Japan\u27s War on Three Fronts Prior to 1941

This paper argues that Japan fought a three-front war prior to 1941. Japan not only fought China in the Second Sino-Japanese War, but conducted military operations against the Soviet Union. The third front occurred within Japan, as military factionalism prevented Japan from focusing on either China or the Soviet Union. By 1941, weakened through years of war, Japan focused their attention on French Indochina. This ultimately led to U.S entry into World War II

“Because We Were Japanese Soldiers : The Failure of Japanese Tactics at Changkufeng and Nomonhan and Lessons Left Unlearned

In their conflicts with the Soviet Union in 1938-1939, Imperial Japanese Army forces suffered a series of dramatic defeats at the hands of the Red Army, the descendant of an enemy they had been preparing to face since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. At the root of these military failures was the dramatic tactical insufficiency of Japanese army doctrine, which had not evolved to meet the combined arms threat of a modern opponent. Instead, relying on \u27spiritual superiority\u27 over firepower, they were forced to attack Soviet tanks with firebombs and operate continuously under the heavy fire of enemy artillery. Despite the disastrous results of Changkufeng and Nomonhan, however, the Japanese failed to take these lessons to heart, and consequently they would experience the same results on other battlefields as they did in these early conflicts

The Chinese market for American foodstuffs

US Government Printing Office Trade information bulletin, no. 277, 24 pages, including tableshttps://digitalrepository.trincoll.edu/moore/1009/thumbnail.jp

“Because We Were Japanese Soldiers : The Failure of Japanese Tactics at Changkufeng and Nomonhan and Lessons Left Unlearned

In their conflicts with the Soviet Union in 1938-1939, Imperial Japanese Army forces suffered a series of dramatic defeats at the hands of the Red Army, the descendant of an enemy they had been preparing to face since the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. At the root of these military failures was the dramatic tactical insufficiency of Japanese army doctrine, which had not evolved to meet the combined arms threat of a modern opponent. Instead, relying on \u27spiritual superiority\u27 over firepower, they were forced to attack Soviet tanks with firebombs and operate continuously under the heavy fire of enemy artillery. Despite the disastrous results of Changkufeng and Nomonhan, however, the Japanese failed to take these lessons to heart, and consequently they would experience the same results on other battlefields as they did in these early conflicts

Constructing a 'Manchurian' Identity: Japanese Education in Manchukuo, 1931-1945

This study investigates the creation and implementation of elementary and secondary education policy for Chinese-language schools by Japanese officials in the puppet state of Manchukuo. Using Manchukuo textbooks, education journals, and post-war memoirs, it examines the background of the policy-makers, the nature of the ideology they constructed, and the role language played in dissemination of the ideology. The study traces the efforts by the Japanese officials to create a new "Manchurian" national consciousness which they hoped would replace Chinese nationalistic identity among the majority Han Chinese. Originally they tried to shape this identity by employing familiar Chinese models which they expected would mask Japanese control. They used Confucian terminology and appeals to historical precedents to try to legitimize the creation of an independent northeastern state. In time, however, the weight of Japanese demands for empire-wide ideological orthodoxy led the Manchukuo leaders to abandon the Chinese models, and instead portray the state as client, dependent on the Japanese Emperor and in need of an injection of Japan's superior culture. Leading Japanese officials began to support forcing the Chinese to follow Japanese linguistic and ceremonial forms in hopes that it would cause them to appreciate and even willingly support the Japanese effort towards creating a unified Greater East Asia. In other words, their goals changed from securing an acquiescent population to creating willing allies, an effort in which they were ultimately unsuccessful. While the Manchukuo education bureaucracy supported the shift towards an emphasis on the Japanese language, as late as 1943 they resisted attempts at filling the curriculum with Japanese militaristic and imperial material, defying the current trend in Japan and Korea. This resistance was lead by a group of Japanese educators who were participants in the liberal "New Education movement" of the 1920s, who found in Manchukuo an opportunity to implement school reforms which had become impossible in the increasingly conservative atmosphere in Japan. Their success at keeping militaristic elements at bay demonstrates the Japanese empire was less monolithic than usually thought

Research & Development in the Telecommunication Industry in Prewar Japan -Automatic Telephone Switchboard-

The telephone system was not sufficiently developed in prewar Japan. This study examines the technological development of automatic telephone switchboard (ATS) to clarify the problems of telephone system in prewar Japan. Ministry of Communication(MOC) introduced automatic telephone system in 1923. From the standpoint of the telephone exchange service, it was a very opportune decision; however, it was technologically premature. Although they had conducted research on the system before WW1, their only choice was the primitive S ~ S system. Further, the dependence on import technology caused different A-type and H-type ATS to coexist. Each local telephone exchange district independently introduced a different type. The MOC had to prepare the specifications and parts for repair for two different systems. These factors hampered the improvement of the telecommunication quality. Standardizing the system by using independent technology became the biggest issue for the MOC in the 1930s. In the 1930s, some joint researches were organized with private enterprises. They tried to develop a gT-typeh or gElectronic Tube-typeh ATS. However, the T-type ATS was merely an improvement over the outdated S ~ S system with respect to the circuit design. On the other hand, Matsumae aimed at a novel technology, an electronic common control system. However, a suitable electronic tube was not invented. As a result, the telecommunication industry was unable to resolve the coexistence problem in the prewar period. However, the engineers of MOC and ATS suppliers recognized their technological backwardness and shared an awareness of the importance of standardization by independent technology. This was the starting point for the research and development system of the telecommunication industry in gPostwar Japan.hTelephone system, Automatic Telephone Switchboard, Ministry of Communication, Research & Development, Joint Research

Connected by conquest: East and Southeast Asia commercial integration during the Age of Empires

Programa de Doctorado en Historia Económica por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; la Universidad de Barcelona y la Universitat de València (Estudi General) Mención InternacionalPresidente/a: Christopher M. Meissner.- Vocales: Debin Ma.- Secretario/a: Jordi Domenech Feli