Regulating excessive speculation: commodity derivatives and the global food crisis

Evidence suggests that commodity derivatives speculation contributed to extraordinary patterns of grain price volatility that led to a global food crisis in 2007–11. People in countries throughout the world are increasingly dependent on international commodity markets for access to food. Almost everywhere, now, the value of food is determined by a single condensed symbol of its worth—its price. Persuaded of the need to ensure that this measure of value is not put at risk of distortion in the pursuit of financial profit, governments in the US and in the EU are now implementing new regulations designed to curb ‘excessive’ levels of speculation in derivative markets. Carrying out an analysis of these regulatory measures, the article demonstrates that both sets of reforms suffer from a critical limitation: They are predicated on an inaccurate understanding of how activity in commodity derivative markets can impact on underlying food prices. If the new regulations for commodity derivative markets are not up to the task, as this article argues that they are not, a more fundamental revision of global economic structures may be required if the basic needs of human beings are not to be subsumed to the interests of financial capital in the years to come

Gone with the war? Neutral state responsibility and the Geneva arbitration of 1872

The Geneva Arbitration of 1872 was convened to settle various differences between the United States and Great Britain and, in particular, American allegations of British collusion with regard to shipbuilding for the Southern Confederacy during the American Civil War. The Arbitrators ultimately found Britain liable, and awarded $15,500,000 to the United States. This decision remains controversial to the extent that it rested on rules which were not yet accepted as principles of general international law, and which clearly favoured the case of the United States from the outset. It is thus the purpose of this article to explore the facts behind the Geneva Arbitration, and to argue that the finding of British liability in Geneva marked the beginning decline of the laws of neutrality. Neutral Countries […] may be exploited by the Great Powers both strategically and as a source of additional armies and fleets. Of central importance to the game are those Neutral Countries and provinces which are designated as “Supply Centres.” […] A player's fighting strength is directly related to the number of Supply Centres he or she controls, whilst the game is won when one player controls at least 18 Supply Centres

Threat Modelling for Active Directory

This paper analyses the security threats that can arise against an Active Directory server when it is included in a Web application. The approach is based on the STRIDE classification methodology. The paper also provides outline descriptions of countermeasures that can be deployed to protect against the different threats and vulnerabilities identified here

Merchant ship 'conversion' in warfare, The Falklands (Malvinas) and the requisition of the QE2

In May 1982, the British government requisitioned numerous private vessels, including the transatlantic liner the RMS Queen Elizabeth 2, for use during the Falklands (Malvinas) War. In taking up ships from trade, the rules contained in the 1907 Hague Convention VII relating to the conversion of merchant ships into warships afforded some guidance to Britain. This article reviews the development of the use made by governments of private ships during wartime, the need for Hague Convention VII, and the relevance of that Convention to the British requisition exercise undertaken in 1982

It's war, Jim, but not as we know it: a "reality-check" for international laws of war?

International Humanitarian Laws of Armed Conflict effectively prohibit the use of terror-violence as a means or method of warfare in all circumstances of armed conflict. However, as new "terrorist" enemies do not appear to share this humanitarian consensus, it becomes crucial to contextualise accurately any characterisation of the recent "war" on "global terror" as a "war"' to which International Humanitarian Law can attach. What needs to be remembered, first, is that technological innovation can destabilise accepted frameworks for waging war. Thus, any laws intended to curtail the use of particular means and methods of warfare will reflect the contemporaneous environment within which such laws were formulated. Secondly, modern laws of war evolved from nineteenth century reciprocal pacts designed to ensure minimal levels of restraint between "civilised" peoples. While any strict contractual approach to mutuality-in-restraint has been superceded in the post-1945 era by more universalised obligations, the interests reflected in this original mutuality of interest warrant examination when distinguishing today between "justifiable"' and "unjustifiable", or "licit"' and "illicit", uses of violence

A tale of two courts: the 'creation' of a jurisdiction?

Two projects to create the international criminal courts were devised during the 20th century. On 1 July 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force. On 16 November 1937, the Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court was opened for signature at Geneva. The latter never entered into force, an event made contingent on the coming into force of its companion Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which also never occurred. The use to be made of law in each court forms the core of this discussion: the Rome Statute Court will rely on both vertical and horizontal approaches to the exercise of jurisdiction, and will utilise a harmonised approach to substantive criminal law; the 1937 court would have utilised domestic criminal law, in that the intent behind the 1937 convention was to make available an alternate forum, should the need arise. It is argued in particular that a horizontal approach to international criminal law may hold more seeds of future discord than a vertical approach, as harmonised law-making and enforcement lack a much-needed critical foundation. Crucially, the new International Criminal Court could greatly disturb the existing distribution of power and authority originally designed into the United Nations Charter, and effect a major shift in power politics, thus upsetting the balance between the principle of non-interference in state domestic affairs and the maintenance of international peace