118,837 research outputs found
Free Will Pessimism
The immediate aim of this paper is to articulate the essential features of an alternative compatibilist position, one that is responsive to sources of resistance to the compatibilist program based on considerations of fate and luck. The approach taken relies on distinguishing carefully between issues of skepticism and pessimism as they arise in this context. A compatibilism that is properly responsive to concerns about fate and luck is committed to what I describe as free will pessimism, which is to be distinguished from free will skepticism. Free will skepticism is the view that our vulnerability to conditions of fate and luck serve to discredit our view of ourselves as free and responsible agents. Free will pessimism rejects free will scepticism, since the basis of its pessimism rests with the assumption that we are free and responsible agents who are, nevertheless, subject to fate and luck in this aspect of our lives. According to free will pessimism, all the major parties and positions in the free will debate, including that of skepticism, are modes of evasion and distortion regarding our human predicament in respect of agency and moral life
Protean Free Will
This paper argues that free will is a purely theological issue, and offers an error theory for the free will debates in analytic philosophy in terms of evolutionary naturalism. I introduce 'protean free will' (PFW) as the ability to play mixed strategies effectively in noncooperative interactions. Thence, I argue that traditional worries about divine foreknowledge, Frankfurt controllers, moral responsibility, and determinism are side effects of selective pressures for unpredictability in our evolutionary past. Finally, I interpret the Libet experiments as showing an adaptive response to such pressures. I conclude that PFW does most things most philosophers want free will to do, conditional on the nonexistence of God
The Free Will Theorem
On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a
particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information
accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of
the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is
robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the
GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic. We also establish
the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications.Comment: 31 pages, 6figure
On Incompatibilist Free Will
We consider the possibility of defining some kind of activity which meets the intuitive requirements of incompatibilist free will. Our analysis of this will be done in a fashion which in some ways parallels the work of Pink on this matter. We will then consider the evidence of such free will, both from an introspective perspective and from a scientific perspective. In the latter we consider neurological and psychological evidence
The Reality of Free Will
The uniqueness of each viewpoint, each point of effect, can be "overcome" only by changing the viewpoint to other viewpoints and returning. Such an alternation, which can also appear as constant change, makes up the unity of the world. The wholeness of an alternation, however, is a consciousness structure because of the special relationship between the circumscribing periphery and the infinitesimal center. This process structure unites determinacy and indeterminacy at every point also totally. We are dealing, therefore, with forms of consciousness everywhere, with more or less freedom of choice and an increasingly unknown depth. We live in a world of choosing consciousness or better: awareness. In this respect, our environment expresses a deep truth about ourselves
Evolving Persons and Free Will
Human beings are masters of deception if they
want to appear superior to others and to suggest that they
have everything under control (see, e.g., Fingarette 2000,
Mele 2000). Such self-delusions might be advantageous,
because those are the most successful liars who believe
their own lies. Although it seems paradoxical at first (for he
who does not tell the untruth intentionally is, strictly
speaking, not a liar at all), it rests upon a much more
radical self-deception which is quite useful – a systematic
and continuous illusion regarding ourselves. Higher-order
forms of self-consciousness, namely I-consciousness, are
based on a feature which is called a self-model. This is an
episodically active representational entity (e.g. a complex
activation pattern in a human brain), the contents of which
are properties of the system itself. It is embedded and
constantly updated in a global model of the world, based
on perceptions, memories, innate information etc.
(Metzinger 1993). But because self-models cannot
represent their own representations as their own
representations as their own representations and so on ad
infinitum, they are semantically transparent, i.e. on the
level of their content they do not contain the information
that they are models. Thus, such systems are not able to
recognize their self-model as a self-model (Van Gulick
1988). The result is an ego-illusion, which is stable,
coherent, and cannot be transcended on the level of
conscious experience itself
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