Money as a legally enforceable debt

Money is usually regarded as a subject in the domain of economists, but it is really a fundamentally legal notion. In fact, it is a creation of the law. Money is a special object of property, and at the same time a form of debt, enforceable by law which ultimately confers on it the quality of money. The concept of dematerialised property assists in describing the concept of money accurately. The article discusses the different types of money, and the creation of money through central banks and through commercial banks by giving credit. It explores the possible legal foundation of this money creation process. The discussion also looks at the legal regulation of money creation in Germany and presents findings from an interview with a practising commercial lawyer in Germany which confirm the author’s thesis that money is a legally enforceable debt

Banks As Social Accountants: Credit and Crisis Through an Accounting Lens

This paper probes the role of banks and credit in our socio-economic system using the metaphor of banks as social accountants (Stiglitz and Weiss 1988). It highlights the credit nature of money, and thus the fact that money is an accounting construct. This motivates the viewing of financial booms and crises through an accounting lens. By accounting necessity, credit creation in deposit-taking institutions implies debt creation. The analysis is that self-amortizing credit to the real sector grows apace with the size of the economy while credit to financial asset markets creates a net debt overhead on the real economy, as illustrated by dissection of long-term credit flows in the US economy. The long boom in credit to the financial sector so led to the growth of debt since the 1980s and onto the credit crisis. Turning to the behavioral aspects of credit and debt growth, the paper also discusses the role of banks and regulators in facilitating the boom. It identifies three ways in which debt growth was de-emphasized in monitoring and policy making.credit; economic history; banks; accounting; crisis; regulation

Beyond financial repression and regulatory capture. The recomposition of European financial ecosystems after the crisis

The financial crisis has radically and rapidly changed the political economy of the European financial system. The evolution of relations between European states and their respective financial systems has given rise to two competing narratives. On the one hand, government agencies are often described as being at the mercy of the financial sector, regularly highjacking political, regulatory and supervisory processes. This trend is often referred to as "regulatory capture" and would explain the "soft touch" regulation and bank bailout. On the other hand, governments are portrayed as subverting markets and abusing the financial system for their benefit, mainly to obtain better financing conditions and allocate credit to the economy on preferential terms, a trend called "financial repression" that is considered corrosive to the proper functioning of free markets and a source of capital misallocation. This paper takes a critical look at this debate in the European context. First, he argues that the relationship between governments and financial systems in Europe cannot be reduced to the polar notions of "capture" and "repression", but that the channels of pressure and influence between governments and their financial systems have often been two-way. Secondly, it puts these issues in a historical perspective and shows that the current reconfiguration of national financial systems in Europe is not simply a return to the "interventionist" policies of the past, although it is influenced by the path-dependency of national institutions and characterised by a broader political and economic role for public bodies (public credit institutions, financial supervision agencies, central bank, European relief fund, etc.)

Beyond financial repression and regulatory capture: the recomposition of European financial ecosystems after the crisis. LEQS Paper No. 147/2019 September 2019

The financial crisis has radically changed the political economy of the European financial system. The evolution of relations between European states and their respective financial systems has given rise to two competing narratives. On the one hand, government agencies are often described as being at the mercy of the financial sector, regularly hijacking political, regulatory and supervisory processes. This trend is often referred to as "regulatory capture" and would explain the "soft touch" regulation and bank bailout. On the other hand, governments are portrayed as subverting markets and abusing the financial system for their benefit, mainly to obtain better financing conditions and allocate credit to the economy on preferential terms, a trend called "financial repression" that is considered corrosive to the proper functioning of free markets and a source of capital misallocation. This paper takes a critical look at this debate and argues that the relationship between governments and financial systems in Europe cannot be reduced to the polar notions of "capture" and "repression", but that the channels of pressure and influence between governments and their financial systems have often been bi-directional and mutually reinforcing

ROMANIA IN A POST-CREDIT CRUNCH WORLD? A CAUTIONARY TALE FROM AUSTRALIA AND AMERICA

We present data on debt accumulation in Australia and the United States, and tentative data on Romania, to pose the question of whether Romania might experience a credit crunch as a result of the US subprime financial crisis. We develop a model of a credit crunch in a pure credit economy with endogenous money creation to show how changes in bank lending practices and borrower repayment behaviour can bring about an economic decline.Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, Debt Deflation, Financial Instability

"Is There Room for Bulls, Bears, and States in the Circuit?"

This paper takes off from Jan Kregel's paper "Shylock and Hamlet, or Are There Bulls and Bears in the Circuit?" (1986), which aimed to remedy shortcomings in most expositions of the "circuit approach." While some "circuitistes" have rejected John Maynard Keynes's liquidity preference theory, Kregel argued that such rejection leaves the relation between money and capital asset prices, and thus investment theory, hanging. This paper extends Kregel's analysis to an examination of the role that banks play in the circuit, and argues that banks should be modeled as active rather than passive players. This also requires an extension of the circuit theory of money, along the lines of the credit and state money approaches of modern Chartalists who follow A. Mitchell Innes. Further, we need to take Charles Goodhart's argument about default seriously: agents in the circuit are heterogeneous credit risks. The paper concludes with links to the work of French circuitist Alain Parguez.Circuit Approach; Liquidity Preference; Banks as Ephor of Capitalism; J. M. Keynes; J. A. Schumpeter; A. Parguez; J. A. Kregel; Chartalist; Modern Money Theory; State Money; Credit Money; Default