Strategy Logic with Imperfect Information

We introduce an extension of Strategy Logic for the imperfect-information setting, called SLii, and study its model-checking problem. As this logic naturally captures multi-player games with imperfect information, the problem turns out to be undecidable. We introduce a syntactical class of "hierarchical instances" for which, intuitively, as one goes down the syntactic tree of the formula, strategy quantifications are concerned with finer observations of the model. We prove that model-checking SLii restricted to hierarchical instances is decidable. This result, because it allows for complex patterns of existential and universal quantification on strategies, greatly generalises previous ones, such as decidability of multi-player games with imperfect information and hierarchical observations, and decidability of distributed synthesis for hierarchical systems. To establish the decidability result, we introduce and study QCTL*ii, an extension of QCTL* (itself an extension of CTL* with second-order quantification over atomic propositions) by parameterising its quantifiers with observations. The simple syntax of QCTL* ii allows us to provide a conceptually neat reduction of SLii to QCTL*ii that separates concerns, allowing one to forget about strategies and players and focus solely on second-order quantification. While the model-checking problem of QCTL*ii is, in general, undecidable, we identify a syntactic fragment of hierarchical formulas and prove, using an automata-theoretic approach, that it is decidable. The decidability result for SLii follows since the reduction maps hierarchical instances of SLii to hierarchical formulas of QCTL*ii

Solving Imperfect Information Games Using Decomposition

Decomposition, i.e. independently analyzing possible subgames, has proven to be an essential principle for effective decision-making in perfect information games. However, in imperfect information games, decomposition has proven to be problematic. To date, all proposed techniques for decomposition in imperfect information games have abandoned theoretical guarantees. This work presents the first technique for decomposing an imperfect information game into subgames that can be solved independently, while retaining optimality guarantees on the full-game solution. We can use this technique to construct theoretically justified algorithms that make better use of information available at run-time, overcome memory or disk limitations at run-time, or make a time/space trade-off to overcome memory or disk limitations while solving a game. In particular, we present an algorithm for subgame solving which guarantees performance in the whole game, in contrast to existing methods which may have unbounded error. In addition, we present an offline game solving algorithm, CFR-D, which can produce a Nash equilibrium for a game that is larger than available storage.Comment: 7 pages by 2 columns, 5 figures; April 21 2014 - expand explanations and theor

New results on pushdown module checking with imperfect information

Model checking of open pushdown systems (OPD) w.r.t. standard branching temporal logics (pushdown module checking or PMC) has been recently investigated in the literature, both in the context of environments with perfect and imperfect information about the system (in the last case, the environment has only a partial view of the system's control states and stack content). For standard CTL, PMC with imperfect information is known to be undecidable. If the stack content is assumed to be visible, then the problem is decidable and 2EXPTIME-complete (matching the complexity of PMC with perfect information against CTL). The decidability status of PMC with imperfect information against CTL restricted to the case where the depth of the stack content is visible is open. In this paper, we show that with this restriction, PMC with imperfect information against CTL remains undecidable. On the other hand, we individuate an interesting subclass of OPDS with visible stack content depth such that PMC with imperfect information against the existential fragment of CTL is decidable and in 2EXPTIME. Moreover, we show that the program complexity of PMC with imperfect information and visible stack content against CTL is 2EXPTIME-complete (hence, exponentially harder than the program complexity of PMC with perfect information, which is known to be EXPTIME-complete).Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2011, arXiv:1106.081

Implementing imperfect information in fuzzy databases

Information in real-world applications is often vague, imprecise and uncertain. Ignoring the inherent imperfect nature of real-world will undoubtedly introduce some deformation of human perception of real-world and may eliminate several substantial information, which may be very useful in several data-intensive applications. In database context, several fuzzy database models have been proposed. In these works, fuzziness is introduced at different levels. Common to all these proposals is the support of fuzziness at the attribute level. This paper proposes first a rich set of data types devoted to model the different kinds of imperfect information. The paper then proposes a formal approach to implement these data types. The proposed approach was implemented within a relational object database model but it is generic enough to be incorporated into other database models.ou

Distributed Stochastic Optimization under Imperfect Information

We consider a stochastic convex optimization problem that requires minimizing a sum of misspecified agentspecific expectation-valued convex functions over the intersection of a collection of agent-specific convex sets. This misspecification is manifested in a parametric sense and may be resolved through solving a distinct stochastic convex learning problem. Our interest lies in the development of distributed algorithms in which every agent makes decisions based on the knowledge of its objective and feasibility set while learning the decisions of other agents by communicating with its local neighbors over a time-varying connectivity graph. While a significant body of research currently exists in the context of such problems, we believe that the misspecified generalization of this problem is both important and has seen little study, if at all. Accordingly, our focus lies on the simultaneous resolution of both problems through a joint set of schemes that combine three distinct steps: (i) An alignment step in which every agent updates its current belief by averaging over the beliefs of its neighbors; (ii) A projected (stochastic) gradient step in which every agent further updates this averaged estimate; and (iii) A learning step in which agents update their belief of the misspecified parameter by utilizing a stochastic gradient step. Under an assumption of mere convexity on agent objectives and strong convexity of the learning problems, we show that the sequences generated by this collection of update rules converge almost surely to the solution of the correctly specified stochastic convex optimization problem and the stochastic learning problem, respectively

Imperfect Information, Democracy, and Populism

The modern world is complex and difficult to understand for voters, who may hold beliefs that are at variance with reality. Politicians face incentives to pander to voters' beliefs to get reelected. We analyze the welfare effects of this pandering and show that it entails both costs and benefits. Moreover, we explore optimal constitutional design in the presence of imperfect information about how the world works. We compare indirect democracy to direct democracy and to delegation of policy making to independent agents. We find that indirect democracy is often welfare maximizing.Imperfect information;beliefs;democracy;populism;accountabil- ity;experts