Emission angle dependent HBT at RHIC and beyond

We study the geometrical features of non-central heavy ion collisions throughout their dynamical evolution from equilibration to thermal freeze-out within a hydrodynamic picture. We discuss resulting observables, in particular the emission angle dependence of the HBT radii and the relation of these oscillations to the geometry at the final stage.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, proceedings for Quark Matter 200

Braking and bouncing

I discuss the case for an efficient orbital braking mechanism in CVs, and the effect of nova outbursts on the observed range of mass transfer rates. I review the continuing problem that models have in interpreting the short-period cut-off of the CV period distribution.Comment: 10 pages, including 5 figures. To appear in "The Physics of Cataclysmic Variables and Related Objects", eds. B. Gaensicke, K. Beuermann, K. Reinsch, ASP Conf. Serie

MULTIFUNCTIONAL POWER QUALITY CORRECTION SYSTEM

Study the system of electric power quality control based on AVI with PWM in the systems of group feed of electromechanics with the direct-current unibus

Where do the architects live?

discussion of the extent to which architects can float about history and the inevitable finitude of architectural possibilities from any historical standpoint

Self-criticism in a broken mirror

If we have no transparent access to our self, what kind of self-criticism is possible? Neither modernists nor postmodernists yet this pragmatic issue correct

"Authenticity with Teeth: Positing Process"

The goal or criterion of "authenticity" for judging a change in art or ethics or culture is notoriously vague and can be dangerous. This essay proposes a version of authenticity based on a quasi-Hegelian version of the process of development rather than on any specific patrimony to be preserved. Oddly enough, the proposed criterion has many similarities with one proposed by a staunch anti-Hegelian, Gilles Deleuze

A Place Without a Form

The old spiritual masters told us to be in the world but not of it. We moderns have given this a secular twist. We are in our world — we have values, ways of life, world pictures — but not of it — we are to be aware of our freedom, aware of the contingency of our world and its dependence on factors many of which are or will be under our control. We both inhabit our world and enjoy the status of distanced controllers. Or, if our lack of control and our dependence on historical and social factors is being emphasized, we are to inhabit our world with a certain knowing irony, since we understand the process by which it came about, even if we cannot change it. We hnave found ways to institutionalize this split-level identity. Such institutions posit a separation of form and content. In the free market, in procedural justice, in free speech we live out that separation. This parallels cognitive and volitional theories of Kantian and Utilitarian descent, which make the same separation. All these give us freedom by having us seek our identity in a formal process above all content, but at the cost of introducing distance and irony. Martin Heidegger's response to modernity often sounds like a romantic flight from modern distances. He clearly wants to overcome our split-level existence, the uneasy balance of facticity and freedom, which for him is but another manifestation of the will to power which he fines lurking behind our tradition. But to what degree is his own overcoming of modernity also susceptible to split-level living and ironic distance

Filling in the Blanks

Eugene Gendlin claims that he wants "to think with more than conceptual structures, forms, distinctions, with more than cut and presented things" (WCS 29).1 He wants situations in their concreteness to be something we can think with, not just analyze conceptually. He wants to show that "conceptual patterns are doubtful and always exceeded, but the excess seems unable to think itself. It seems to become patterns when we try to think it. This has been the problem of twentieth century philosophy" (WCS 29). As a result he has "long been concerned with what is not formed although always in some form" (TAD 1). In this essay I would like to explore some of the issues surrounding the relation of the unformed and the formed. Gendlin says that "we get beyond the forms by thinking precisely in them" (TAD 1). The two emphasized words have to be considered separately as well as together. In many essays Gendlin's main concern is with the "precisely": can something that is not fully formed and definite still direct us as we carry forward language and action? My discussion begins with that issue; I suggest ways that Gendlin's proposal connects with and differs from some current ideas in epistemology and the philosophy of language. Then my discussion moves to the "in": what sense can we make of the formed being unformed? Finally I suggest that Gendlin's program runs into some difficulties in this connection

Public Exposure: Architecture and Interpretation

How the interpretation of architecture differs from that of other artworks