The weight of representing the body: addressing the potentially indefinite number of body representations in healthy individuals

There is little consensus about the characteristics and number of body representations in the brain. In the present paper, we examine the main problems that are encountered when trying to dissociate multiple body representations in healthy individuals with the use of bodily illusions. Traditionally, task-dependent bodily illusion effects have been taken as evidence for dissociable underlying body representations. Although this reasoning holds well when the dissociation is made between different types of tasks that are closely linked to different body representations, it becomes problematic when found within the same response task (i.e., within the same type of representation). Hence, this experimental approach to investigating body representations runs the risk of identifying as many different body representations as there are significantly different experimental outputs. Here, we discuss and illustrate a different approach to this pluralism by shifting the focus towards investigating task-dependency of illusion outputs in combination with the type of multisensory input. Finally, we present two examples of behavioural bodily illusion experiments and apply Bayesian model selection to illustrate how this different approach of dissociating and classifying multiple body representations can be applied

Specificity and coherence of body representations

Bodily illusions differently affect body representations underlying perception and action. We investigated whether this task dependence reflects two distinct dimensions of embodiment: the sense of agency and the sense of the body as a coherent whole. In experiment 1 the sense of agency was manipulated by comparing active versus passive movements during the induction phase in a video rubber hand illusion (vRHI) setup. After induction, proprioceptive biases were measured both by perceptual judgments of hand position, as well as by measuring end-point accuracy of subjects' active pointing movements to an external object with the affected hand. The results showed, first, that the vRHI is largely perceptual: passive perceptual localisation judgments were altered, but end-point accuracy of active pointing responses with the affected hand to an external object was unaffected. Second, within the perceptual judgments, there was a novel congruence effect, such that perceptual biases were larger following passive induction of vRHI than following active induction. There was a trend for the converse effect for pointing responses, with larger pointing bias following active induction. In experiment 2, we used the traditional RHI to investigate the coherence of body representation by synchronous stimulation of either matching or mismatching fingers on the rubber hand and the participant's own hand. Stimulation of matching fingers induced a local proprioceptive bias for only the stimulated finger, but did not affect the perceived shape of the hand as a whole. In contrast, stimulation of spatially mismatching fingers eliminated the RHI entirely. The present results show that (i) the sense of agency during illusion induction has specific effects, depending on whether we represent our body for perception or to guide action, and (ii) representations of specific body parts can be altered without affecting perception of the spatial configuration of the body as a whole

How many motoric body representations can we grasp?

At present there is a debate on the number of body representations in the brain. The most commonly used dichotomy is based on the body image, thought to underlie perception and proven to be susceptible to bodily illusions, versus the body schema, hypothesized to guide actions and so far proven to be robust against bodily illusions. In this rubber hand illusion study we investigated the susceptibility of the body schema by manipulating the amount of stimulation on the rubber hand and the participant’s hand, adjusting the postural configuration of the hand, and investigating a grasping rather than a pointing response. Observed results showed for the first time altered grasping responses as a consequence of the grip aperture of the rubber hand. This illusion-sensitive motor response challenges one of the foundations on which the dichotomy is based, and addresses the importance of illusion induction versus type of response when investigating body representations

Voluntary self-touch increases body ownership

Experimental manipulations of body ownership have indicated that multisensory integration is central to forming bodily self representation. Voluntary self touch is a unique multisensory situation involving corresponding motor, tactile and proprioceptive signals. Yet, even though self-touch is frequent in everyday life, its contribution to the formation of body ownership is not well understood. Here we investigated the role of voluntary self touch in body ownership using a novel adaptation of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), in which a robotic system and virtual reality allowed participants self-touch of real and virtual hands. In the first experiment, active and passive self-touch were applied in the absence of visual feedback. In the second experiment, we tested the role of visual feedback in this bodily illusion. Finally, in the third experiment, we compared active and passive self-touch to the classical RHI in which the touch is administered by the experimenter. We hypothesized that active self-touch would increase ownership over the virtual hand through the addition of motor signals strengthening the bodily illusion. The results indicated that active self-touch elicited stronger illusory ownership compared to passive self-touch and sensory only stimulation, and show an important role for active self-touch in the formation of bodily self

Action Sounds Informing Own Body Perception Influence Gender Identity and Social Cognition

Sensory information can temporarily affect mental body representations. For example, in Virtual Reality (VR), visually swapping into a body with another sex can temporarily alter perceived gender identity. Outside of VR, real-time auditory changes to walkers’ footstep sounds can affect perceived body weight and masculinity/femininity. Here, we investigate whether altered footstep sounds also impact gender identity and relation to gender groups. In two experiments, cisgender participants (26 females, 26 males) walked with headphones which played altered versions of their own footstep sounds that sounded more typically male or female. Baseline and post-intervention measures quantified gender identity [Implicit Association Test (IAT)], relation to gender groups [Inclusion of the Other-in-the-Self (IOS)], and perceived masculinity/femininity. Results show that females felt more feminine and closer to the group of women (IOS) directly after walking with feminine sounding footsteps. Similarly, males felt more feminine after walking with feminine sounding footsteps and associated themselves relatively stronger with “female” (IAT). The findings suggest that gender identity is temporarily malleable through auditory-induced own body illusions. Furthermore, they provide evidence for a connection between body perception and an abstract representation of the Self, supporting the theory that bodily illusions affect social cognition through changes in the self-concept.This work was supported by ESRC grant ES/K001477/1 (“The hearing body”) and by Ministerio de Economia, Industria y Competitividad of Spain Grant RYC-2014-15421 to AT-J, and by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación “MAGIC outFIT” grant (PID2019-105579RB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033)

Action Sounds Informing Own Body Perception Influence Gender Identity and Social Cognition

Sensory information can temporarily affect mental body representations. For example, in Virtual Reality (VR), visually swapping into a body with another sex can temporarily alter perceived gender identity. Outside of VR, real-time auditory changes to walkers’ footstep sounds can affect perceived body weight and masculinity/femininity. Here, we investigate whether altered footstep sounds also impact gender identity and relation to gender groups. In two experiments, cisgender participants (26 females, 26 males) walked with headphones which played altered versions of their own footstep sounds that sounded more typically male or female. Baseline and post-intervention measures quantified gender identity [Implicit Association Test (IAT)], relation to gender groups [Inclusion of the Other-in-the-Self (IOS)], and perceived masculinity/femininity. Results show that females felt more feminine and closer to the group of women (IOS) directly after walking with feminine sounding footsteps. Similarly, males felt more feminine after walking with feminine sounding footsteps and associated themselves relatively stronger with “female” (IAT). The findings suggest that gender identity is temporarily malleable through auditory-induced own body illusions. Furthermore, they provide evidence for a connection between body perception and an abstract representation of the Self, supporting the theory that bodily illusions affect social cognition through changes in the self-concept

The Bodily Illusion in Adverse Conditions: Virtual Arm Ownership During Visuomotor Mismatch

Classically, body ownership illusions are triggered by cross-modal synchronous stimulations, and hampered by multisensory inconsistencies. Nonetheless, the boundaries of such illusions have been proven to be highly plastic. In this immersive virtual reality study, we explored whether it is possible to induce a sense of body ownership over a virtual body part during visuomotor inconsistencies, with or without the aid of concomitant visuo-tactile stimulations. From a first-person perspective, participants watched a virtual tube moving or an avatar’s arm moving, with or without concomitant synchronous visuo-tactile stimulations on their hand. Three different virtual arm/tube speeds were also investigated, while all participants kept their real arms still. The subjective reports show that synchronous visuo-tactile stimulations effectively counteract the effect of visuomotor inconsistencies, but at slow arm movements, a feeling of body ownership might be successfully induced even without concomitant multisensory correspondences. Possible therapeutical implications of these findings are discussed

Interpersonal motor interactions shape multisensory representations of the peripersonal space

This perspective review focuses on the proposal that predictive multisensory integration occurring in one’s peripersonal space (PPS) supports individuals’ ability to efficiently interact with others, and that integrating sensorimotor signals from the interacting partners leads to the emergence of a shared representation of the PPS. To support this proposal, we first introduce the features of body and PPS representations that are relevant for interpersonal motor interactions. Then, we highlight the role of action planning and execution on the dynamic expansion of the PPS. We continue by presenting evidence of PPS modulations after tool use and review studies suggesting that PPS expansions may be accounted for by Bayesian sensory filtering through predictive coding. In the central section, we describe how this conceptual framework can be used to explain the mechanisms through which the PPS may be modulated by the actions of our interaction partner, in order to facilitate interpersonal coordination. Last, we discuss how this proposal may support recent evidence concerning PPS rigidity in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and its possible relationship with ASD individuals’ difficulties during interpersonal coordination. Future studies will need to clarify the mechanisms and neural underpinning of these dynamic, interpersonal modulations of the PPS

On Confusing Propositional Attitudes

The purpose of this article is to answer the question, whether there is the possibility of self-delusion in mental content, which is understood as a set of conscious content constituting self-knowledge – if such illusions are possible, this knowledge could be challenged. More precisely, could a subject be wrong about his own propositional attitudes? Assuming a positive answer to this question, first, proper examples of such confusion should be found and, second, the Cartesian paradigm of self-knowledge should be revisited