Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism toBargaining, Deadlines, Markets

Labour Market Insecurity: The Effects of Job, Employment and Income Insecurity on the Mental Well-being of Employees

This article proposes that the insecurity facing employees in the labour market can be viewed as a multifaceted concept that encompasses job insecurity, employment insecurity and income insecurity, as well as the cognitive and affective dimensions of each of these. The results indicate the validity of using this concept in order to better understand how insecurity relates to mental well-being by affecting both the manifest and latent functions of work

Implementation Cycles in the New Economy

The economic boom of the USA in the 1990s was remarkable in its duration, the sustained rise in equipment investment, the reduced volatility of productivity growth, and continued uncertainty about the trend growth rate. In this paper we link these phenomena using an extension of the classic model of implementation cycles due to Shleifer (1986). The key idea is that uncertainty about the trend growth rate can lead firms to bring forward the implementation of innovations, temporarily eliminating expectations-driven business cycles, because delay is risky when beliefs are not common knowledge.Implementation cycles, New Economy, multiple equilibria.

Naked Aggression: Personality and portfolio manager performance

We provide evidence that a personality trait, aggression, has a first-order effect on group financial decision making. In a laboratory experiment on group portfolio choice, highly aggressive subjects (measured by a standard psychology test) were much more likely to recommend risky investment strategies consistent with their own personal information, regardless of the information received by other group members. Outside of this group context, aggression had no effect on subject behavior. Thus, our aggression measure appears to capture an aggressive disposition, which seeks to dominate group decisions, rather than simply reflect risk attitudes or cognitive biases

What About The Third-Agers?: A Study Of Participation In Informal/Non-Formal Learning By Older Adults

Set in the context of an ageing population where longevity is often presented as a problem, this study aims to examine the participation of 60 - 90 year-olds in learning outside the formal sector and to contest the prevailing negative image of older people as non-participants in education. A survey of the literature illustrates the ageist attitudes prevalent amongst some educationalists and demonstrates how older people are often marginalized from the social and economic process, not necessarily by active discrimination but more by oversight and omission, their educational needs being largely ignored. The research seeks to understand the meanings older people give to education and to illuminate the processes by which some, even if only a few, come to learning in later life. Calling for the inclusion of older learners in educational provision, the Carnegie Inquiry into the Third Age (1993) hinted that learning in a social context, with participants involved in planning their own learning, was a constructive way forward for this age group. A life history approach is used to compile learning biographies of twelve members of a self-help educational organisation, the University of the Third Age. Tracing the routes that have brought these people to learning in later life, the study examines their motivations to learn at different life stages and demonstrates how decisions to participate or not participate are conditioned by a complex interplay of reactions to social, cultural and historical events. Many of the current generation of older people constructed their lives against a background of limited initial education, economic depression and the disruptions of a world war, all factors which would seem to predict nonparticipation in learning. Yet many thousands of this generation are participants. The study examines the role of learning in the lives of older people and seeks to understand their reasons for choosing to participate in a specific type of informal or non-formal learning where participants take responsibility for their own learning

After the Great Recession: Unions’ Views on Transnational Interests and Cooperation

The aim is to describe and explain the similarities and differences between European trade unions concerning their views on transnational union interests and cooperation in the wake of the Great Recession. We do this by analyzing 221 responses from a European-wide web/postal survey distributed in 2015–2016 to union officials representing staff in employment sectors such as transport, metal and mining, construction, health care, and banking and finance. We find only limited sectoral differences, despite the varied impact of the Great Recession. The main findings are that unions in crisis-ridden southern European countries express a stronger orientation toward transnational union interests and cooperation. Unions in the northern and western European center express a weaker transnational orientation, in line with a renationalization strategy typically expressed in the form of national competitive corporative arrangements. This shows the importance of different institutional resources for unions across the various European industrial relations regimes

Cohort Differences in Swedish Union Membership 1956–2019 and the Role of Individualization

Discussions of the role of cohort differences have long been part of academic research on union membership, with a central hypothesis being that the general decline in unionization is caused by changes toward more individualistic values in the younger generations. However, the short time span of most studies makes it uncertain if they can separate cohort effects from age effects. Using survey data going back to 1956, we test the individualization hypothesis. Our main result is that later Swedish cohorts are indeed less prone to join unions. In particular, the differences between cohorts born before and after ca 1970 are striking. We also provide evidence that the erosion in union membership in Sweden is not related to changes toward more individualistic values in later cohorts, or even to more negative views of unions per se

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker’s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.Interbank Competition, Screening, Credit Risk, Adverse Selection

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to use, no delay will be observed

Naked Aggression: Personality and portfolio manager performance

Why do portfolio managers actively manage their stock portfolios? The finance literature suggests the importance of financial incentives, effort, information and career concerns. We suggest that personality can also be a factor. We perform an experiment with industry experts. The experiment documents that, in a group decision setting, subjects with high aggression, measured by a standard psychology test, were much more likely to deviate from market tracking. In an individual decision setting, these same subject’s behavior was not significantly affected by aggressiveness. This result suggests that, in group settings, personality, rather than cognitive biases, might be the most important source of behavioral deviations from the rational choice paradigm