Family Capitalism Corporate Governance Theory

Family firms, which are prevalent around the world both for small organizations and large corporations, are usually more performant than other types of firms. This paper draws on altruism and on the theory of incentives contracting to explain why family firms perform better. Assuming that altruism only exists in family firms, we show that the strength of family ties has an impact on the optimal contract only under asymmetric information. Then, we extend the analysis to the principal-agent supervisor setting and prove that the recruitment of family members may be seen as a device against collusion within a three-tier hierarchy.Family Capitalism; Altruism; Family Ties ;Asymmetric Information;Supervisor Agent Principal; Collusion

Research and Prospect of Collaborative Governance Theory

With the deepening of public management reform, collaborative governance theory has aroused widespread concern in academia and has become one of the important research hotspots. This paper focuses on the definition of collaborative governance concept, the theoretical characteristics and the operational mechanism through systematical analysis of collaborative governance theory research. On the basis of three dimensions, the collaborative governance theory itself, the relationship between the collaborative governance and other elements and the specific application of collaborative governance theory, this paper puts forward the collaborative governance theory research prospects in order to promote the further integration and development of collaborative governance theory. Keywords: Collaborative governance, Research review, Research Prospect

Editorial: new challenges In theory and practice of corporate governance

The aim of international conference “New Challenges in Corporate Governance: Theory And Practice” is to move the field closer to a global theory by advancing our understanding of corporate governance, which combines insights from the literature on firm governance bundles with insights from the national governance systems literature, investigating new perspectives and challenges for corporate governance and outlining possible scenarios of its development

Raoul Beunen, Kristof Van Assche, & Martijn Duineveld, Evolutionary Governance Theory: Theory and Applications

Book Revie

Corporate Governance: Theory and Practice

no abstract è un libro

Fuzzy Logic and Corporate Governance Theories

[Excerpt] “Fuzzy logic is a theory that categorizes concepts or things belonging to more than one group. A methodology that explains how things function in multiple groups (not fully in one group or another) offers advantages when no one definition or membership in a group accounts for belonging to multiple groups. The principal/agent model of corporate governance has some characteristics of fuzzy logic theory. Under traditional agency theory of corporate governance, shareholders, directors, and senior corporate officers each belong to groups having multiple attributes. In the principal/agent model of corporate governance, shareholders are owners or principals; directors are shareholders and agents of the corporation; and senior corporate officers are directors’ agents, shareholders’ agents, and agents of the corporation. Each one functions within multiple groups serving multiple agency roles, and each owes fiduciary duties that vary depending on whose agent they are functioning as. Such a multi-dimensional role for corporate actors is a consequence of multi-definitional corporate purpose within agency theory of governance. This multi-dimensional group membership is not easily reconciled within agency theory and is therefore not always explained. However, traditional corporate governance theory can borrow another basic tenet of fuzzy logic theory. Fuzzy theory not only accounts for membership in multiple groups, but also explains how things work because they are multidimensional or ambiguous. This article seeks to explain the ambiguities of corporate governance theory and suggests a framework that accounts for the multi-agent role of senior corporate officers of public companies. It offers a kind of fuzzy logic theory for understanding the fiduciary duties of senior officers. The purpose of this article is to evaluate other models of corporate governance that account for the multi-agent role of senior officers of public companies and assess the ability of various models to hold senior officers accountable to the corporation.

Environmental Compliance, Corruption and Governance: Theory and Evidence on Forest Stock in Developing Countries

This paper analyses the relationships between environmental compliance, corruption and environmental regulations in the case of forestry. Using a Principal-Agent model, we highlight interrelationships between firm's environmental non-compliance and corruption conditioned to the efficiency of the legal and regulatory framework. Moreover, we show that environmental compliance and judicial efficiency may be complementary or substitutable depending on the level of judicial efficiency to strengthen the forest stock. After having design a new indicator of environmental compliance, we test these predictions using cross section data for 59 developing countries. The empirical results support the predictions of the model. Judicial efficiency reduces corruption and environmental non compliance which are positively correlated and conditioned to judicial efficiency. We also find empirical evidences on the substitutability and complementarity of environmental compliance and judicial efficiency to preserve the forest stock.corruption, Environmental compliance, Forest Stock, political economy, governance

Environmental Compliance, Corruption and Governance: Theory and Evidence on Forest Stock in Developing Countries

This paper analyses the relationships between environmental compliance, corruption and environmental regulations in the case of forestry. Using a Principal-Agent model, we highlight interrelationships between firm's environmental non-compliance and corruption conditioned to the efficiency of the legal and regulatory framework. Moreover, we show that environmental compliance and judicial efficiency may be complementary or substitutable depending on the level of judicial efficiency to strengthen the forest stock. After having design a new indicator of environmental compliance, we test these predictions using cross section data for 59 developing countries. The empirical results support the predictions of the model. Judicial efficiency reduces corruption and environmental non compliance which are positively correlated and conditioned to judicial efficiency. We also find empirical evidences on the substitutability and complementarity of environmental compliance and judicial efficiency to preserve the forest stock.corruption;Environmental compliance;Forest Stock;political economy;governance