41 research outputs found

    Follow-up Survey for the Binary Black Hole Merger GW200224_222234 Using Subaru/HSC and GTC/OSIRIS

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    The LIGO/Virgo detected a gravitational wave (GW) event, named GW200224_222234 (also known as S200224ca) and classified as a binary-black hole coalescence, on 2020 February 24. Given its relatively small localization skymap (71 deg ^2 for a 90% credible region; revised to 50 deg ^2 in GWTC-3), we performed target-of-opportunity observations using the Subaru/Hyper Suprime-Cam (HSC) in the r 2 and z bands. Observations were conducted on 2020 February 25 and 28 and March 23, with the first epoch beginning 12.3 hr after the GW detection. The survey covered the highest-probability sky area of 56.6 deg ^2 , corresponding to a 91% probability. This was the first deep follow-up ( m _r ‚Č≥ 24, m _z ‚Č≥ 23) for a binary-black hole merger covering >90% of the localization. By performing image subtraction and candidate screening including light-curve fitting with transient templates and examples, we found 22 off-nucleus transients that were not ruled out as the counterparts of GW200224_222234 with our Subaru/HSC data alone. We also performed GTC/OSIRIS spectroscopy of the probable host galaxies for five candidates; two are likely to be located within the 3D skymap, whereas the others are not. In conclusion, 19 transients remain as possible optical counterparts of GW200224_222234; but we could not identify a unique promising counterpart. If there are no counterparts in the remaining candidates, the upper limits of the optical luminosity are őĹLőĹ<5.2‚ąí1.9+2.4√ó1041\nu {L}_{\nu }\lt {5.2}_{-1.9}^{+2.4}\times {10}^{41} erg s ^‚ąí1 and őĹLőĹ<1.8‚ąí0.6+0.8√ó1042\nu {L}_{\nu }\lt {1.8}_{-0.6}^{+0.8}\times {10}^{42} erg s ^‚ąí1 in the r 2 and z bands, respectively, at ‚ąľ12 hr after GW detection. We also discuss improvements in the strategies of optical follow-ups for future GW events

    A Reemerging Bright Soft X-Ray State of the Changing-look Active Galactic Nucleus 1ES 1927+654:A Multiwavelength View

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    1ES1927+654 is a nearby active galactic nucleus (AGN) that has shown an enigmatic outburst in optical/UV followed by X-rays, exhibiting strange variability patterns at timescales of months to years. Here we report the unusual X-ray, UV, and radio variability of the source in its postflare state (2022 January‚Äď2023 May). First, we detect an increase in the soft X-ray (0.3‚Äď2 keV) flux from 2022 May to 2023 May by almost a factor of 5, which we call the bright soft state. The hard X-ray 2‚Äď10 keV flux increased by a factor of 2, while the UV flux density did not show any significant changes (‚ȧ30%) in the same period. The integrated energy pumped into the soft and hard X-rays during this period of 11 months is ‚ąľ3.57 √ó 10 ^50 erg and 5.9 √ó 10 ^49 erg, respectively. From the energetics, it is evident that whatever is producing the soft excess (SE) is pumping out more energy than either the UV or hard X-ray source. Since the energy source presumably is ultimately the accretion of matter onto the supermassive black hole, the SE-emitting region must be receiving the majority of this energy. In addition, the source does not follow the typical disk‚Äďcorona relation found in AGNs, neither in the initial flare (from 2017 to 2019) nor in the current bright soft state (2022‚Äď2023). We found that the core (<1 pc) radio emission at 5 GHz gradually increased until 2022 March, but showed a dip in 2022 August. The G√ľdel‚ÄďBenz relation ( L _radio / L _X-ray ‚ąľ 10 ^‚ąí5 ), however, is still within the expected range for radio-quiet AGNs, and further follow-up radio observations are currently being undertaken

    Software di riduzione dati della Camera Infrarossa CAINDR. User Manual

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    User Manual- Software per la riduzioni dei dati infrarossi della camera CAINDR, situata nel Telescopio Carlos Sanchez (TCS) all'Osservatorio del Teide (Tenerife, Spagna

    Fotometria e calibrazione infrarossi. User Manual

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    Manuale dove si descrivono le procedure di calibrazione e fotometria infraross

    On the Collisional Disalignment of Dust Grains in Illuminated and Shaded Regions of IC 63

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    Interstellar dust grain alignment causes polarization from UV to mm wavelengths, allowing the study of the geometry and strength of the magnetic field. Over the last couple of decades, observations and theory have led to the establishment of the radiative alignment torque mechanism as a leading candidate to explain the effect. With a quantitatively well constrained theory, polarization can be used not only to study the interstellar magnetic field, but also the dust and other environmental parameters. Photodissociation regions, with their intense, anisotropic radiation fields, consequent rapid H-2 formation, and high spatial density-contrast provide a rich environment for such studies. Here we discuss an expanded optical, NIR, and mm-wave study of the IC 63 nebula, showing strong H-2 formation-enhanced alignment and the first direct empirical evidence for disalignment due to gas-grain collisions using high-resolution HCO+(J = 1-0) observations. We find that a relative amount of polarization is marginally anticorrelated with column density of HCO+. However, separating the lines of sight of optical polarimetry into those behind, or in front of, a dense clump as seen from gamma Cas, the distribution separates into two well defined sets, with data corresponding to "shaded" gas having a shallower slope. This is expected if the decrease in polarization is caused by collisions since collisional disalignment rate is proportional to R-C proportional to n root T. Ratios of the best-fit slopes for the "illuminated" and "shaded" samples of lines of sight agrees, within the uncertainties, with the square root of the two-temperature H-2 excitation in the nebula seen by Thi et al

    Monetary Policy Report - July de 2021

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    Macroeconomic summary The Colombian economy sustained numerous shocks in the second quarter, pri¬¨marily related to costs and supply. The majority of these shocks were unantic¬¨ipated or proved more persistent than expected, interrupting the recovery in economic activity observed at the beginning of the year and pushing overall inflation above the target. Core inflation (excluding food and regulated items) increased but remained low, in line with the technical staff‚Äôs expectations. A third wave of the pandemic, which became more severe and prolonged than the previous outbreak, began in early April. This had both a high cost in terms of human life and a negative impact on Colombia's economic recovery. Between May and mid-June roadblocks and other disruptions to public order had a sig¬¨nificant negative effect on economic activity and inflation. The combination and magnitude of these two shocks likely led to a decline in gross domestic product (GDP) compared to the first quarter. Roadblocks also led to a significant in¬¨crease in food prices. The accumulated effects of global disruptions to certain value chains and increased international freight transportation prices, which since the end of 2020 have restricted supply and increased costs, also affected Colombia‚Äôs economy. The factors described above, which primarily affected the consumer price index (CPI) for goods and foods, explain to a significant degree the technical staff‚Äôs forecast errors and the increase in overall inflation above the 3% target. By contrast, increases in core inflation and in prices for regulated items were in line with the technical staff‚Äôs expectations, and can be explained largely by the elimination of various price relief measures put in place last year. An increase in perceived sovereign risk and the upward pressures that this im¬¨plies on international financing costs and the exchange rate were further con¬¨siderations. Despite significant negative shocks, economic growth in the first half of the year (9.1%) is now expected to be significantly higher than projected in the April re¬¨port (7.1%), a sign of a more dynamic economy that could recover more quickly than previously forecast. Diverse economic activity figures have indicated high¬¨er-than-expected growth since the end of 2020. This suggests that the negative effects on output from recurring waves of COVID-19 have grown weaker and less long-lasting with subsequent outbreaks. Nevertheless, the third wave of the coro¬¨navirus, and to an even greater degree the previously mentioned roadblocks and disruptions to public order, likely led to a decline in GDP in the second quar¬¨ter compared to the first. Despite this, data from the monthly economic tracking indicator (ISE) for April and May surpassed expectations, and new sector-level measures of economic activity suggest that the negative impact of the pandemic on output continues to moderate, amid reduced restrictions on mobility and im¬¨provements in the pace of vaccination programs. Freight transportation registers (June) and unregulated energy demand (July), among other indicators, suggest a significant recovery following the roadblocks in May. Given the above, annual GDP growth in the second quarter is expected to have been around 17.3% (previously 15.8%), explained in large part by a low basis of comparison. The technical staff revised its growth projection for 2021 upward from 6% to 7.5%. This forecast, which comes with an unusually high degree of uncertain¬¨ty, assumes no additional disruptions to public order and that any new waves of COVID-19 will not have significant additional negative effects on economic activity. Recovery in international demand, price levels for some of Colombia‚Äôs export com¬¨modities, and remittances from workers abroad have all performed better than projected in the previous report. This dynamic is expected to continue to drive recovery in the national income over the rest of the year. Continued ample international liquidity, an acceleration in vacci¬¨nation programs, and low interest rates can also be ex¬¨pected to favor economic activity. Improved performance in the second quarter, which led to an upward growth revision for all components of spending, is expected to continue, with the economy returning to 2019 production levels at the end of 2021, earlier than estimated in the April report. This forecast continues to account for the short-term effects on aggregate demand of a tax reform package along the lines of what is currently being pro-posed by the national government. Given the above, the central forecast scenario in this report projects growth in 2021 of 7.5% and in 2022 of 3.1% (Graph 1.1). In this scenar¬¨io, economic activity would nonetheless remain below potential. The noted improvement in these projections comes with a high degree of uncertainty. Annual inflation increased more than expected in June (3.63%) as a result of changes in food prices, while growth in core inflation (1.87%) was similar to projections. The in¬¨creased CPI for foods would be expected to persist for the remainder of the year, contributing to inflation remaining above the target. Overall and core inflation would be ex¬¨pected to return to close to 3% at the end of 2022, amid a deceleration in growth in the CPI for foods and reduced ex¬¨cess productive capacity. Recent increases in international freight and agricultural goods prices, as well as the live¬¨stock cycle and increased meat exports, have exerted up¬¨ward pressure on food prices, primarily in processed foods (see Box 21). In addition to these persistent factors affecting prices, national roadblocks and related disruptions to pub¬¨lic order in several cities throughout May and parts of June were reflected in a significant restriction of supply and an unexpected annual increase in the CPI for foods (8.52%). Inflation in regulated items (5.93%) also accelerated, due to a low basis of comparison on gasoline prices and the par¬¨tial lapse of relief measures on utility rates that were put in place in 2020. Inflation excluding food and regulated items recovered in line with projections to 1.87%, due to the rein¬¨statement of indirect taxes on certain goods and services that had been temporarily eliminated in 2020, and to up¬¨ward pressures exerted by prices for foods away from home (FAH), among other factors. The increase in perishable foods prices is expected to be reversed over the course of the year, assuming an absence of additional, long-lasting blockades of national roads. Increased processed food pric¬¨es would be expected to persist and contribute to keeping inflation above the target at the end of the year. Inflation excluding foods and regulated items is expected to contin¬¨ue to exhibit an upward trend, as excesses in productive ca¬¨pacity continue to close, and register a temporary increase in March 2022 largely due to the reinstatement of the FAH consumption tax. Given the above, overall year-end infla¬¨tion is expected to be 4.1% in 2021 and 3.1% in 2022 (Graph 1.2), and core inflation is expected to be 2.6% in 2021 and 3.2% in 2022 (Graph 1.3). The technical staff has interpreted the overall behavior of prices in the CPI excluding food and regulated items, alongside continued unexpected increases in economic activity, as signs of more ample excess productive capaci¬¨ty in the economy. This would be expected to persist over the next two years, with the output gap closing at the end of that period. Increased economic growth suggests a less negative output gap than estimated last quarter. Nevertheless, the behavior of core inflation, especially in services, suggests that potential GDP has recovered to an unanticipated degree and that ample excess capacity con¬¨tinues, with a persistent effect on aggregate demand. La¬¨bor market observation supports this interpretation, with persistent high levels of unemployment and stagnation in the recovery of jobs lost as a result of the pandemic. Increased inflation can be explained largely by shocks re¬¨lated to costs and supply, and by the dissolution of some price relief measures put in place in 2020. The growth and inflation forecasts described above would be consistent with a less negative output gap closing more quickly across the forecast horizon compared to the projection from the April report. Nevertheless, uncertainty surrounding excess capacity is very high and constitutes a risk to the forecast (Graphic 1.4). The fiscal accounts outlook deteriorated, Standard and Poor‚Äôs Global Ratings (S&P) and Fitch Ratings (Fitch) down¬¨graded Colombia‚Äôs credit rating, roadblocks and disrup¬¨tions to public order affected output, and the country faced a third wave of COVID-19 that was more severe and prolonged than the previous outbreak. These factors were reflected in an increased risk premium and depreciation of the peso compared to the dollar. This occurred in a favor¬¨able context in regard to foreign income, as international prices for oil, coffee, and other Colombian export goods in¬¨creased. This contributed to a recovery in the terms of trade and in the national income and mitigated upward pres¬¨sures on the risk premium and the exchange rate. Expected oil prices in this report are USD 68 per barrel (previous¬¨ly USD 61/bl) for 2021 and USD 66/bl (previously USD 60/ bl) for 2022. This increased trajectory shows convergence to oil prices below recently observed levels, as a result of increased global supply that would more than offset increased demand. As a result, the recent price increase is expected to be temporary. International financial conditions are expected to become somewhat less fa¬¨vorable in the current macroeconomic context, despite the improvement in foreign income due to increased demand and some higher prices for oil and other export products. Growth in foreign demand was better than expected in the previous report, with projections for 2021 and 2022 increasing from 5.2% to 6.0% and from 3.4% to 3.5%, respectively. For the year to date, figures for economic activity suggest more dynamic foreign demand than previously expected. Output recovery has been faster in the United States and China than in Latin America, as economic reactivation in the latter has been limit¬¨ed by outbreaks of COVID-19, restricted vaccine supplies, and a lack of fiscal space to confront the pandemic, among other factors. The positive dynamic in foreign goods trade has come amid a deterioration in value chains and a significant increase in commodities and freight prices (see Box 3). Inflation in the United States has been unexpectedly high, with observed and expected values remaining above the target, while growth forecasts have been revised upward. As a result, the beginning of a normalization in monetary policy in the U.S. could come earlier than previously projected. This report estimates that the U.S. Federal Reserve‚Äôs first rate increase will come at the end of 2022 (before the first quarter of 2023). Colombia‚Äôs risk premium is projected to be higher than forecast in the April report, and is expected to remain on a growth trajectory given the country‚Äôs accumulation of public and external debt. This would be expected to contribute to an increase in international financing costs on the forecast horizon. An expansionary monetary policy stance continues to support favorable do¬¨mestic financing conditions. The interbank rate and the reference banking indi¬¨cator (IBR)remained consistent with the policy interest rate in the second quar¬¨ter. Average deposit and credit rates continued at historical lows, despite some observed increases at the end of June. The peso-denominated credit portfolio continued to decelerate in annual terms and, between March and June, growth in the household credit portfolio accelerated, primarily related to housing pur¬¨chases. Disbursements and recovery in the commercial credit portfolio were significant, returning to high levels observed one year ago, when businesses required significant levels of liquidity to confront the economic effects of the pandemic. Meanwhile, credit risk increased, liability provisions remained high, and some banks withdrew from the balance of their past-due portfolios. Nev¬¨ertheless, financial system earnings have recovered, and liquidity and solvency levels remain above regulatory minimums. Beginning with this report, a new methodology will be used to quantify and communicate the uncertainty surrounding central macroeconomic fore¬¨casts in the context of an active monetary policy. The new methodology, known as predictive densities (PD), will be explained in detail in Box 1. PD methodology provides probability distributions of the main forecast vari¬¨ables (e.g. growth, inflation) based on the balance of risks of key factors that, in the technical staff‚Äôs judgment, could affect the economy on the forecast horizon. These distributions reflect the result of possible shocks (to external variables, prices, and economic activity) that the economy could sustain and the transmission effects considering Colombia‚Äôs economic structure and anticipated monetary policy responses. As a result, PD allows for the quantification of uncertainty around the central forecast and of its bias. In this report, the PD exercise shows a downward bias for both economic growth and output gap, while the op¬¨posite is shown for headline inflation (Graphs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). The balance of risks indicates more complex mone¬¨tary policy dilemmas than previously expected. The most significant anticipated risk regarding external financing would be a return to less favorable conditions in a sce¬¨nario in which the U.S. Federal Reserve promptly raises interest rates. Such a decision could come as the result of current levels of economic growth and higher-than-ex¬¨pected employment generating significant inflationary pressures on that country. Uncertainty regarding Colom¬¨bia‚Äôs fiscal outlook and the subsequent effects on the risk premium and external financing costs represent addi¬¨tional considerations. The risks to economic growth are mainly downside risks, relating especially to the effects of political and fiscal uncertainty on consumption and investment decisions and the potential for additional waves of COVID-19 and the subsequent effects on eco-nomic activity. Inflation risks take into account the po¬¨tential for more persistent shocks associated with dis¬¨ruption to value chains, higher international commodity and food prices, and a slower-than-expected recovery in the national agricultural chain as a result of the recent roadblocks. These would represent upward risks primarily to food and goods prices. The main downside risk to the inflation forecast would come from an increase in rental housing prices below the central scenario projection. This would be explained by weak demand and increased sup¬¨ply in 2022 as a result of high observed housing sales this year. All told, the PD exercise reveals a downward bias for economic growth forecast, with 90% probability of growth between 6.1% and 9.1% for 2021 and between 0.5% and 4.1% in 2022. The output gap also exhibits a downward bias to the central forecast scenario, primarily in 2022. On the contrary, an upward bias is expected for headline inflation forecast, with 90% probability ranging between 3.7% and 4.9% in 2021 and between 2.2% and 4.7% in 2022. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in June and July the BDBR left the bench¬¨mark interest rate unchanged at 1.75% (Graph 1.5).Box 1. Characterizing and Communicating the Balance of Risks of Macroeconomic Forecasts: A Predictive Densities Approach for Colombia Authors: Juan Camilo M√©ndez-Vizca√≠no, C√©sar √Ānzola-Bravo, Alexander Guar√≠n y Anderson Grajales-OlarteBox 2. Analysis of Recent Disturbances in Global Logistics Chains and their Impact on Colombian Import Markets. Authors: Aar√≥n Garavito, Juan Diego Cort√©s, Stefany Andrea Moreno, Alex Fernando P√©rez y Juan Esteban CarranzaBox 3. The Upward Dynamics of Food Prices. Authors: Edgar Caicedo G., Andrea Salazar D. y Jes√ļs Daniel Sarmiento S

    Informe de Política Monetaria - Julio de 2021

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    En el segundo trimestre la econom√≠a enfrent√≥ varios choques, principalmente de oferta y de costos, la mayor√≠a de los cuales no fueron anticipados, o los previstos fueron m√°s persistentes de lo esperado, y que en conjunto interrumpieron la recuperaci√≥n de la actividad econ√≥mica observada a comienzos de a√Īo y llevaron la inflaci√≥n total a niveles superiores a la meta. La inflaci√≥n b√°sica (sin alimentos ni regulados: SAR) aument√≥, pero se mantuvo baja y acorde con lo esperado por el equipo t√©cnico. A comienzos de abril se inici√≥ una tercera ola de pandemia, m√°s acentuada y prolongada que la anterior, con un elevado costo en vidas humanas y alg√ļn impacto negativo en la recuperaci√≥n econ√≥mica. Entre mayo y mediados de junio los bloqueos de las carreteras y los problemas de orden p√ļblico tuvieron un fuerte efecto negativo sobre la actividad econ√≥mica y la inflaci√≥n. Se estima que la magnitud de estos dos choques combinados habr√≠a generado una ca√≠da en niveles en el producto interno bruto (PIB) con respecto al primer trimestre del a√Īo. Adicionalmente, los bloqueos causaron un aumento significativo de los precios de los alimentos. A estos choques se sumaron los efectos acumulados de la disrupci√≥n global en algunas cadenas de valor y el incremento en los fletes internacionales que desde finales de 2020 vienen generando restricciones de oferta y aumentos de costos. Todos estos factores, que afectaron principalmente el √≠ndice de precios al consumidor (IPC) de bienes y de alimentos, explicaron la mayor parte del error de pron√≥stico del equipo t√©cnico y el aumento de la inflaci√≥n total a niveles superiores a la meta del 3 %. El incremento en la inflaci√≥n b√°sica y de los precios de los regulados fue acorde con lo esperado por el equipo t√©cnico, y se explica principalmente por la eliminaci√≥n de varios alivios de precios otorgados un a√Īo atr√°s. A todo esto se suma la mayor percepci√≥n de riesgo soberano y las presiones al alza que esto implica sobre el costo de financiamiento externo y la tasa de cambio. A pesar de los fuertes choques negativos, el crecimiento econ√≥mico esperado para la primera mitad del a√Īo (9,1%), es significativamente mayor que lo proyectado en el informe de abril (7,1%), signo de una econom√≠a m√°s din√°mica que se recuperar√≠a m√°s r√°pido de lo previsto. Desde finales de 2020 las diferentes cifras de actividad econ√≥mica han mostrado un crecimiento mayor que el esperado. Esto sugiere que los efectos negativos sobre el producto de las recurrentes olas de contagio estar√≠an siendo cada vez menos fuertes y duraderos. No obstante, la tercera ola de contagio del Covid-19, y en mayor medida los bloqueos a las v√≠as y los problemas de orden p√ļblico, habr√≠an generado una ca√≠da del PIB durante el segundo trimestre, frente al primero. Pese a lo anterior, los datos del √≠ndice de seguimiento a la econom√≠a (ISE) de abril y mayo han resultado mayores que lo esperado, y las nuevas cifras de actividad econ√≥mica sectoriales sugieren que el impacto negativo de la pandemia sobre el producto se sigue moderando, en un entorno de menores restricciones a la movilidad y de mayor avance en el ritmo de vacunaci√≥n. Los registros de transporte de carga (junio) y la demanda de energ√≠a no regulada (julio), entre otros, indican una recuperaci√≥n importante despu√©s de los bloqueos en mayo. Con todo lo anterior, el incremento anual del PIB del segundo trimestre se habr√≠a situado alrededor del 17,3 % (antes 15,8 %), explicado en gran parte por una base baja de comparaci√≥n. Para todo 2021 el equipo t√©cnico increment√≥ su proyecci√≥n de crecimiento desde un 6 % hasta el 7,5 %. Este pron√≥stico, que est√° rodeado de una incertidumbre inusualmente elevada, supone que no se presentar√°n problemas de orden p√ļblico y que posibles nuevas olas de contagio del Covid-19 no tendr√°n efectos negativos adicionales sobre la actividad econ√≥mica. Frente al pron√≥stico del informe pasado, la recuperaci√≥n de la demanda externa, los niveles de precios de algunos bienes b√°sicos que exporta el pa√≠s y la din√°mica de las remesas de trabajadores han sido mejores que las esperadas y seguir√≠an impulsando la recuperaci√≥n del ingreso nacional en lo que resta del a√Īo. A esto se sumar√≠a la a√ļn amplia liquidez internacional, la aceleraci√≥n en el proceso de vacunaci√≥n y las bajas tasas de inter√©s, factores que continuar√≠an favoreciendo la actividad econ√≥mica. La mejor din√°mica del primer semestre, que llev√≥ a una revisi√≥n al alza en el crecimiento de todos los componentes del gasto, continuar√≠a hacia adelante y, antes de lo esperado en abril, la econom√≠a recuperar√≠a los niveles de producci√≥n de 2019 a finales de 2021. El pron√≥stico contin√ļa incluyendo efectos de corto plazo sobre la demanda agregada de una reforma tributaria de magnitud similar a la proyectada por el Gobierno. Con todo eso, en el escenario central de este informe, el pron√≥stico de crecimiento para 2021 es del 7,5 % y para 2022 del 3,1 %. A pesar de esto, el nivel de la actividad econ√≥mica seguir√≠a siendo inferior a su potencial. La mejora en estas proyecciones, sin embargo, est√° rodeada de una alta incertidumbre. En junio la inflaci√≥n anual (3,63 %) aument√≥ m√°s de lo esperado debido al comportamiento del grupo de alimentos, mientras que la inflaci√≥n b√°sica (1,87 %) fue similar a la proyectada. En lo que resta del a√Īo el mayor nivel del IPC de alimentos persistir√≠a y contribuir√≠a a mantener la inflaci√≥n por encima de la meta. A finales de 2022 la inflaci√≥n total y b√°sica retornar√≠an a tasas cercanas al 3 %, en un entorno de desaceleraci√≥n del IPC de alimentos y de menores excesos de capacidad productiva. En los meses recientes el aumento en los precios internacionales de los fletes y de los bienes agr√≠colas, y las mayores exportaciones de carne y el ciclo ganadero han ejercido presiones al alza sobre el precio de los alimentos, principalmente de los procesados. A estas fuerzas persistentes se sumaron los bloqueos de las v√≠as nacionales y los problemas de orden p√ļblico en varias ciudades registrados en mayo y parte de junio, los cuales se reflejaron en una fuerte restricci√≥n en la oferta y en un aumento anual no esperado del IPC de alimentos (8,52 %). El grupo de regulados (5,93 %) tambi√©n se aceler√≥, debido a la baja base de comparaci√≥n en los precios de la gasolina y a la disoluci√≥n de parte de los alivios a las tarifas de servicios p√ļblicos otorgados en 2020. Como se proyectaba, la inflaci√≥n SAR repunt√≥ al 1,87 %, debido a la reactivaci√≥n de los impuestos indirectos de algunos bienes y servicios eliminados un a√Īo atr√°s, y por las presiones al alza que ejercieron los alimentos sobre las comidas fuera del hogar (CFH), entre otros. En lo que resta del a√Īo se espera que el aumento en los alimentos perecederos se revierta, siempre y cuando no se registren nuevos bloqueos duraderos a las v√≠as nacionales. El mayor nivel de precios de los alimentos procesados persistir√≠a y contribuir√≠a a mantener la inflaci√≥n por encima de la meta a finales de a√Īo. La inflaci√≥n SAR continuar√≠a con una tendencia creciente, en la medida en que los excesos de capacidad productiva se sigan cerrando y registrar√≠a un aumento transitorio en marzo de 2022, debido principalmente al restablecimiento del impuesto al consumo en las CFH. Con todo esto, para finales de 2021 y 2022 se estima una inflaci√≥n total del 4,1 % y 3,1 %, y una inflaci√≥n b√°sica del 2,6 % y 3,2 %, respectivamente. El comportamiento conjunto de los precios del IPC SAR, junto con continuas sorpresas al alza en la actividad econ√≥mica, son interpretados por el equipo t√©cnico como se√Īales de amplios excesos de capacidad productiva de la econom√≠a. Estos persistir√≠an en los siguientes dos a√Īos, al final de los cuales la brecha del producto se cerrar√≠a. El mayor crecimiento econ√≥mico sugiere una brecha del producto menos negativa que la estimada hace un trimestre. Sin embargo, el comportamiento de la inflaci√≥n b√°sica, especialmente en servicios, indica que el PIB potencial se ha recuperado de forma sorpresiva y que los excesos de capacidad siguen siendo amplios, con una demanda agregada afectada de forma persistente. Esta interpretaci√≥n encuentra soporte en el mercado laboral, en donde persiste un desempleo alto y la recuperaci√≥n de los empleos perdidos se estanc√≥. Adicionalmente, los aumentos en la inflaci√≥n en buena medida est√°n explicados por choques de oferta y de costos y por la disoluci√≥n de algunos alivios de precios otorgados un a√Īo atr√°s. Los pron√≥sticos de crecimiento y de inflaci√≥n descritos son coherentes con una brecha del producto que se cierra m√°s r√°pido y es menos negativa en todo el horizonte de pron√≥stico con respecto al informe de abril. No obstante, la incertidumbre sobre los excesos de capacidad es muy alta y es un riesgo sobre el pron√≥stico. Las perspectivas de las cuentas fiscales de Colombia se deterioraron, Standard & Poor‚Äôs Global Ratings (S&P) y Fitch Ratings (Fitch) redujeron su calificaci√≥n crediticia, los bloqueos y problemas de orden p√ļblico afectaron el producto y el pa√≠s enfrent√≥ una nueva ola de contagios de Covid-19 m√°s acentuada y prolongada que las pasadas. Todo lo anterior se ha reflejado en un aumento de las primas de riesgo y en una depreciaci√≥n del peso frente al d√≥lar. Esto ha ocurrido en un entorno favorable de ingresos externos. Los precios internacionales del petr√≥leo, del caf√© y de otros bienes b√°sicos que exporta el pa√≠s aumentaron y han contribuido a la recuperaci√≥n de los t√©rminos de intercambio y del ingreso nacional, y han mitigado las presiones al alza sobre las primas de riesgo y la tasa de cambio. En el presente informe se increment√≥ el precio esperado del petr√≥leo para 2021 a USD 68 por barril (antes USD 61 bl) y para 2022 a USD 66 bl (antes USD 60 bl). Esta mayor senda presenta una convergencia hacia precios menores que los observados recientemente, como resultado de una mayor oferta mundial esperada de petr√≥leo, la cual m√°s que compensar√≠a el incremento en la demanda de este bien b√°sico. Por ende, se supone que el aumento reciente de los precios tiene un car√°cter transitorio. En el escenario macroecon√≥mico actual se espera que las condiciones financieras internacionales sean algo menos favorables, a pesar de la mejora en los ingresos externos por cuenta de una mayor demanda y unos precios del petr√≥leo y de otros productos de exportaci√≥n m√°s altos. Frente al informe de abril el crecimiento de la demanda externa fue mejor que el esperado, y las proyecciones para 2021 y 2022 aumentaron del 5,2 % al 6,0 % y del 3,4 % al 3,5 %, respectivamente. En lo corrido del a√Īo las cifras de actividad econ√≥mica muestran una demanda externa m√°s din√°mica de la esperada. En los Estados Unidos y China la recuperaci√≥n del producto ha sido m√°s r√°pida que la registrada en los pa√≠ses de la regi√≥n. En estos √ļltimos la reactivaci√≥n econ√≥mica ha estado limitada por los rebrotes del Covid-19, las limitaciones en la oferta de vacunas y el poco espacio fiscal para enfrentar la pandemia, entre otros factores. La buena din√°mica en el comercio externo de bienes se ha dado en un entorno de deterioro en las cadenas de valor y de un aumento importante en los precios de las materias primas y en el costo de los fletes. En los Estados Unidos la inflaci√≥n sorprendi√≥ al alza y su valor observado y esperado se mantiene por encima de la meta, al tiempo que se increment√≥ la proyecci√≥n de crecimiento econ√≥mico. Con esto, el inicio de la normalizaci√≥n de la pol√≠tica monetaria en ese pa√≠s se dar√≠a antes de lo proyectado. En este informe se estima que el primer incremento en la tasa de inter√©s de la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos se d√© a finales de 2022 (antes del primer trimestre de 2023). Para Colombia se supone una mayor prima de riesgo frente al informe de abril y se sigue esperando que presente una tendencia creciente, dada la acumulaci√≥n de deuda p√ļblica y externa del pa√≠s. Todo esto contribuir√≠a a un incremento en el costo del financiamiento externo en el horizonte de pron√≥stico. La postura expansiva de la pol√≠tica monetaria sigue soportando unas condiciones financieras internas favorables. En el segundo trimestre la tasa de inter√©s interbancaria y el √≠ndice bancario de referencia (IBR) se han mantenido acordes con la tasa de inter√©s de pol√≠tica. Las tasas de inter√©s promedio de captaci√≥n y cr√©dito continuaron hist√≥ricamente bajas, a pesar de algunos incrementos observados a finales de junio. La cartera en moneda nacional detuvo su desaceleraci√≥n anual y, entre marzo y junio, el cr√©dito a los hogares se aceler√≥, principalmente para compra de vivienda. La recuperaci√≥n de la cartera comercial y de los desembolsos a ese sector fue importante, y se alcanz√≥ de nuevo el elevado saldo observado un a√Īo atr√°s, cuando las empresas requirieron niveles significativos de liquidez para enfrentar los efectos econ√≥micos de la pandemia. El riesgo de cr√©dito aument√≥, las provisiones se mantienes altas y algunos bancos han retirado de su balance una parte de su cartera vencida. No obstante, las utilidades del sistema financiero se han recuperado y sus niveles de liquidez y solvencia se mantienen por encima del m√≠nimo regulatorio. A partir de este informe se implementar√° una nueva metodolog√≠a para cuantificar y comunicar la incertidumbre que rodea los pron√≥sticos del escenario macroecon√≥mico central, en un entorno de pol√≠tica monetaria activa. Esta metodolog√≠a se conoce como densidades predictivas (DP) y se explica en detalle en el Recuadro 1. Partiendo del balance de riesgos que contiene los principales factores que, de acuerdo con el juicio del equipo t√©cnico, podr√≠an afectar a la econom√≠a en el horizonte de pron√≥stico, la metodolog√≠a DP produce distribuciones de probabilidad sobre el pron√≥stico de las principales variables (v. g.: crecimiento, inflaci√≥n). Estas distribuciones reflejan el resultado de los posibles choques (a variables externas, precios y actividad econ√≥mica) que podr√≠a recibir la econom√≠a y su transmisi√≥n, considerando la estructura econ√≥mica y la respuesta de pol√≠tica monetaria en el futuro. En este sentido, permiten cuantificar la incertidumbre alrededor del pron√≥stico y su sesgo. El ejercicio DP muestra un sesgo a la baja en el crecimiento econ√≥mico y en la brecha del producto, y al alza en la inflaci√≥n. El balance de riesgos indica que las disyuntivas para la pol√≠tica monetaria ser√°n potencialmente m√°s complejas que lo contemplado en el pasado. Por el lado de las condiciones de financiamiento externo, se considera que el mayor riesgo es que se tornen un poco menos favorables, en un escenario en el cual la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos incremente con mayor prontitud su tasa de inter√©s. Esto √ļltimo, ante un crecimiento econ√≥mico y del empleo mayor que el esperado en los Estados Unidos que genere presiones significativas sobre la inflaci√≥n de ese pa√≠s. A esto se suma la incertidumbre sobre el panorama fiscal en Colombia y sus efectos sobre la prima de riesgo y el costo del financiamiento externo. En el caso del crecimiento, la mayor√≠a de los riesgos son a la baja, destac√°ndose los efectos de la incertidumbre pol√≠tica y fiscal sobre las decisiones de consumo e inversi√≥n, la aparici√≥n de nuevas olas de contagio de la pandemia del Covid-19 y sus impactos sobre la actividad econ√≥mica. En el caso de la inflaci√≥n, se incorpor√≥ el riesgo de una mayor persistencia de los choques asociados con la disrupci√≥n de las cadenas de valor, mayores precios internacionales de las materias primas y de los alimentos, y una recuperaci√≥n m√°s lenta que la esperada de la cadena agr√≠cola nacional afectada por los pasados bloqueos a las v√≠as. Estos riesgos presionar√≠an al alza principalmente los precios de los alimentos y de los bienes. Como principal riesgo a la baja se incluy√≥ un alza de los arriendos menor que el esperado en el escenario central, explicada por una demanda d√©bil y por una mayor oferta en 2022 dadas las altas ventas de vivienda observadas en el presente a√Īo. Con todo, el crecimiento econ√≥mico presenta un sesgo a la baja y, con el 90 % de confianza, se encontrar√≠a entre un 6,1 % y 9,1 % para 2021 y entre el 0,5 % y 4,1 % para 2022. La brecha del producto tendr√≠a un sesgo a la baja, principalmente en 2022. El sesgo de la inflaci√≥n es al alza, y se encontrar√≠a entre el 3,7 % y 4,9 % en 2021, y el 2,2 % y 4,7 % en 2022, con un 90 % de probabilidad. 1.2 Decisi√≥n de pol√≠tica monetaria En las reuniones de junio y julio la JDBR decidi√≥ mantener la tasa de pol√≠tica monetaria inalterada en 1,75 %.Recuadro 1. Caracterizaci√≥n y comunicaci√≥n del balance de riesgos del pron√≥stico macroecon√≥mico: un enfoque de densidades predictivas para Colombia. Autores: Juan Camilo M√©ndez-Vizca√≠no, C√©sar √Ānzola-Bravo, Alexander Guar√≠n y Anderson Grajales-OlarteRecuadro 2: An√°lisis de las perturbaciones recientes en las cadenas log√≠sticas globales y su impacto en los mercados de las importaciones colombianas. Autores: Aar√≥n Garavito, Juan Diego Cort√©s ,Stefany Andrea Moreno, Alex Fernando P√©rez y Juan Esteban Carranza.Recuadro 3: La din√°mica alcista de los precios de los alimentos. Autores: Edgar Caicedo G., Andrea Salazar D. y Jes√ļs Daniel Sarmiento S

    Monetary Policy Report - January 2021

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    Macroeconomic Summary Overall inflation (1.61%) and core inflation (excluding food and regulated items) (1.11%) both declined beyond the technical staff‚Äôs expectations in the fourth quarter of 2020. Year-end 2021 forecasts for both indicators were revised downward to 2.3% and 2.1%, respectively. Market inflation expectations also fell over this period and suggested inflation below the 3% target through the end of this year, rising to the target in 2022. Downward pressure on inflation was more significant in the fourth quarter than previously projected, indicating weak demand. Annual deceleration among the main groups of the consumer price index (CPI) was generalized and, except for foods, was greater than projected in the October report. The CPI for goods (excluding foods and regulated items) and the CPI for regulated items were subject to the largest decelerations and forecasting discrepancies. In the first case, this was due in part to a greater-than-expected effect on prices from the government‚Äôs ‚ÄúVAT-fee day‚ÄĚ amid weak demand, and from the extension of some price relief measures. For regulated items, the deceleration was caused in part by unanticipated declines in some utility prices. Annual change in the CPI for services continued to decline as a result of the performance of those services that were not subject to price relief measures, in particular. Although some of the overall decline in inflation is expected to be temporary and reverse course in the second quarter of 2021, various sources of downward pressure on inflation have become more acute and will likely remain into next year. These include ample excesses in capacity, as suggested by the continued and greater-than-expected deceleration in core inflation indicators and in the CPI for services excluding price relief measures. This dynamic is also suggested by the minimal transmission of accumulated depreciation of the peso on domestic prices. Although excess capacity should fall in 2021, the decline will likely be slower than projected in the October report amid additional restrictions on mobility due to a recent acceleration of growth in COVID-19 cases. An additional factor is that low inflation registered at the end of 2020 will likely be reflected in low price adjustments on certain indexed services with significant weight in the CPI, including real estate rentals and some utilities. These factors should keep inflation below the target and lower than estimates from the previous report on the forecast horizon. Inflation is expected to continue to decline to levels near 1% in March, later increasing to 2.3% at the end of 2021 and 2.7% at year-end 2022 (Graph 1.1). According to the Bank‚Äôs most recent survey, market analysts expect inflation of 2.7% and 3.1% in December 2021 and 2022, respectively. Expected inflation derived from government bonds was 2% for year-end 2021, while expected inflation based on bonds one year forward from that date (FBEI 1-1 2022) was 3.2%.Box I. Macroeconomic Expectations: Analysis of the Monthly Survey of Economic Analyst Expectations. Authors: Hernando Vargas, Alexander Guar√≠n, Anderson Grajales, C√©sar Anzola, Jonathan Mu√Īo

    Informe de Política Monetaria - Octubre 2020

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    Recent data suggest that the technical staff‚Äôs appraisals of the condition and development of economic activity, inflation and the labor market have been in line with current trends, marked by a decline in demand and the persistence of ample excess productive capacity. A significant projected fall in output materialized in the second quarter, contributing to a decline in inflation below the 3% target and reflected in a significant deterioration of the labor market. A slow recovery in output and employment is expected to continue for the remainder of 2020 and into next year, alongside growing inflation that should remain below the target. The Colombian economy is likely to undergo a significant recession in 2020 (GDP contraction of 7.6%), though this may be less severe than projected in the previous report (-8.5%). Output is expected to have begun a slow recovery in the second half of this year, though it is not projected to return to pre-pandemic levels in 2021 amid significant global uncertainty. The output decline in the first half of 2020 was less severe than anticipated, thanks to an upward revision in first-quarter GDP and a smaller contraction in the second quarter (-15.5%) than had been projected (-16.5%). Available economic indicators suggest an annual decline in GDP in the third quarter of around 9%. No significant acceleration of COVID-19 cases that would imply a tightening of social distancing measures is presumed for the remainder of this year or in 2021. In that context, a gradual opening of the economy would be expected to continue, with supply in sectors that have been most affected by the pandemic recovering slowly as restrictions on economic activity continue to be relaxed. On the spending side, an improvement in consumer confidence, suppressed demand for goods and services, low interest rates, and higher expected levels of foreign demand should contribute to a recovery in output. A low base of comparison would also help explain the expected increase in GDP in 2021. Based on the conditions laid out above, economic growth in 2020 is expected to be between -9% and -6.5%, with a central value of -7.6%. Growth in 2021 is projected to be between 3% and 7%, with a central value of 4.6% (Graph 1.1). Upward revisions compared to the July report take into account a lower-than-expected fall in first-semester growth and a somewhat faster recovery in the third quarter in some sectors. The forecast intervals for 2020 and 2021 growth tightened somewhat but continue to reflect a high degree of uncertainty over theevolution of the pandemic, the easures required to deal with it, and their effects on global and domestic economic activity.Box 1. Evaluation of the Predictive Capacity of Expected Inflation Measures. Authors: C√©sar Anzola-Bravo, Anderson Grajales-Olarte, Alexander Guar√≠n-L√≥pez, Juli√°n Camilo Mateus-Gamboa, Jonathan Alexander Mu√Īoz-Mart√≠nez, Carlos Andr√©s Quicaz√°n-Moreno, Juan Sebasti√°n Rojas-Moreno, Cristhian Hernando Ruiz-CardozoBox 2. Literature Review: Weighing the Drivers of Portfolio Flows to Emerging Market Economies. Authors: Andr√©s S√°nchez-Jabb

    Informe de Política Monetaria - Enero de 2021

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    De acuerdo con el mandato constitucional, el Banco de la Rep√ļblica debe ‚Äúvelar por mantener el poder adquisitivo de la moneda, en coordinaci√≥n con la pol√≠tica econ√≥mica general‚ÄĚ. Para cumplir con este mandato, la Junta Directiva del Banco de la Rep√ļblica (JDBR) adopt√≥ como estrategia un esquema flexible de inflaci√≥n objetivo, en el cual las acciones de pol√≠tica monetaria (PM) buscan conducir la inflaci√≥n a una meta puntual y alcanzar el nivel m√°ximo sostenible del producto y del empleo. La flexibilidad del esquema le permite a la JDBR mantener un balance apropiadoentre el logro de la meta de inflaci√≥n y el prop√≥sito de suavizar las fluctuaciones del producto y el empleo alrededor de su senda sostenible. La JDBR estableci√≥ una meta de inflaci√≥n del 3 %, planteada sobre la variaci√≥n anual del √≠ndice de precios al consumidor (IPC). En el corto plazo la inflaci√≥n puede ser afectada por factores que est√°n fuera del control de la PM, como por ejemplo cambios en los precios de los alimentos debido a fen√≥menos clim√°ticos. Para incorporar lo anterior, la JDBR anuncia, junto con la meta, un rango de ¬Ī1 punto porcentual (3 ¬Ī1 pp), el cual no es un objetivo de la PM, pero refleja el hecho de que la inflaci√≥n puede fluctuar alrededor de la meta, sin pretender que sea siempre igual al 3 %. El principal instrumento que tiene la JDBR para el control de la inflaci√≥n es la tasa de inter√©s de pol√≠tica (tasa repo a un d√≠a o tasa de inter√©s de referencia). Dado que las acciones de PM toman tiempo en tener un efecto completo sobre la econom√≠a y la inflaci√≥n, para fijar su valor la JDBR eval√ļa el pron√≥stico y las expectativas de la inflaci√≥n frente a la meta, as√≠ como el estado actual y las perspectivas sobre la evoluci√≥n de la econom√≠a. La JDBR se re√ļne una vez al mes, pero solo en ocho meses sesiona de forma ordinaria para tomar decisiones de PM (enero, marzo, abril, junio, julio, septiembre, octubre y diciembre). En los cuatro meses restantes (febrero, mayo, agosto y noviembre) no se toman, en principio, decisiones de este tipo. Al finalizar las Juntas donde se toman decisiones de PM, se publica un comunicado y se hace una rueda de prensa a cargo del gerente general del Banco y el ministro de Hacienda. El siguiente d√≠a h√°bil se publican las minutas de la Junta, donde se describen las posturas que llevaron a adoptar la decisi√≥n. Adicionalmente, en enero, abril, julio y octubre se publica, junto con las minutas, el Informe de Pol√≠tica Monetaria (IPM) realizado por el equipo t√©cnico del Banco: el mi√©rcoles de la semana siguiente a la Junta el gerente general aclara inquietudes sobre las minutas y el gerente t√©cnico del Banco presenta el IPM. Este esquema de comunicaci√≥n busca entregar informaci√≥n relevante y actualizada que contribuya a la toma de mejores decisiones por parte de los agentes de la econom√≠a.Recuadro 1. Expectativas macroecon√≥micas: an√°lisis de la Encuesta mensual de expectativas de analistas econ√≥micos. Autores: Hernando Vargas, Alexander Guar√≠n, Anderson Grajales, C√©sar Anzola, Jonathan Mu√Īo