Oosagitta gen. nov. from tropical Africa, with revision of two species and description of four new species (Coleoptera: Chrysomelidae, Galerucinae)

After our taxonomic revision of Ootheca Chevrolat, 1837, and the description of Oothecoides Kortenhaus & Wagner, 2011 and Ootibia Kortenhaus & Wagner, 2012, it became clear that a further four galerucine species, closely related to the above named taxa, form a distinct monophyletic group, that constitutes a new genus, Oosagitta gen. nov. with O. anningae sp. nov., O. geescheae sp. nov., O. melanopicta sp. nov. and O. thomasi sp. nov.. Exosoma angolensis Laboissière, 1939, the type species of the new genus, and Ergana minuta Laboissière, 1937 are newly transferred to Oosagitta gen. nov. All species of Oosagitta gen. nov. are characterized by a broad body and pronotum, a more or less convex dorsum and short legs, and as such are most similar to the other above named genera. The antennae of Oosagitta gen. nov. are distinctly longer than those of Ootheca, Oothecoides and Ootibia. Genital structures of the males allow a reliable identifi cation of the genus. (Re-) descriptions are given for all species, including semi-schematic illustrations depicting the habitus outline, shape of the basal antennomeres and the median lobe. Photographs of the name-bearing types and distribution maps are provided

Deregulation Using Stealth “Science” Strategies

In this Article, we explore the “stealth” use of science by the Executive Branch to advance deregulation and highlight the limited, existing legal and institutional constraints in place to discipline and discourage these practices. Political appointees have employed dozens of strategies over the years, in both Democratic and Republican administrations, to manipulate science in ends-oriented ways that advance the goal of deregulation. Despite this bald manipulation of science, however, the officials frequently present these strategies as necessary to bring “sound science” to bear on regulatory decisions. To begin to address this problem, it is important to reconceptualize how the administrative state addresses science-intensive decisions. Rather than allow agencies and the White House to operate as a cohesive unit, institutional bounds should be drawn around the scientific expertise lodged within the agencies. We propose that the background scientific work prepared by agency staff should be firewalled from the evaluative, policymaking input of the remaining officials, including politically appointed officials, in the agency

Substitution and crowding-out effects of active labour market policy

The search model contains two matching technologies, the public employment service (PES) with its type-specific registers for workers and vacancies, and the search market where firms advertise vacancies and unemployed who have not been placed by the PES search for jobs. The placement activity of the PES increases the bargained wages, reduces active job search, decreases the number of advertised vacancies, but - compared with the laissez- faire regime - increases employment and per capita consumption. Of all the instruments of ALMP, the probabilities of a match, the portion of unskilled not interested in a job, and the hiring subsidies generate crowding-out effects. The productivity of the unskilled, (re-employment)bonuses, penalties for violations of the search rule, and the stringency of the search rule cause crowdingin effects. Assistance for problem groups is less effective than promoting active job search. -- Das Suchmodel umfasst zwei Matching-Technologien, die des PES mit typspezifischen Registern für Arbeitslose und Vakanzen und die des Suchmarkts, wo Firmen Vakanzen annoncieren und nicht Vermittelte nach Stellen suchen. Die Vermittlungstätigkeit des PES erhöht die Lohnkosten, reduziert die aktive Suche und die annoncierten Vakanzen, senkt im Vergleich zum Laissez-faire Regime die Arbeitslosenquote und steigert den Pro-Kopf-Konsum. Von den Instrumentvariablen der ALMP verdrängen die Matchwahrscheinlichkeiten, der Anteil der "Arbeitsunwilligen" und die Lohnkostenzuschüsse Arbeitsplätze. Die Produktivität der Geringqualifizierten, (Wiederbeschäftigungs-) Prämien, Sanktionen für Suchregel-Verstöße sowie die Intensität der Regeldurchsetzung senken die Arbeitslosigkeit. Die Förderung von "Problemgruppen" ist weniger wirkungsvoll als die Förderung der aktiven Jobsuche.Matching model,active labor market policy,PES,search market,heterogeneous unemployment pool,ranking

Do Targeted Hiring Subsidies and Profiling Techniques Reduce Unemployment?

To reduce unemployment targeted hiring subsidies for long-term unemployed are often recommended. To explore their effect on employment and wages, we devise a model with two types of unemployed and two methods of search, a public employment service (PES) and random search. The eligibility of a new match depends on the applicant’s unemployment duration and on the method of search. The hiring subsidy raises job destruction and extends contrary to Mortensen-Pissarides (1999, 2003) the duration of a job search, so that equilibrium unemployment increases. Like the subsidy, organizational reforms, which advance the search effectiveness of the PES, crowd out the active jobseekers and reduce overall employment as well as social welfare. Nevertheless, reforms are a visible success for the PES and its target group, as they significantly increase the service’s placement rate and lower the duration of a job search via the PESMatching model; hiring subsidy; endogenous separation rate; active labour market policy; PES; random search

A hiring subsidy for long-term unemployed in a search model with PES and random search

Our search model combines two search methods, the public employment service (PES) and random search. The separation rate is endogenous, the job matching process consists of three rounds. In the first and the second respectively the short-term (STU) and the long-term unemployed (LTU) randomly search for a vacancy. During the last round the PES matches registered jobseekers with registered vacancies. The LTU cause training costs and, during the training period, have a lower marginal product than the STU. The effects of the hiring subsidy and of profiling techniques to increase the effectiveness of the PES depend on the target group they are geared towards. For skill groups, who have relatively low private search costs in comparison with their productivity, not only the hiring subsidy but also the job placement activities of the PES are counterproductive and reduce overall employment. -- Das Modell kombiniert zwei Suchmethoden, den staatlichen Vermittlungsdienst (PES) und die private Jobsuche. Die Trennungsrate des Modells ist endogen, der Matching Prozeß umfasst drei Phasen. In der ersten und zweiten suchen jeweils die Kurzzeitarbeitslosen (STU) und die Langzeitarbeitslosen (LTU) nach annoncierten Stellen, in der dritten vermittelt der PES registrierte Jobsucher mit registrierten Vakanzen. LTU verursachen Trainingskosten und haben während der Einarbeitungszeit eine geringere Produktivität als STU. Die Wirkungen des Lohnkostenzuschusses für LTU und der Maßnahmen zur Erhöhung der Vermittlungseffektivität des PES hängen von der Zielgruppe ab. Für Zielgruppen, deren private Suchkosten im Vergleich zu ihrer Arbeitsproduktivität relativ gering sind, erweisen sich nicht nur der Lohnkostenzuschuss sondern auch die staatliche Vermittlungsaktivität als kontraproduktive Instrumente, die die gesamtwirtschaftliche Beschäftigung reduzieren.Matching model,hiring subsidy,endogenous separation rate,active labour market policy,PES,search market