Economic integration, intensity of competition and R&D incentives

A two-country differentiated duopoly model is set out in which economic integration increases firms' incentives to invest in R&D, purely through the effect of increased intensity of competition between firms. The model is extended to incorporate knowledge spillovers, which, if related to the degree of integration, give rise to an inverted u-shaped relationship between R&D incentives and integration. The model is also extended to the n-firm general equilibrium case in which integration stimulates economic growth through intensity of competition. As such, the model suggests a positive growth effect of economic integration that does not rely on the usual scale effects

Vertical Integration versus Vertical Separation: An Equilibrium Model

Abstract. In this paper, the role of strategic forces in vertical relationships is examined. Using a simple model of differentiated products with symmetric demands and costs, the Perfect equilibrium to a vertical integration-vertical separation game between manufacturers is determined. Given the assumptions of the model, I show that the manufacturer's decision whether to vertically integrate or to remain separate from its retailer depends on the degree of product differentiation. I show that when the products are poor substitutes, the only Perfect equilibrium is vertical integration by both manufacturers. As the products become closer substitutes, an additional Perfect equilibrium appears, both firms vertically separated. For manufacturers, the vertically separated equilibrium always Pareto dominates the vertical integration equilibrium when both equilibria exist.Vertical integration, vertical separation, differentiated products.

Good Governance and Differentiated Integration

The study of European integration has traditionally focused on organizational growth: the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU). By contrast, this article analyzes organizational differentiation, a process in which states refuse, or are being refused, full integration but find value in establishing in-between grades of membership. It describes how the EU’s system of graded membership has developed, and it explains the positioning of states in this system. The core countries of the EU set a standard of good governance. The closer European countries are to this standard, the closer their membership grade is to the core. Some countries fall short of this standard and are refused further integration by the core: their membership grade increases with better governance. Other countries refuse further integration because they outperform the standards of the core countries: their membership grade decreases as governance improves. These conjectures are corroborated in a panel analysis of European countries

The Human Capital-Intensive Firm and Coordination: Redefined Integration and Disintegration

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the link between integration and disintegration. We argue that the conception of this link depends on the way one defines the firm and its coordinating role. We focus on studying the human capital-intensive firm. We explain that coordination by this kind of firms consists in coordinating productive tasks. The role of the firm is to coordinate the specialization of complementary resources and the division of labour. We show that integration and disintegration must be differentiated by the tools they give to the firm to effectively govern productive assets.Specific human capital; coordination; disintegration; integration; boudaries of the firm

Vertical integration and the licensing of innovation with a fixed fee or a royalty

In this paper, we analyse a situation where a patent holder is considered as an upstream firm that can license its innovation to some downstream companies that compete on a final market with differentiated products. Licensing contract may be based either on a royalty or a fixed fee. The patent holder can either be independant or vertically integrated with one of the downstream companies. We show that a licence based on a royalty works better with vertical integration, and that consequently, the patent holder have some interest to vertically integrate if it enables him to apply a royalty based license. The effect of vertical integration on the social surplus can be either positive or negative.LICENSING; INNOVATION; VERTICAL INTEGRATION

Market Integration and Industrial Structure: Home Market Effects Revisited

Does market size matter for industrial structure? This paper generalises the theory on home market effects to reconcile the recent debate by allowing for an endogenous expenditure share on differentiated goods. It is shown that, in general, market size matters for industrial structure. Even when both sectors face identical transport costs, a "home market effect" can arise, disappear, or reverse in sign, depending on whether the elasticity of substitution between the homogenous good and the composite of differentiated goods is greater than, equal to, or less than one. It is also shown that a commonly used benchmark - the relative market size in a one-factor economy - for discussing trade and industrial structure is, in general, not correct. The results should change common perceptions about how market integration affects a country's industrial structure. In particular, it is not always correct to consider a country that ends up with a less-than-proportionate of manufacturing industry in market integration to be "de-industrialised".

A Multi-level Approach to Differentiated Integration: Distributive Policy, National Heterogeneity and Actors in the European Research Area

This paper argues that differentiated integration can be understood more thoroughly by using a multi-level approach that conceives of the nation state as an aggregate of partly autonomous subunits and actors. The participation of such components in European integration is influenced by a combination of type of policy through which integration is pursued, national heterogeneity, their loosely coupledness within national systems. By examining the case of the European Research Area, we document patterns of differentiated integration across governance levels and discuss how the following factors shape these patterns: the competitive nature of the European distributive instruments, stark variation in national and sub-national material conditions and in the governance of national research systems, as well as the normative and cognitive factors specific to the research policy sector. The conceptual and policy-based implications to the debate on European differentiated integration are discussed

Economic integration, intensity of competition and R&D incentives

A two-country differentiated duopoly model is set out in which economic integration increases firms' incentives to invest in R&D, purely through the effect of increased intensity of competition between firms. The model is extended to incorporate knowledge spillovers, which, if related to the degree of integration, give rise to an inverted u-shaped relationship between R&D incentives and integration. The model is also extended to the n-firm general equilibrium case in which integration stimulates economic growth through intensity of competition. As such, the model suggests a positive growth effect of economic integration that does not rely on the usual scale effects.

A second-order continuity domain-decomposition technique based on integrated Chebyshev polynomials for two-dimensional elliptic problems

This paper presents a second-order continuity non-overlapping domain decomposition (DD) technique for numerically solving second-order elliptic problems in two-dimensional space. The proposed DD technique uses integrated Chebyshev polynomials to represent the solution in subdomains. The constants of integration are utilized to impose continuity of the second-order normal derivative of the solution at the interior points of subdomain interfaces. To also achieve a C2 (C squared) function at the intersection of interfaces, two additional unknowns are introduced at each intersection point. Numerical results show that the present DD method yields a higher level of accuracy than conventional DD techniques based on differentiated Chebyshev polynomials