From Accession to Exemption: A Brief History of the Development of Alaska Property Exemption Laws

This Article examines the historical development of Alaska\u27s debtor protections from their beginnings in the period of initial federal administration to the present. The current Alaska statutes protecting certain property of debtors from their creditors descended from policies first enacted by Congress. Although federal authority began in 1867 with the area\u27s acquisition from Russia, Congress did not provide for governmental administration in Alaska until 1884, which act also provided Alaska its first debtor protection statutes. Extension of the federal Homestead Act to Alaska in 1898 brought the first protections for settlers\u27 homesteads from their creditors. By 1912 and the creation of the territorial government, Congress had set the basic structure of debtor protection in Alaska. Unlike those states which insisted historically on placing certain debtor protections within their constitutions, public policy in Alaska has deemed statutory structures adequate to protect a debtor\u27s interests

Rights of Creditors to Collect Marital Debts After Divorce in Community Property Jurisdictions

The primary thrust of this Article is to address the post-divorce liability issue outlined in Part III from the perspective of debtor-creditor law. The rules adopted in most of the community property jurisdictions with respect to this issue appear to be primarily focused on the perspective of marital property and family law without regard to general debtor-creditor law principles and policies. For example, basic fraudulent transfer law has been ignored in those jurisdictions and not applied in the usual manner. As a result, the rules developed in those jurisdictions with regard to the post-divorce liability issue are not consistent with the basic principles and policies of debtor-creditor law. Part IV of this Article will discuss basic debtor-creditor law as it relates to this issue, and will propose a set of rules which could and should be adopted by the community property jurisdictions consistent with debtor-creditor law as it applies generally

Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework

This paper analyzes the strategic role of investment from a debtor country's perspective. The framework is one in which, if the debtor country is unable to meet debt obligations, a bargaining regime determines the amount of debt repayment. In the context of a two-country real trade model, debt repayment is equal to the trade surplus of the debtor. The outcome of the bargaining game will therefore be dependent (among other things) on the level of production in the debtor country. In this framework, the paper shows that productive investment may increase or decrease the bargaining power of the debtor country. This ambiguity appears to be fairly robust.

The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act

The secured creditor enjoys several advantages over his unsecured brethren. If the debtor defaults on his obligation, the secured creditor is sometimes empowered to take matters in his own hands, sell the property covered by his security, and reimburse himself out of the proceeds without the time and expense of the lawsuit to which the unsecured creditor must resort. If the debtor disposes of all of his property, the secured creditor\u27s claim, if properly perfected, follows the property into the hands of the transferee and may be satisfied therefrom without the necessity of litigation to establish that the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. If unsecured creditors go after property of the debtor to satisfy their claims, the secured creditor\u27s interest in the property covered by his security, if properly perfected, is immune from their levies. And if the debtor goes into bankruptcy, the secured creditor has first claim on the proceeds of the property covered by his security, after which he shares pro rata on any unpaid balance with the full claims of unsecured creditors in the remainder of the debtor\u27s assets

Fairness in sovereign debt restructuring

Experience from events of sovereign debt restructuring over the last decade exemplifies that the prevailing process is mainly shaped by exchange-offer launched by the debtor. This suggests that negotiations for changing the repayment terms of the debt take place in an Ultimatum Game which centres virtually the whole bargaining power on the debtor side. Creditors vote according to reservations values that might be influenced by fairness consideration both vis-à-vis the debtor and their fellow creditors. And as fairness is usually a highly subjective influence this can result heterogeneity of reservation values which might impede effective intra-creditor coordination for the benefit of the debtor. --

Execution of Mortgage Object Against Bankruptcy Debtors

The problems arise when the company is unable to pay its debts to the bank and then the bank submits a legal remedy for bankruptcy which results in the debtor (company) being declared bankrupt. So that in the event the debtor has been declared bankrupt, the curator will carry out the execution process under the power of the supervisory judge. The execution of collateral when the debtor goes bankrupt is related to two main issues, namely, the legal regulations regarding execution and the status of collateral related to the debtor’s bankruptcy. In connection with the legal regulations regarding the execution and status of collateral when a debtor goes bankrupt, it is found that there are two different regulations, namely Law no. 37 of 2004 regarding KPKPU and Law no. 4 of 1996 regarding Mortgage Rights, so that a principle is needed to solve these problems, namely lex specialis derogate legi generalis (Special Laws defeat general laws). Therefore, based on these problems, research is carried out using normative legal research methods, by taking an approach, namely, a statute approach related to execution

Mixed Strategies in Simultaneous and Sequential Play of a 2 Player Game

We take a class of games with two players and two actions which only have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show that such games can only have hybrid equilibria if played sequentially with one player moving first. The hybrid equilibrium has the leader p laying a mixed strategy but the follower playing a pure strategy. We apply this result to a game between a debtor and a lender following a loan contract. The debtor can have high or low revenues and has to report his state to the lender. The lender can choose whether or not to undertake a costly audit. With simultaneou s play there is only a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with random cheating in reports and auditing. With sequential play if the debtor moves first, there is zero auditing and the debtor cheats as much as possible without giving the incentive to audit. We argue that the setting of the game and the valuable first mover advantage of the debtor mean that we should expect the game to be played sequentially with this hybrid outcome. This is important in the context of the loan contract since the hybrid outcome makes the contract renegotiation proof. Alternatively if the timing allowed the lender to move first, then the equilibrium would have the debtor reporting truthfully and the monitor auditing just sufficiently to ensure truthtelling by the debtor. This ha s strong links to the optimal debt contract with no commitment (Mookherjee-Png, 1989 and Jost, 1996). However we argue that the natural timing of events makes the debtor the leader. We then consider other examples and show that the same outcome emerges in matching pennies and in a generic inspection game involving adverse selection in labour markets.Mixed Strategies; Loan Contracts; First Mover Advantage

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 111:Do debtor-favored contracts necessarily benefit the debtor?

We consider a case of security design, where the optimal contract depends on the nature of the future renegotiations game. It is shown that giving the bargaining power to the debtor in the renegotiations game may not always work in his interest

Monetary Policy Operations of Debtor Central Banks in MENA Countries

The paper analyses the monetary policy operations of central banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We distinguish the pattern of monetary policy operations of the liquidity providing central banks of the large industrialized countries (creditor central banks) and the liquidity absorb-ing central banks of emerging market economies (debtor central banks). Many debtor central banks provide liquidity through foreign exchange intervention in reaction to foreign exchange inflows. If the respective liquidity expansion is regarded as a threat to domestic price and financial stability, liquidity is partly absorbed through sterilization operations. The paper finds that most MENA coun-tries are debtor central banks due to a general pattern of excessive liquidity creation as well as due to country specific reasons.Emerging Markets; Debtor Central Banks; Foreign Exchange Inflows; Sterilization

Monetary policy operations of debtor central banks in MENA countries

The paper analyses the monetary policy operations of central banks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We distinguish the pattern of monetary policy operations of the liquidity providing central banks of the large industrialized countries (creditor central banks) and the liquidity absorbing central banks of emerging market economies (debtor central banks). Many debtor central banks provide liquidity through foreign exchange intervention in reaction to foreign exchange inflows. If the respective liquidity expansion is regarded as a threat to domestic price and financial stability, liquidity is partly absorbed through sterilization operations. The paper finds that most MENA countries are debtor central banks due to a general pattern of excessive liquidity creation as well as due to country specific reasons. --Emerging Markets,Debtor Central Banks,Foreign Exchange Inflows,Sterilization