This is the first draft of the entry “Game Theory” to appear in the Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science (edited by Ian Jarvie & Jesús Zamora Bonilla), Part III, Chapter 16.game theory, epstemic foundations, incomplete information,epstemic foundations, incomplete information

Giacomo Bonanno

English

Research Papers in Economics

A note on backward induction.

A syntactic approach to rationality in games with ordinal payoffs.

A theory of conditionals. In

Agreeing to disagree. The Annals of Statistics,

Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality.

Bargaining and markets.

Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction.

Convention.

Counterfactuals.

Equilibrium points in n-person games,

Evolution and the Theory of Games.

Evolutionary game theory.

Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection.

Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction.

Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian players”, Parts I-III.

Inefficiency of Nash equilibria.

Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games.

Just Playing.

Memory and perfect recall in extensive games.

Modelling rational players I.

Non-cooperative games,

Playing Fair.

Political Game Theory: An Introduction.

Rationality in extensive form games.

Re-examination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.

Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory.

Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships.

Reply to Binmore.

Substantive rationality and backward induction.

The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms.

The logic of rational play in games of perfect information.

The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology.

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.

Non-cooperative game theory

Non-cooperative game theory

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Research Papers in Economics