Progressive construction of a parametric reduced-order model for PDE-constrained optimization

An adaptive approach to using reduced-order models as surrogates in PDE-constrained optimization is introduced that breaks the traditional offline-online framework of model order reduction. A sequence of optimization problems constrained by a given Reduced-Order Model (ROM) is defined with the goal of converging to the solution of a given PDE-constrained optimization problem. For each reduced optimization problem, the constraining ROM is trained from sampling the High-Dimensional Model (HDM) at the solution of some of the previous problems in the sequence. The reduced optimization problems are equipped with a nonlinear trust-region based on a residual error indicator to keep the optimization trajectory in a region of the parameter space where the ROM is accurate. A technique for incorporating sensitivities into a Reduced-Order Basis (ROB) is also presented, along with a methodology for computing sensitivities of the reduced-order model that minimizes the distance to the corresponding HDM sensitivity, in a suitable norm. The proposed reduced optimization framework is applied to subsonic aerodynamic shape optimization and shown to reduce the number of queries to the HDM by a factor of 4-5, compared to the optimization problem solved using only the HDM, with errors in the optimal solution far less than 0.1%

Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer

Embedded advertising—marketing that promotes brands from within entertainment content—is a thriving, rapidly changing practice. Analysts estimate that embedded advertising expenditures will exceed $10 billion in 2010. The market continues to grow even as traditional advertising revenues contract. The relatively few legal scholars who have studied embedded advertising believe that it is under-regulated. Ineffective regulation, they claim, is deeply troubling because corporations may, with legal impunity, deceptively pitch products to trusting viewers. Critics charge that embedded advertising creates hyper-commercialism, distorts consumers\u27 tastes, taints the artistic process, and erodes faith in public discourse. This Article argues that the critics are wrong. Sponsorship disclosure law under the Communications Act of 1934 and related regulations is indeed largely ineffective, in part because the media industry has consolidated considerably and in part because the drafters could not imagine the diverse ways we create and consume media content in the twenty-first century. Congress conceived the law not only for yesterday\u27s marketplace, but also for yesterday\u27s consumer. The media consumer today is a venture consumer. Often, she knows what she wants, knows where to get it, and is aware of the risks and costs involved. The mismatch between regulators\u27 imagined consumer and the contemporary consumer means that expanded regulation of embedded advertising according to current reform proposals could end up harming consumers more than helping them. Moreover, embedded advertising is not especially amenable to effective regulation, given the incentives for artists and advertisers to collaborate in the production of entertainment content. In light of both the difficulty of correcting the regime\u27s flaws and the consumer interests threatened by expanded regulation, this Article concludes that maintaining the law as-is—rather than expanding it through the proposed reforms—better serves the consumer

Assessment of Factors Affecting Hospital Readmission in Inpatients with Chronic Heart Failure

This item is only available electronically.Thesis (BHlthMSc(Hons)) -- University of Adelaide, Adelaide Medical School, YEA

Only Part of the Picture: A Response to Professor Tushnet\u27s Worth a Thousand Words

Professor Rebecca Tushnet’s recent article Worth a Thousand Words: The Image of Copyright elucidates a number of difficulties in copyright that flow from judicial failures to treat images consistently and rigorously. She argues that courts both assess copyrightability and evaluate potential infringement in ways that rely on a naïve understanding of the way artists create, and indeed, the way viewers receive works of art. The problem is particularly pronounced with respect to what Tushnet calls non-textual works because copyright law’s default to textuality means that the tools and methods that judges use misalign with the objects of their examination. In this Article, I explain why I am less than fully convinced by Tushnet’s exclusive focus on the visual (or visual exceptionalism). I argue that copyright’s adjudication of all expressive works, not simply visual ones, falls short of ideal. Tushnet’s illuminating analysis helps us see partly why that is. Expressive works—whether visual or verbal or constituted in some other fashion, such as aural, or kinetic—pose a particular and typically unacknowledged problem for courts. Tushnet shows us how, in dealing with images, courts abandon interpretation, or believe it unnecessary. Images are either interpretively opaque—too difficult or impossible to see through and thus adjudicate—or they are transparent—too obvious to necessitate interpretation. Tushnet’s emphasis is on the visual yet her powerful insight may be used as a lens through which to understand copyright’s problems with all expressive works. All expressive works require an interpretive step that courts do not typically acknowledge, a step that delineates what method of interpretation a court will adopt. Thus all cases involving expressive works stand to benefit from the improvements and adjustments Tushnet proposes. This Article calls into question the difference Tushnet builds between visual works and other kinds. I argue that while differences between the visual and the verbal do in some instances exist, the differences may not hold the weight that Tushnet’s visual exceptionalism attributes to them. These differences may, as Tushnet discusses, be the product of such far-ranging causes as cultural construction, or innate biological tendency; and or they may be a function of pragmatic considerations embedded in technical and institutional and generic contexts, as I argue. Both visual and verbal modes of expression conform to, or resist or rework, generic and theoretical conventions (such as romance, pastoral, noir, the sentimental; or realism, modernism, surrealism, avant-gardism, postmodernism, respectively). Whether or not it acknowledges it openly, copyright law traffics in aesthetic theories when it deals with artistic works. It follows therefrom that if copyright suffers from aesthetic naiveté, images and words probably suffer equally. If this view is accurate, the issue is less one of visual exceptionalism, and more one of copyright’s need to develop a more finely-tuned (or simply more consistent) way of treating expressive works. A fix offered for one might also be a fix well-suited to the others