Facts About Human Trafficking

Defines human trafficking and explains the United States’ efforts to limit it worldwide, with special reference to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 and 2003, which provides tools for the U.S. to combat trafficking in persons, both domestically and abroad. One of the key components of the law is the creation of the Trafficking in Persons Report

Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Annual Report, FY 2009

The Iowa Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) was created by an act of the Iowa legislature in 1967 with its purpose being to upgrade law enforcement to professional status. The specific goals were to maximize training opportunities for law enforcement officers, to coordinate training and to set standards for the law enforcement services. The Academy establishes minimum standards for Iowa law enforcement and grants officer certification. The Academy has the responsibility to de-certify or to suspend officer‟s certification when necessary

Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in Immigration Enforcement

This report presents findings from a survey of Latinos regarding their perceptions of law enforcement authorities in light of the greater involvement of police in immigration enforcement. Lake Research Partners designed and administered a randomized telephone survey of 2,004 Latinos living in the counties of Cook (Chicago), Harris (Houston), Los Angeles, and Maricopa (Phoenix).The survey was designed to assess the impact of police involvement in immigration enforcement on Latinos' perceptions of public safety and their willingness to contact the police when crimes have been committed. The survey was conducted in English and Spanish by professional interviewers during the period November 17 to December 10, 2012.Survey results indicate that the increased involvement of police in immigration enforcement has significantly heightened the fears many Latinos have of the police, contributing to their social isolation and exacerbating their mistrust of law enforcement authorities.These findings reveal one of the unintended consequences of the involvement of state and local police in immigration enforcement -- a reduction in public safety as Latinos' mistrust of the police increases as a result of the involvement of police in immigration enforcement

Competition law litigation in the UK courts: a study of all cases 2005-2008- Part I

It is clear from a cursory examination of the academic literature in the field that private enforcement is an established, well-developed and vibrant mode of enforcement of US anti trust law, constituting the preponderance of anti trust enforcement activity complemented by public enforcement by the DOJ and FTC. Historically, arange of factors have combined to ensure that private enforcement is effectively the default setting for antitrust enforcement in general, namely the wider litigative culture, the significant period of development of antitrust law and economics, and the specific characeristics of US civil procedure: the rules on discovery, the funding of actions, the availability of class actions and the existence of treble damages actions, together with clarification(and modification)of the legal position in relation to issues such as the passing on defence and standing for indirect purchasers

How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing it with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration

The United States is becoming more like Europe, and not in a good way. For a long time, the central difference between antitrust enforcement in the United States and Europe has been that the United States features not only public enforcement, but a vigorous system of private antitrust enforcement, while in Europe, public agencies have had an effective monopoly on antitrust enforcement. But that difference is on the verge of collapsing. We are achieving a form of convergence; but contrary to expectations, this convergence is not coming from recent European efforts to facilitate private enforcement, which have not yet overcome some serious obstacles on discovery and class actions. Instead, it is coming from the recent US Supreme Court decision in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, which threatens to gut private antitrust enforcement in the United States by replacing it with ineffective forms of arbitration

Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines

The present paper analyzes the competitive, monopolistic, and public enforcement of fines allowing for the costs of enforcement to differ by the choice of the enforcer. There are a number of reasons to expect such differences. First, the benefits from coordinating enforcement -- for example, avoiding duplication of investigative effort and exploiting economies of scale in information processing -- are obtained under public enforcement and monopolistic enforcement, but not under competitive enforcement. Second, the profit motive might be imagined to lead to lower costs under either form of private enforcement relative to public enforcement. Third, when the revenue from fines under public enforcement is not sufficient to finance enforcement costs, there may be a deadweight burden incurred in making up the deficit from other sources. Conversely, if the fine revenue exceeds enforcement costs, the effective cost of enforcement would be lower. On balance, these considerations suggest that monopolistic enforcement may be cheaper than competitive enforcement, but that public enforcement could be more or less expensive than private enforcement.

Enforcement Guide: Near Shore Artisanal Fisheries

We need healthy oceans to support our way of life. Unfortunately, fish stocks are under growing pressure and the need to find innovative and pragmatic resource management strategies is more important than ever. Disregard for fisheries and environmental laws is common and if we are to succeed in reversing the declining trend, we must draft relevant regulations, design and fund comprehensive enforcement programs and cultivate a culture of compliance. Historically, marine law enforcement has been the competency of Naval and Coast Guard authorities; however, many fishery and park agencies, who lack training, equipment, and at times controlling legal authority, are tasked with fisheries management and enforcement. Complicating matters, most agencies are understaffed; lack budgetary resources, and possess limited authority (i.e. power of arrest and the ability to use force). WildAid in cooperation with The Nature Conservancy developed this guide to assist managers in designing a cost effective enforcement strategy for near shore artisanal fisheries. This document is not a recompilation of literature, but a practical guide based on our experience in the Eastern and Western Pacific. Generally, an enforcement system is designed to monitor all activities within a given area ranging from tourism, investigation, and transportation to fisheries; however, this guide will focus primarily on near shore artisanal fisheries. The objectives of this guide are three-fold:1. Examine all factors considered for the design and operation of a marine law enforcement system; 2. Illustrate key components of an enforcement system and evaluate surveillance technology and patrol equipment options; 3. Guide managers in the design and implementation of an enforcement system.In summary, it aims to equip managers with the tools needed to strengthen fisheries management and design enforcement systems that are practical, affordable and feasible to implement in a timely manner. Fisheries enforcement requires a holistic approach that accounts for surveillance, interdiction, systematic training, education and outreach and lastly, meaningful sanctions. Although it explores many surveillance technologies and management tools, this guide more importantly provides a blueprint for the capacity building and professionalization of enforcement officers, who truly are the core component of any fisheries enforcement program

Enforcement of regulation, informal labor and firm performance

This paper investigates how enforcement of labor regulation affects the firm’s use of informal labor and firm performance. Using firm level data on informal employment and firm performance, and administrative data on enforcement of regulation at the city level, we show that in areas where law enforcement is stricter firms employ a smaller amount of informal employment. Furthermore, by reducing the firm’s access to unregulated labor, stricter enforcement is also associated with lower labor productivity. We control for different regional and firm characteristics, and we instrument enforcement with a measure of the access of labor inspectors to firms. Taken together, our findings suggest that increased access to labor flexibility significantly improves firm performance

Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering

This Essay formulates a positive model that predicts when commercial parties will employ private ordering to enforce their agreements. The typical enforcement mechanism associated with private ordering is the reputation mechanism, in which a merchant community punishes parties in breach of contract by denying them future business. The growing private ordering literature argues that these private enforcement mechanisms can be superior to the traditional, less efficient enforcement measures provided by public courts. However, previous comparisons between public and private contractual enforcement have presented a misleading dichotomy by failing to consider a third enforcement mechanim: the vertically integrated firm. This Essay develops a model that comprehensively addresses three distinct types of enforcement mechanisms--firms, courts, and reputation-based private ordering. The model rests on a synthesis of transaction cost economics, which compares the efficiencies of firms versus markets, and the private ordering literature, which compares the efficiencies of public courts versus private ordering. It hypothesizes that private ordering will arise when agreements present enforcement difficulties, high-powered market incentives are important, and the costs of entry barriers are low. The Essay then conducts an illustrative test by comparing the model\u27s predictions to documented instances of private ordering