20,925 research outputs found
Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory
We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approachesthat in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictionis indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata
Non-cooperative game theory
This is the first draft of the entry “Game Theory” to appear in the Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science (edited by Ian Jarvie & Jesús Zamora Bonilla), Part III, Chapter 16.game theory, epstemic foundations, incomplete information,epstemic foundations, incomplete information
Applying Abstract Argumentation Theory to Cooperative Game Theory
We apply ideas from abstract argumentation theory to study cooperative game
theory. Building on Dung's results in his seminal paper, we further the
correspondence between Dung's four argumentation semantics and solution
concepts in cooperative game theory by showing that complete extensions (the
grounded extension) correspond to Roth's subsolutions (respectively, the
supercore). We then investigate the relationship between well-founded
argumentation frameworks and convex games, where in each case the semantics
(respectively, solution concepts) coincide; we prove that three-player convex
games do not in general have well-founded argumentation frameworks.Comment: 15 pages, 1 tabl
Cases in Cooperation and Cutting the Cake
Cooperative game;sharing problem
Dominant Strategies in Two Qubit Quantum Computations
Nash equilibrium is a solution concept in non-strictly competitive,
non-cooperative game theory that finds applications in various scientific and
engineering disciplines. A non-strictly competitive, non-cooperative game model
is presented here for two qubit quantum computations that allows for the
characterization of Nash equilibrium in these computations via the inner
product of their state space. Nash equilibrium outcomes are optimal under given
constraints and therefore offer a game-theoretic measure of constrained
optimization of two qubit quantum computations.Comment: The abstract has been re-written and technical details added to
section 5 in version
Probabilistic game approaches for network cost allocation
In a restructured power market, the network cost is to be allocated between multiple players utilizing the system in varying capacities. Cooperative game approaches based on Shapley value and Nucleolus provide stable models for embedded cost allocation of power networks. Varying network usage necessitates the introduction of probabilistic approaches to cooperative games. This paper proposes a variety of probabilistic cooperative game approaches. These have variably been modeled based upon the probability of existence of players, the probability of existence of coalitions, and the probability of players joining a particular coalition along with their joining in a particular sequence. Application of these approaches to power networks reflects the system usage in a more justified way. Consistent and stable results qualify the application of probabilistic cooperative game approaches for cost allocation of power networks.Cooperative games, embedded cost allocation, probabilistic games, transmission pricing
Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.balancedness, cooperative game, core, parametrized game
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