AN ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICING IN THE FLORIDA CELERY INDUSTRY

The pricing behavior of the Florida celery industry under the current federal marketing order was examined by analyzing the implied market structure of the industry using a model proposed by Appelbaum. Point estimates of the oligopoly power index suggest that some degree of price enhancement above that which would be characterized by a perfectly competitive market may have occurred. However, the bulk of statistical evidence suggests that the departure from marginal cost pricing implied by the industry's pricing behavior is not statistically significant.Demand and Price Analysis,

Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown

Extreme adverse selection arises when private information has unbounded support, and market breakdown occurs when no trade is the only equilibrium outcome. We study extreme adverse selection via the limit behavior of a financial market as the support of private information converges to an unbounded support. A necessary and sufficient condition for market breakdown is obtained. If the condition fails, then there exists competitive market behavior that converges to positive levels of trade whenever it is first best to have trade. When the condition fails, no feasible (competitive or not) market behavior converges to positive levels of trade.Adverse selection, market breakdown, separation, competitive pricing

Food Retailers' Pricing and Marketing Strategies, with Implications for Producers

This paper examines grocery retailers' ability to influence prices charged to consumers and paid to suppliers. We discuss how retailer market power manifests itself in terms of pricing and marketing strategies by setting forth and offering evidence in support of eight "stylized facts" of retailer pricing and brand decisions. We argue that little, if any, of this behavior can be explained by a model of a competitive, price-taking retailer, but that most of the indicated behavior was also inconsistent with traditional models of market power. Finally, we discuss the impacts of aspects of this retailer behavior on the upstream farm sector.grocery retailer, market power, price spread, sales, Agribusiness, Marketing,

Consolidated Markets, Brand Competition, and Orange Juice Prices

This paper examines how consolidation in the marketing system affects prices for orange juice. We isolated the pricing behavior of brand marketers, wholesalers, and retailers by observing the retail prices for specific orange juice products, including leading national brands and private label brands, in 54 U.S. markets over a 1-year period. The data provided little compelling evidence that consolidated markets engaged in non-competitive pricing behavior. Increased brand competition, particularly between private labels and leading national brands, did, however, appear to lower average market prices.consumer demographics, national brands, orange juice, price behavior, private labels, wholesaler concentration, retailer concentration, Demand and Price Analysis, Industrial Organization,

Heterogeneous Behavioral Rules in the Oligopolistic Case

In a static symmetric duopoly the set of behavioral rules is extended to different types of markup pricing. Using an equilibrium concept suggested in Pasche (2001), it is shown that dependend on the markup neither pure Cournot nor pure Bertrand behavior is a behavioral equilibrium profile. Instead, there is a rationale for the usage of simple heuristics. The presence of markup rules leads to Stackelberg outcomes. Furthermore, pure markup behavior is more competitive than in Cournot case but less competitive than in Bertrand case. It is shown, that multiple behavioral equilibria and heterogeneous behavior may arise, where at least one player uses price setting strategies.oligopoly, markup rules, heterogeneity, behavioral equilibrium.

Average Cost and Marginal Cost Pricing in Marshall: Textual Analysis and Interpretation

This paper proposes a textual analysis of Marshall’s theory of firm pricing behavior under competitive conditions. It considers to what extent average cost and marginal cost pricing rules characterize Marshall’s competitive partial equilibrium, and it shows that the two rules differ for origins and can be reconciled only with great difficulty in a general equilibrium framework.Marshall, classical competition, perfect competition, marginal and average cost

"Asymmetric Market Shares, Advertising, and Pricing: Equilibrium with an Information Gatekeeper"

We analyze the impact of market share on advertising and pricing decisions by firms that sell to loyal, non-shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through an information intermediary or "gatekeeper." In equilibrium the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market, and there is no equilibrium in which both firms advertise with probability 1. The results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes all prices are revealed to shoppers and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as Shopper.com.online markets, E-commerce, market share, information gatekeeper, equilibrium price dispersion, advertising

Why Prices Rise Faster than they Fall

For decades the fact that input price hikes are passed on faster than input price cuts was thought to be well explained by the assumption that competitive firms fully pass on all input price changes, so they can't price asymmetrically, so asymmetric pricing behavior is limited to oligopolies, firms that do all sorts of bizarre things (finding yet another one being no big deal). However, Peltzman found no effect of concentration on such asymmetric pricing, raising the puzzle of why competitive industries generally price asymmetrically. This paper solves that puzzle.

Assessing the Competitive Interaction Between Private Labels and National Brands

In contrast to single-equation cross-sectional studies of private label share, developing a complete understanding of the nature of the competitive interaction between national brands and private labels requires an understanding of the determinants of both demand and strategic pricing decisions by firms. Consequently, we estimate a simultaneous system of share and price for private labels and national brands. From the empirical results, two measures of market response are derived. The unilateral demand elasticity measures the pure own demand response, while the residual (or total) elasticity also captures the impact of competitive price reaction (Baker and Bresnahan 1985). When taken together, these provide important strategic insights into the pricing interaction between national brands and private labels. In our empirical analysis, we employ a flexible, non-linear demand specification, the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a), and specify the price reaction equations derived under the LA/AIDS demand specification. Incorporating LA/AIDS demands into a structural equation framework represents an important departure from previous demand specifications in competitive analysis. Using the proposed LA/AIDS framework, we perform a detailed intra-category analysis using data on six individual categories: bread, milk, pasta, instant coffee, butter and margarine. In addition, in an attempt to generalize the results to a broader set of categories and in order to enable us to compare our results to previous cross-section studies, we also estimate using a sample pooled across 125 categories and 59 geographic markets. Consistent with our objectives, we find that consumer response to price and promotion decisions (demand) and the factors influencing firm pricing behavior (supply) jointly determine observed market prices and market shares. Further, estimates of residual demand elasticities suggest that examination of partial demand elasticities alone may provide an incomplete picture of the ability of brands to raise price. Managerial implications, limitations and suggestion for future research are discussed.competition, competitive strategy, private labels, pricing, Demand and Price Analysis,

Fostering SLA-Driven API Specifications

Software architecture tendencies are shifting to a microservice paradigm. In this context, RESTful APIs are being established the standard of integration. API designer often identifies two key issues to be competitive in such growing market. On the one hand, the generation of accurate documentation of the behavior and capabilities of the API to promote its usage; on the other hand, the design of a pricing plan that fits into the potential API user’s needs. Besides the increasing number of API modeling alternatives is emerging, there is a lack of proposals on the definition of flexible pricing plans usually contained in the Service Level Agreements (SLAs). In this paper we propose two different modeling techniques for the description of SLA in a RESTful API context: iAgree and SLA4OAI.Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad TIN2015-70560-RJunta de Andalucía P12-TIC-1867Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad TIN2014-53986-RED