Information on Goods Delivery System Pt.garmen

Search duration data delivery warehouse staff needed to provide information to the staff of the seller if needed because the amount of work done so far with the manual method by warehouse staff, are obstacles that were found in a running system. other than that with this new system, the warehouse staff is no longer expected difficulties to obtain the required information, including the minimum inventory

Nonlinear pricing of information goods

This paper analyzes optimal pricing for information goods under incomplete information, when both unlimited-usage (fixed-fee) pricing and usage-based pricing are feasible, and administering usage-based pricing may involve transaction costs. It is shown that offering fixed- fee pricing in addition to a non-linear usage-based pricing scheme is always profit-improving in the presence of any non-zero transaction costs, and there may be markets in which a pure fixed-fee is optimal. This implies that the optimal pricing strategy for information goods is almost never fully revealing. Moreover, it is proved that the optimal usage-based pricing schedule is independent of the value of the fixed- fee, a result that simplifies the simultaneous design of pricing schedules considerably, and provides a simple procedure for determining the optimal combination of fixed-fee and non-linear usage-based pricing. The introduction of fixed-fee pricing is shown to increase both consumer surplus and total surplus. The differential effects of setup costs, fixed transaction costs and variable transaction costs on pricing policy are described. These results suggests a number of managerial guidelines for designing pricing schedules. For instance, in nascent information markets, firms may profit from low fixed-fee penetration pricing, but as these markets mature, the optimal pricing mix should expand to include a wider range of usage-based pricing options. The extent of minimum fees, quantity discounts and adoption levels across the different pricing schemes are characterized, strategic pricing responses to changes in market characteristics are described, and the implications of the paper's results for bundling and vertical differentiation of information goods are discussed.nonlinear pricing, screening, digital goods, information goods, fixed-fee, usage-based pricing, transaction costs

Determination of the bundle price for digital information goods

The fast emergence of Internet as a media to distribute digital information goods created many new opportunities for the packaging and pricing of these goods. The pricing of information goods introduces a challenge since the cost structure of information goods differs from that of conventional physical goods in that they can be costly to introduce but are relatively cheap to reproduce. The bundling strategy for digital information goods helps producers to extract more value from customers and can result in cost savings due to the presence of economies of scale. This study aims to determine the optimum price a producer of digital information goods has to charge for a bundle in order to maximize his gross margin. The bundle pricing model is constructed for both uniform and exponential distributions of the fraction of information goods in the bundle that has positive value for the customers

Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information

We investigate a simultaneous discrete public good provision game with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the latter they are. In the presence of complete information about individuals' valuations for the public good, the difference between the equilibrium outcomes of a subscription game and a contribution game is not significant. However, there is both casual evidence from the fund-raising literature and experimental evidence that subscription games are ``superior '', i.e., a refund increases the chance of providing the good given that it is efficient to do so. Our analysis shows that this is indeed the case in the presence of incomplete information. We compute a symmetric equilibrium for the subscription game and show that it is not necessarily efficient. This inefficiency stems from the difficulties arising in coordinating to overcome the free-rider problem in the presence of incomplete information. Although it is well known that informational disparities impose limits on the efficiency of outcomes, the novel feature of our analysis is to explicitly model the resulting trade-off --- when deciding how much to contribute towards the public good --- between increasing the likelihood of provision and creating incentives for free-riding by the other player. Moreover, we show that for the contribution game, ``contributing zero'' is the only equilibrium for a given range of the fixed cost of provision and for a family of distributions.public goods; incomplete information; continuous distribution