/448) were identified as requiring neuropsychology input. Patients deemed to require input were younger, more likely to be male and more functionally disabled than those not requiring input. Cognitive assessment was the main identified need (93%) followed by mood (29%) and family support (9%). 30% of patients required two types of intervention. During a pilot of neuropsychology provision, 17 patients were seen; 15 completed a full cognitive assessment. All patients assessed presented with cognitive impairment despite three being deemed cognitively intact (> standardised cut-off) using a cognitive screening tool. CONCLUSION: We showed that direct neuropsychology input on a HASU is necessary for complex and varied interventions involving cognition, mood and family support. Furthermore, input is feasible and useful in detecting cognitive impairment not revealed by screening instruments