Bad money and distributive conflict

The paper argues that the world economy might experiment inflationary pressures (or restrictive policies aimed at fighting them) when the economic depression triggered by the financial crisis is stabilized. The primary cause is that bad money has been (endogenously) delivered which did not lead to a proportionate increase of real wealth, thereby creating an artificial purchasing power into the economic system. According to Keynes and Post Keynesians 'true inflation' develops when the quantity of effective demand increases at full employment, but financial 'inventiveness' proved to be capable of creating the possibility for houses and assets prices to inflate whatever the level of unemployment is. If the ongoing reinforced regulations get to limit the artificial increase of assets prices, the circulating bad money may trigger a generalized inflationary process. Public deficits have been seriously damaged during the depression; in addition, authorities have provided the required liquidity to the banking system in exchange of private bad debt, part of which might have turned out irrecoverable. The paper also points out that this amounts to a collectivization of private losses, which carries lasting difficulties in terms of a trade-off between inflation and higher unemployment. Some general policy principles are suggested to relieve the post crisis growth regime of the bad debts/bad money plague.inflation; stagflation; economic crisis; bad debts, money

Political Risk and Sovereign Debt Contracts

Default on sovereign debt is a form of political risk. Issuers and creditors have responded to this risk both by strengthening the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and by creating terms that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; and debtors and creditors may attempt to externalize costs on the taxpayers of other countries. We support this argument with an empirical overview of the development of sovereign bond terms from 1960 to the present

Perlindungan Hukum Pemegang Hak Tanggungan terhadap Gugatan/perlawanan dalam Eksekusi Hak Tanggungan

Installation of Insurance Rights to the debtor's guarantee in the form of land, is expected to provide protection to the creditor, if at any time the debtor has an injury to the pledge. But the fact is often the resistance or lawsuit of the debtor or the owner of the guarantee to impede the execution, as well as bad debts that occurred at PT. Bank Mega, Tbk, based on these conditions solve the problem of how the legal protection and how the settlement of bad loans if there is a lawsuit or resistance in the execution of mortgages. The type of research using normative legal research, the research approach consists of the approach of legislation and cases. And analytical technique used is descriptive analytical technique. The result of the research of settlement of bad credit banking can be pursued through rescue and settlement of bad debts, the form of legal protection provided by the law of mortgage and legal protection based on contractual, and effort of settlement of bad credit against lawsuit and resistance in executing execution pursued through process of law in court And outside the court. Keywords : Legal Protection, Bad Debts, and Deposit Right

Pengaruh Pengendalian Intern Terhadap Piutang Tak Tertagih

Internal control is an action taken by the company in regulating the company's activities so that the goals set are achieved. The key to the success of the company's activities is to carry out good internal control. One of them is internal control on accounts receivable. The purpose of writing this article is to anticipate the possibility of bad debts. This article describes how to implement internal control of accounts receivable to minimize bad debts in a company. The method used in the preparation of this article is a literature study by looking for references that are relevant to the problem. Based on the results of the literature study, it shows that good internal control of accounts receivable can minimize bad debts

Passive Creditors

Creditors are often passive because they are reluctant to show bad debts on their own balance sheets. We propose a simple general equilibrium model to study the externality effect of creditor passivity. The model yields rich insights in the phenomenon of creditor passivity, both in transition and developed market economies. Policy implications are deduced. The model also explains in what respect banks differ from enterprises and what this implies for policy. Commonly observed phenomenons in the banking sector, such as deposit insurance, lender of last resort facilities, government coordination to work out bad loans and special bank closure provisions, are interpreted in our framework.creditor passivity, bankruptcy, arrears, bad loans, bank closure

Passive Creditors

Creditors are often passive because they are reluctant to show bad debts on their balance sheets. We propose a simple general equilibrium model to study the externality effect of creditor passivity. The model yields rich insights in the phenomenon of creditor passivity, both in transitional and developed market economies. Policy implications are deduced. The model also explains in what respect banks differ from enterprises and what this implies for policy. Commonly observed phenomena in the banking sector, such as deposit insurance, lender of last resort facilities, government coordination to work out bad loans and special bank closure provisions, are interpreted in our framework.creditor passivity, bankruptcy, arrears, bad loans, bank closure

Passive Creditors

Creditors are often passive because they are reluctant to show bad debts on their own balance sheets. We propose a simple general equilibrium model to study the externality effect of creditor passivity. The model yields rich insights in the phenomenon of creditor passivity, both in transition and developed market economies. Policy implications are deduced. The model also explains in what respect banks differ from enterprises and what this implies for policy. Commonly observed phenomenons in the banking sector, such as deposit insurance, lender of last resort facilities, government coordination to work out bad loans and special bank closure provisions, are interpreted in our framework.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40123/3/wp737.pd