Sharing Information

Customers write book reviews for Amazon.com and rate stores at BizRate.com. Car drivers call up radio stations to report traffic jams or radar traps. In many cases individuals share their information to the benefit of an unknown group of recipients, even though doing so is costly for the provider. In contrast to a standard public good, providers have no immediate benefit from information public goods. The paper reports the results of an experimental study on information sharing under two payoff conditions (opportunity announcement and hazard warning) and two information conditions (anonymous and identified provider). The experimental results show a substantial degree of information sharing. Information on extreme opportunities and extreme hazards is significantly more often provided than information on moderate prospects. Identification only plays a role in case of extreme opportunities and not in case of hazard warnings.Information public good; online recommendation; consumer rating; word-of-mouth communication; altruism; other-regarding behavior

Information Sharing Games

In this paper we study information sharing situations.For every information sharing situation we construct an associated cooperative game, which we call an information sharing game.We show that the class of information sharing games co-incides with the class of cooperative games with a population monotonic allocation scheme.game theory

Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviour

More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games, the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emergence of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regard to content

Secret Sharing and Shared Information

Secret sharing is a cryptographic discipline in which the goal is to distribute information about a secret over a set of participants in such a way that only specific authorized combinations of participants together can reconstruct the secret. Thus, secret sharing schemes are systems of variables in which it is very clearly specified which subsets have information about the secret. As such, they provide perfect model systems for information decompositions. However, following this intuition too far leads to an information decomposition with negative partial information terms, which are difficult to interpret. One possible explanation is that the partial information lattice proposed by Williams and Beer is incomplete and has to be extended to incorporate terms corresponding to higher order redundancy. These results put bounds on information decompositions that follow the partial information framework, and they hint at where the partial information lattice needs to be improved.Comment: 9 pages, 1 figure. The material was presented at a Workshop on information decompositions at FIAS, Frankfurt, in 12/2016. The revision includes changes in the definition of combinations of secret sharing schemes. Section 3 and Appendix now discusses in how far existing measures satisfy the proposed properties. The concluding section is considerably revise

Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly

By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists’ information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost parameters gives the following trade-off in Cournot oligopoly. On the one hand, it decreases the expected consumer surplus for a given information precision, as the literature shows. On the other hand, information sharing increases the firms’ incentives to acquire information, and the consumer surplus increases in the precision of the firms’ information. Interestingly, the latter effect may dominate the former effect.Oligopoly, information acquisition, information sharing, Information structures, Consumer surplus

Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly

We study the incentives of oligopolistic firms to share private information on demand parameters. Differently from previous studies, we consider bilateral sharing agreements, by which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then pairwise stable networks of sharing agreements are either empty or made of fully connected components of increasing size. When linking is costly, non complete components may emerge, and components with larger size are less densly connected than components with smaller size. When signals have different variances, incomplete and irregular network can be stable, with firms observing high variance signals acting as "critical nodes". Finally, when signals are correlated, the empty network may not be pairwise stable when the number of firms and/or correlation are large enough.Information sharing, oligopoly, networks, Bayesian equilibrium