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Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 111:Do debtor-favored contracts necessarily benefit the debtor?
Authors
Ajit Mishra
Publication date
1 January 2000
Publisher
'University of Dundee'
Abstract
We consider a case of security design, where the optimal contract depends on the nature of the future renegotiations game. It is shown that giving the bargaining power to the debtor in the renegotiations game may not always work in his interest
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University of Dundee Online Publications
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oai:discovery.dundee.ac.uk:pub...
Last time updated on 08/07/2014
University of Dundee Online Publications
See this paper in CORE
Go to the repository landing page
Download from data provider
oai:discovery.dundee.ac.uk:ope...
Last time updated on 04/11/2019