Special and Differential Treatment: A New Factor Explaining LDC Engagement with the WTO Dispute Settlement System?

تُعد العوامل التي تفسر عدم مشاركة والتزام الدول الأقل تطورًا في آلية تسوية النزاعات لمنظمة التجارة الدولية موضوع جدل القطاع الأكاديمي. تقدم هذه الدراسة عاملًا جديدًا لتغذية وتوسيع هذا الجدل. كما أنها تقيّم مواصلة هذه الدول للمعاملة الخاصة التفضيلية في زمن الاتفاقية العامة للتعريفات الجمركية والتجارة، باعتبارها أساس سياستها. وخلال جولة أوروغواي لاتفاقيات التجارة، دفعت هذه السياسة الدول الأقل تطورًا للبحث عن نظام موصى عليه لتسوية النزاعات، ومنفصل عن آلية تسوية النزاعات المتفق عليها من قبل أكثرية أطراف الاتفاقية العامة للتعريفات الجمركية والتجارة. وتخلص هذه الدراسة برغبة الدول الأقل تطورًا في عدم المشاركة أو الانضمام إلى آلية تسوية النزاعات، بالإضافة إلى المطالبة بآلية لتسوية النزاعات موصى عليها فقط لهذه الدول، مما يوضح سبب عدم التزام هذه الأخيرة بآلية تسوية النزاعات.The factors explaining the lack of participation and engagement by Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism (DSU) have been the subject of much academic discourse. This paper posits the existence of a new factor that will inform and expand this discourse. The paper examines the pursuit of Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) by LDCs during the GATT era, positing that S&D became a key driver of LDC policy during this period. It is argued that during the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, this S&D-driven policy led the LDCs to seek a bespoke LDC dispute settlement system extraneous to, and separate from, the DSU mechanism agreed upon by the vast majority of GATT contracting parties. This paper concludes that the clearly espoused desire of LDCs neither to participate in nor to be associated the DSU, coupled with their clearly expressed requests for a bespoke LDC-only dispute settlement mechanism; together provide a powerful new reason why LDCs have not more actively engaged with the DSU

المعاملة الخاصة التفضيلية: عامل جديد لتفسير التزام الدول القل تطورًا بنظام تسوية النزاعات لمنظمة التجارة العالمية

The factors explaining the lack of participation and engagement by Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism (DSU) have been the subject of much academic discourse. This paper posits the existence of a new factor that will inform and expand this discourse. The paper examines the pursuit of Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) by LDCs during the GATT era, positing that S&D became a key driver of LDC policy during this period. It is argued that during the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, this S&D-driven policy led the LDCs to seek a bespoke LDC dispute settlement system extraneous to, and separate from, the DSU mechanism agreed upon by the vast majority of GATT contracting parties. This paper concludes that the clearly espoused desire of LDCs neither to participate in nor to be associated the DSU, coupled with their clearly expressed requests for a bespoke LDC-only dispute settlement mechanism; together provide a powerful new reason why LDCs have not more actively engaged with the DSU.تُعد العوامل التي تفسر عدم مشاركة والتزام الدول الأقل تطورًا في آلية تسوية النزاعات لمنظمة التجارة الدولية موضوع جدل القطاع الأكاديمي. تقدم هذه الدراسة عاملًا جديدًا لتغذية وتوسيع هذا الجدل. كما أنها تقيّم مواصلة هذه الدول للمعاملة الخاصة التفضيلية في زمن الاتفاقية العامة للتعريفات الجمركية والتجارة، باعتبارها أساس سياستها. وخلال جولة أوروغواي لاتفاقيات التجارة، دفعت هذه السياسة الدول الأقل تطورًا للبحث عن نظام موصى عليه لتسوية النزاعات، ومنفصل عن آلية تسوية النزاعات المتفق عليها من قبل أكثرية أطراف الاتفاقية العامة للتعريفات الجمركية والتجارة. وتخلص هذه الدراسة برغبة الدول الأقل تطورًا في عدم المشاركة أو الانضمام إلى آلية تسوية النزاعات، بالإضافة إلى المطالبة بآلية لتسوية النزاعات موصى عليها فقط لهذه الدول، مما يوضح سبب عدم التزام هذه الأخيرة بآلية تسوية النزاعات

The WTO dispute settlement system - one size does not fit all

This thesis examines the operation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) from the perspective of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Ensuring predictability and stability in the rules-based international trading system requires the DSU to be accessible, efficient, reliable, and able to redress imbalances. The inability of the LDCs to fully utilise with the DSU, thus denigrates their ability to redress imbalances and, by extension, their ability to fully engage in international trade, which logically could restrict their economic growth. This thesis builds upon our existing knowledge by exploring and examining why the LDCs, having brought only one dispute, appear to have difficulties -engaging with the DSU, and this thesis reveals a series of issues and concerns. Since the 1990s, the DSU has been the subject of review, and this thesis also explores these ongoing review negotiations from an LDC viewpoint. This LDC-focused analysis and evaluation represent an original and important contribution to the general body of academic knowledge, illuminating areas of these negotiations which have hitherto been overlooked within the academic fora. The thesis also narrates how during both the negotiations which led to the creation of the DSU and those relating to its review, the repeated failure of the LDC proposals to either gain traction or even, upon occasion, be discussed by the wider WTO membership, contributed towards a growing bias amongst the LDCs against engaging with the DSU which is a recurring theme of this thesis. The thesis makes recommendations to address some of the engagement issues faced by the LDCs. Arguing that WTO action alone will not address all these issues, the thesis advocates that the LDCs must themselves be prepared to take measures to address their structural and other weaknesses.This thesis examines the operation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) from the perspective of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Ensuring predictability and stability in the rules-based international trading system requires the DSU to be accessible, efficient, reliable, and able to redress imbalances. The inability of the LDCs to fully utilise with the DSU, thus denigrates their ability to redress imbalances and, by extension, their ability to fully engage in international trade, which logically could restrict their economic growth. This thesis builds upon our existing knowledge by exploring and examining why the LDCs, having brought only one dispute, appear to have difficulties -engaging with the DSU, and this thesis reveals a series of issues and concerns. Since the 1990s, the DSU has been the subject of review, and this thesis also explores these ongoing review negotiations from an LDC viewpoint. This LDC-focused analysis and evaluation represent an original and important contribution to the general body of academic knowledge, illuminating areas of these negotiations which have hitherto been overlooked within the academic fora. The thesis also narrates how during both the negotiations which led to the creation of the DSU and those relating to its review, the repeated failure of the LDC proposals to either gain traction or even, upon occasion, be discussed by the wider WTO membership, contributed towards a growing bias amongst the LDCs against engaging with the DSU which is a recurring theme of this thesis. The thesis makes recommendations to address some of the engagement issues faced by the LDCs. Arguing that WTO action alone will not address all these issues, the thesis advocates that the LDCs must themselves be prepared to take measures to address their structural and other weaknesses

Frustration through futility: Least developed countries and the WTO’s settlement of disputes

The lack of participation and engagement by Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the WTO in general and in their use of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) in particular has been a continuing problem facing the WTO, tainting not only the organization as a whole but also tarnishing the crown jewels of the WTO namely the DSU. This article considers from a commercial viewpoint the many issues and barriers preventing LDCs usage of the DSU including capacity issues, costs, private sector involvement and others. Consideration is also given to specific provisional measures which are widely available and recognised within national legal regimen, have been adopted internationally by a plethora of divergent judicial, quasi-judicial and arbitral fora, and are recommended by the WTO and which are, significantly, missing from the DSU itself. The paper concludes that the addition of provisional measures to the DSU toolkit will enhance the effectiveness of the DSU by removing key structural obstacles, which hitherto have prevented LDCs from exercising their right to prosecute trade disputes with other WTO members