Rani Lill Anjum & Stephen Mumford What Tends to Be: the Philosophy of Dispositional Modality. London & New York: Routledge, hbk pp. x+193

There seems to be widespread agreement that there are two modal values: necessity and possibility. X is necessary if it is not possible that not-X; and Y is possible if it is not necessary that not-Y. In their path-breaking book, Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford defend the radical idea that there is a third modal value, weaker than necessity and stronger than possibility. This third value is dubbed 'dispositional modality' (DM) or 'tendency' and is taken to be an irreducible and sui generis worldly modality: "the modality that's everywhere" (5). The source of DM is the causal powers of particulars; hence, DM is constitutively involved in causation: "a cause tends or disposes towards its effect, and can sometimes succeed in producing it" (9). Accordingly, DM is involved in all causal processes, from fundamental physics to the social and moral realm. This "deeply tendential view" (11) of the metaphysics of nature is advanced as distinct from both extant neo-Aristotelian and Humean views. Its key feature is that there is neither pure contingency nor necessitation in nature

Mechanisms, counterfactuals and laws

In this chapter we examine the relation between mechanisms and laws/counterfactuals by revisiting the main notions of mechanism found in the literature. We distinguish between two different conceptions of ‘mechanism’: mechanisms-of underlie or constitute a causal process; mechanisms-for are complex systems that function so as to produce a certain behavior. According to some mechanists, a mechanism fulfills both of these roles simultaneously. The main argument of the chapter is that there is an asymmetrical dependence between both kinds of mechanisms and laws/counterfactuals: while some laws and counterfactuals must be taken as primitive (non-mechanistic) facts of the world, all mechanisms depend on laws/counterfactuals

Choosing the Realist Framework

There has been an empiricist tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, starting with Moritz Schlick and ending in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach), according to which the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all the explanatory entities posited by scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to articulate this tradition and to explore ways in which its key elements can find a place in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It presents a way empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety, by developing an indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework

Regularities, natural patterns and laws of nature

El objetivo de este artículo es plantear y defender una metafísica empirista sobre las leyes de la naturaleza. La idea empirista clave es que hay regularidades sin que se requiera la existencia de algo que haga que se mantengan como tales (regularity-enforcers). Dicho de otro modo, hay leyes naturales sin que lo que produce la ley (law-maker) pertenezca a una categoría metafísica diferente. Este plan se apoya en el concepto de "esquema natural" (natural pattern) y en la existencia de una red de esquemas naturales en la naturaleza. La relación entre una regularidad y un esquema se analizará en términos mereológicos. Explico la ruta que seguiré. En la sección 2 discuto brevemente la relación entre empirismo y metafísica con objeto de mostrar que una metafísica empirista es posible. En la sección 3 doy argumentos contra concepciones de las leyes más metafísicas. Después, en la sección 4, apoyo el objetivismo nómico. En la 5 abordo la pregunta "¿qué es una regularidad?" y desarrollo una respuesta novedosa, basada en la noción de esquema. En la sección 6 analizo la noción de esquema y en la 7 planteo la cuestión "¿qué es una ley de la naturaleza?", cuya respuesta es: una ley de la naturaleza es una regularidad que se caracteriza por la unidad de un esquema natural

Choosing the Realist Framework

There has been an empiricist tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, starting with Moritz Schlick and ending in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach), according to which the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all the explanatory entities posited by scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to articulate this tradition and to explore ways in which its key elements can find a place in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It presents a way empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety, by developing an indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework

Tolstoy’s argument: realism and the history of science

In this short paper I examine the role of history-of-science based arguments against realism in the end of the nineteenth century