Throwing baby out with the bath water : some reflections on the evolution of reproductive technology.

This article discusses section 156 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 which prohibits the use of eggs from aborted female foetuses for the purposes of reproduction. I argue that the pre-legislative debates focus only on the biological relationship between the aborted foetus and any ensuing child and foreclose the possibility of useful discussion about the potential merits of such technology. Kristeva's theory of abjection has been used in order to elucidate the strength of feeling about the use of eggs from the expelled foetus. I suggest that the ‘yuk’ factor stems from the potential for the blurring of the boundaries between life and death. In addition, I suggest that the stress placed on the biological link means that the foetus is ascribed special properties not given to live donors. Woman's very crucial role in reproductive technologies is therefore erased. The article argues that there are very good reasons why the debate on the subject should remain open. At present women donors have to undergo highly intrusive procedures in order to give eggs and the process is not without its health risks. The use of eggs from aborted foetuses certainly raises important consent issues but these could be addressed by placing women at the centre of the decision making process, starting with the recognition that it is women and not foetuses who have the remit and responsibility for giving consent for the use of their genetic material. Moreover, there should be an acknowledgement that women are perfectly capable of making informed decisions about donation and of considering the potential implications of participating in egg donation

The mysterious case of disappearing family law and the shrinking vulnerable subject: The shifting sands of family law’s jurisdiction

This article seeks to critically examine the implications that the new eligibility requirements for legal aid as implemented by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 are having on the ways in which private family law governs families. It makes use of a theoretical lens drawn from the work of Valverde (2009, 2014a, 2014b) on ‘jurisdiction’ to map the shift that has taken place within family law as a result of the political boundary that the act has drawn between ‘vulnerable’ litigants eligible for legal aid and the rest of families engaging with private family law, for whom self-sufficiency and responsibility is encouraged and expected. It argues that in reserving legal aid for a narrow group of vulnerable litigants, the formal scale of family law has shrunk, there being at the same time an increased reliance on more informal sources of law such as advice-based resources. This has led to a diversification of formal and informal scales of governance which operate according to different ‘logics’, which impact negatively on access to family justice for families from various backgrounds and circumstances. The article concludes with a call for family law researchers to be mindful of the need to look at both formal and more informal sources of family law in order to fully appreciate developments within the jurisdiction, particularly pernicious ones, and to be able to respond to them appropriately