Targeting, rhetoric and the failure of grassroots jihad

In this paper I examine the apparent failure of Al Qaeda ideologues, not for want of trying, to incite a widespread campaign of ‘individual jihad’. Not only are instances of genuinely ‘leaderless’ jihadist violence rare, they also tend to be more discriminate and less lethal in their targeting than the operations which Al Qaeda expresses a discursive preference for, and which it attempts to carry out. I argue that an explanation for the rather constrained nature of grassroots jihadist violence can be found, rather paradoxically, in the logic of collective action, which seems to underlie the rhetorical attempts of jihadist ideologues to incite violence. I then briefly examine the possible implications of this for understanding what makes for a successful ‘leaderless’ terrorist campaign.Publisher PD

Automatic Detection of Online Jihadist Hate Speech

We have developed a system that automatically detects online jihadist hate speech with over 80% accuracy, by using techniques from Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning. The system is trained on a corpus of 45,000 subversive Twitter messages collected from October 2014 to December 2016. We present a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the jihadist rhetoric in the corpus, examine the network of Twitter users, outline the technical procedure used to train the system, and discuss examples of use.Comment: 31 page

Kittens and Nutella: Why Women Join ISIS

On February 18, 2015 CNN published a reported stating that Western women were leaving their homes to join ISIS because of a social media campaign featuring pictures of kittens and Nutella. This reported propagated the notion that women who join jihadist organizations are brainwashed or feeble minded. The reality is not so simple. This paper explores the motives women may have for joining ISIS through comparison to the motivations that drove women to partake in other violent jihadist organizations\u27 activities

An Exploration of Transportation Terrorist Stabbing Attacks

In his August 22, 2018 message to supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and [greater] Syria (ISIS), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi implored ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq as well as those on various jihadist fronts in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia not to be dismayed by military setbacks suffered by the Islamic State, but to continue fighting, confident that Allah would ultimately reward those who remained steadfast with victory. In the same message, he exhorted homegrown jihadists abroad— “the fierce lions in the lands of the Cross—Canada, Europe, and elsewhere” to carry out simple attacks within their limited capabilities that would nonetheless have great psychological impact because they would strike in the enemy’s homeland.Previous reports by the Mineta Transportation Institute have addressed bombings (see Suicide Bombings Against Trains and Buses Are Lethal but Few in Number and Explosives and Incendiaries Used in Terrorist Attacks on Public Surface Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis ). Car ramming attacks or what are sometimes called vehicular rammings have been the subject of more recent reporting. This report looks first at terrorist stabbing attacks against the public as a general phenomenon, and then examines stabbing attacks in public surface transportation venues

“Smashing Into Crowds” -- An Analysis of Vehicle Ramming Attacks

Vehicle ramming attacks are not new. But since 2010 Jihadists have urged their use. Is this the wave of the future, or a terrorist fad? To answer this and other questions the authors expanded and updated the database used in their May 2018 MTI Security Perspective entitled An Analysis of Vehicle Ramming as a Terrorist Threat to include 184 attacks since January 1, 1970. They also reviewed literature and examined some cases in detail. This MTI Security perspective indicates that while not new, vehicle rammings are more frequent and lethal since 2014, although the number of attacks seems to be dropping in 2019. Still it is too early to know if this is because of government countermeasures or because it is a fad that has come and gone. They also found that: (a) the majority of attacks occur in developed countries like the US and Europe; (b) though not more lethal than some other tactics they can be easily carried out by those who cannot get bombs or guns in a target-rich environment that is difficult to protect; (c) while Jihadists (responsible for only 19% of the attacks) have exhorted their use since 2010, it isn’t clear these calls have been successful -- instead the pattern of attacks suggest a kind of wider contagion; (d) attackers plowing vehicles into public gatherings and pedestrianized streets are the most lethal, particularly the attacks are planned and the drivers rent or steal large trucks or vans driven at speed; and finally, (e) government authorities cannot prevent these attacks but can and are doing things to prevent them and mitigate fatalities when they occur

Train Wrecks and Track Attacks: An Analysis of Attempts by Terrorists and Other Extremists to Derail Trains or Disrupt Rail Transportation

Attempts to sabotage rails and deliberately derail passenger trains have a long history in conventional and guerrilla warfare as well as during some particularly bitter labor disputes in the past. Since the 1970s, political fanatics have become a major adversary. Terrorists have sought to derail trains to achieve high-casualty events, while anarchists and issue oriented extremists have attacked rails to attract attention to their causes and impose economic damage. In this report, we examine the more than a thousand attempts to derail trains and to attack rail infrastructure to discern overall patterns and trends. We then look at four subsets of attacks in greater detail: those by India’s Maoist guerrillas; those by separatist insurgents in Thailand; those by various jihadist groups worldwide; and those by an assemblage of anarchists, environmental and similar cause-oriented extremists in Europe. How do these adversaries compare in terms of tactics, success rates, lethality, and other factors? Do their different objectives and circumstances affect their actions? Perhaps most important, is there evidence that they become more effective and lethal over time

Suicide Bombings Against Trains and Buses Are Lethal but Few

This Transportation Security Perspective is the sixth in a continuing series produced by the National Transportation Safety and Security Center of the Mineta Transportation Institute. These examine major terrorist attacks and trends in terrorists targeting surface transportation. Previous perspectives include the terrorist bombings in Volgograd, Russia; the assault on passengers at the Kunming train station in China; the security breach at Mineta San Jose Airport; and the reported plot against the Metro in Los Angeles, among others

Media discourse on jihadist terrorism in Europe

This article analyzes the manner in which European print media discuss jihadist terrorism in Europe. It presents key results from a qualitative analysis of media discourse following three selected attacks in seven European countries in 2010: the attack on the cartoonist Westergaard, the Yemen cargo plane plot, and the Stockholm suicide attack. The article finds that attack type is a factor shaping media discourse across different media in Europe. Considering that terrorists also aim to impact discourse for their own agenda, the article presents implications for policy reactions on the basis of attack type, and not as desired by terrorists.Publisher PD

Troubling Trends in Terrorism and Attacks on Surface Transportation: The Outlook Is Grim, but People Still Have a Great Deal of Control

This Transportation Security Perspective is the seventh in a continuing series produced by the National Transportation Safety and Security Center of the Mineta Transportation Institute. These examine major terrorist attacks and trends in terrorists targeting surface transportation

Mali: another European intervention without the EU?

As French forces are engaged in combat operations in Mali, even belated EU involvement remains crucial, to ensure that the intervention fits in with the political end-state that the EU rightly pursues