Detection of selfish manipulation of carrier sensing in 802.11 networks

Recently, tuning the clear channel assessment (CCA) threshold in conjunction with power control has been considered for improving the performance of WLANs. However, we show that, CCA tuning can be exploited by selfish nodes to obtain an unfair share of the available bandwidth. Specifically, a selfish entity can manipulate the CCA threshold to ignore ongoing transmissions; this increases the probability of accessing the medium and provides the entity a higher, unfair share of the bandwidth. We experiment on our 802.11 testbed to characterize the effects of CCA tuning on both isolated links and in 802.11 WLAN configurations. We focus on AP-client(s) configurations, proposing a novel approach to detect this misbehavior. A misbehaving client is unlikely to recognize low power receptions as legitimate packets; by intelligently sending low power probe messages, an AP can efficiently detect a misbehaving node. Our key contributions are: 1) We are the first to quantify the impact of selfish CCA tuning via extensive experimentation on various 802.11 configurations. 2) We propose a lightweight scheme for detecting selfish nodes that inappropriately increase their CCAs. 3) We extensively evaluate our system on our testbed; its accuracy is 95 percent while the false positive rate is less than 5 percent. © 2012 IEEE

Ant routing algorithm for the Lightning Network

We propose a decentralized routing algorithm that can be implemented in Bitcoin Lightning Network. All nodes in the network contribute equally to path searching. The algorithm is inspired from ant path searching algorithms.Comment: 10 pages, 1 figur

Ensuring prolonged participation and deterring cheating behaviors in a collective

technical reportWe are building a system that harnesses the idle resources (cpu, storage, and bandwidth) of nodes (e.g., home desktops) distributed across the Internet to build useful distributed services like content distribution or remote backup. Users are compensated in return for contributing their nodes? idle resources to the system. Collective managers bundle and manage the contributed resources and resell them to end customers. For such a collective system to work, the system must discourage cheating (e.g., cheating users who lie about how many resources they have provided) and encourage nodes to stay in the collective for extended periods of time. To achieve these goals, we have designed an incentive system based on game theory and the economic theory behind law enforcement that motivates just these behaviors. In this paper we describe our incentive system and analyze its economic underpinnings to gain insight into how different players in the system will behave. We demonstrate how our incentive system motivates nodes to stay in the system for prolonged duration and deters cheating. For a typical system configuration, we show that even if we can only detect cheaters 4% of the time we can create sufficient economic deterrents to demotivate cheating

Doctor of Philosophy

dissertationWe propose a collective approach for harnessing the idle resources (cpu, storage, and bandwidth) of nodes (e.g., home desktops) distributed across the Internet. Instead of a purely peer-to-peer (P2P) approach, we organize participating nodes to act collectively using collective managers (CMs). Participating nodes provide idle resources to CMs, which unify these resources to run meaningful distributed services for external clients. We do not assume altruistic users or employ a barter-based incentive model; instead, participating nodes provide resources to CMs for long durations and are compensated in proportion to their contribution. In this dissertation we discuss the challenges faced by collective systems, present a design that addresses these challenges, and study the effect of selfish nodes. We believe that the collective service model is a useful alternative to the dominant pure P2P and centralized work queue models. It provides more effective utilization of idle resources, has a more meaningful economic model, and is better suited for building legal and commercial distributed services. We demonstrate the value of our work by building two distributed services using the collective approach. These services are a collective content distribution service and a collective data backup service

A Framework For Efficient Data Distribution In Peer-to-peer Networks.

Peer to Peer (P2P) models are based on user altruism, wherein a user shares its content with other users in the pool and it also has an interest in the content of the other nodes. Most P2P systems in their current form are not fair in terms of the content served by a peer and the service obtained from swarm. Most systems suffer from free rider\u27s problem where many high uplink capacity peers contribute much more than they should while many others get a free ride for downloading the content. This leaves high capacity nodes with very little or no motivation to contribute. Many times such resourceful nodes exit the swarm or don\u27t even participate. The whole scenario is unfavorable and disappointing for P2P networks in general, where participation is a must and a very important feature. As the number of users increases in the swarm, the swarm becomes robust and scalable. Other important issues in the present day P2P system are below optimal Quality of Service (QoS) in terms of download time, end-to-end latency and jitter rate, uplink utilization, excessive cross ISP traffic, security and cheating threats etc. These current day problems in P2P networks serve as a motivation for present work. To this end, we present an efficient data distribution framework in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks for media streaming and file sharing domain. The experiments with our model, an alliance based peering scheme for media streaming, show that such a scheme distributes data to the swarm members in a near-optimal way. Alliances are small groups of nodes that share data and other vital information for symbiotic association. We show that alliance formation is a loosely coupled and an effective way to organize the peers and our model maps to a small world network, which form efficient overlay structures and are robust to network perturbations such as churn. We present a comparative simulation based study of our model with CoolStreaming/DONet (a popular model) and present a quantitative performance evaluation. Simulation results show that our model scales well under varying workloads and conditions, delivers near optimal levels of QoS, reduces cross ISP traffic considerably and for most cases, performs at par or even better than Cool-Streaming/DONet. In the next phase of our work, we focussed on BitTorrent P2P model as it the most widely used file sharing protocol. Many studies in academia and industry have shown that though BitTorrent scales very well but is far from optimal in terms of fairness to end users, download time and uplink utilization. Furthermore, random peering and data distribution in such model lead to suboptimal performance. Lately, new breed of BitTorrent clients like BitTyrant have shown successful strategic attacks against BitTorrent. Strategic peers configure the BitTorrent client software such that for very less or no contribution, they can obtain good download speeds. Such strategic nodes exploit the altruism in the swarm and consume resources at the expense of other honest nodes and create an unfair swarm. More unfairness is generated in the swarm with the presence of heterogeneous bandwidth nodes. We investigate and propose a new token-based anti-strategic policy that could be used in BitTorrent to minimize the free-riding by strategic clients. We also proposed other policies against strategic attacks that include using a smart tracker that denies the request of strategic clients for peer listmultiple times, and black listing the non-behaving nodes that do not follow the protocol policies. These policies help to stop the strategic behavior of peers to a large extent and improve overall system performance. We also quantify and validate the benefits of using bandwidth peer matching policy. Our simulations results show that with the above proposed changes, uplink utilization and mean download time in BitTorrent network improves considerably. It leaves strategic clients with little or no incentive to behave greedily. This reduces free riding and creates fairer swarm with very little computational overhead. Finally, we show that our model is self healing model where user behavior changes from selfish to altruistic in the presence of the aforementioned policies

An in-depth case study: modelling an information barrier with Bayesian Belief Networks

We present in detail a quantitative Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) model of the use of an information barrier system during a nuclear arms control inspection, and an analysis of this model using the capabilities of a Satis ability Modulo Theory (SMT) solver. Arms control veri cation processes do not in practice allow the parties involved to gather complete information about each other, and therefore any model we use must be able to cope with the limited information, subjective assessment and uncertainty in this domain. We have previously extended BBNs to allow this kind of uncertainty in parameter values (such as probabilities) to be re ected; these constrained BBNs (cBBNs) o er the potential for more robust modelling, which in that study we demonstrated with a simple information barrier model. We now present a much more detailed model of a similar veri cation process, based on the technical capabilities and deployment concept of the UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI) Information Barrier system, demonstrating the scalability of our previously-presented approach. We discuss facets of the model itself in detail, before analysing pertinent questions of interest to give examples of the power of this approach