Developing a Novel Task to Investigate the Cognitive and Neural Processes Involved in Switching between Multiple Goals

Coordinating and switching appropriately between multiple goals is an important challenge. What processes are used by the human mind and brain to solve this challenge? A novel task was developed and pilot tested to study these processes as involved in three types of goal-switching: switching between substitutable means to the same ends, prioritizing among multiple necessary means to an end, and switching goals at different levels of goal-hierarchy. Results confirmed that people switched between goals in the task in ways predicted by the current model of multiple goal pursuit. This study will provide the basis for a planned neuroimaging study to investigate the neural correlates of these goal-switching processes.M.Sc

Normative Approaches to Understanding Stereotyping and Group-based Inferences

People often make inferences about others based on beliefs or stereotypes about the social groups a person belongs to. These types of inferences can often be problematic (e.g. overgeneralizing based on a stereotype can lead to less accurate inferences, and exacerbate moral and social problems like discrimination). Yet group-based types of inferences can also be a necessary and even beneficial part of life (e.g. using accurate beliefs about groups can make inferences more accurate, and recognizing real group differences can serve as a basis addressing problematic social inequalities). The current research clarified the epistemic and moral standards that can be used to distinguish the problematic from non-problematic cases, and then used this to empirically examine several reasons people might fail to live up to these standards. Part 1 re-examined the idea that certain types of social categories (e.g. demographics, occupations) might often be overused compared to “individuating information” (e.g. traits, behaviours) as a heuristic to simplify inferences. Results did not support this idea, instead suggesting that these two types of information are largely used similarly. Part 2 re-examined whether certain biases in people’s information (due to lacking first-hand knowledge or having biased second-hand knowledge about a group) might lead people to think that groups are overly homogeneous, and thus be overconfident in their group-based inferences. Results suggested that, while both sources of bias can lead groups to appear more homogeneous, only second-hand knowledge leads to greater confidence when making inferences. Part 3 examined the moral norms used to judge group-based generalizations, and showed how differences or errors in people’s beliefs might lead people to freely use generalizations that are widely seen as violating these moral norms. Overall, this work helps bring clarity to the epistemic and moral standards that can be applied to evaluate group-based inferences, and helps better understand when people will or will not live up to these standards.Ph.D

The Edge of Ockham’s Razor: Examining Boundary Conditions on Preferences for Simpler Explanations

People often prefer simpler explanations (that posit the presence of fewer causes), judging these more probable than more complex alternatives. However, simplicity preferences are only mathematically justified under certain conditions. We examine one case where, mathematically, complexity preferences are justified, and test whether this corresponds to a boundary condition on simplicity preferences. Specifically, we focus on cases where causes occur frequently (rather than rarely), and where explanations specify the absence of additional causes (e.g., “Cause A and not B or C”) rather than remaining agnostic about their presence or absence (e.g., “Cause A”). Study 1 showed that, in these cases, simplicity preferences were attenuated, but not reversed. Study 2 suggests that simplicity preferences partly stemmed from failures to explicitly represent absent causes. We suggest that biases towards oversimplification may arise due to over-application of a cognitively simple version of Ockham’s razor, that is insensitive to the probability of absent causes

Integrating stereotypes and individuating information based on informativenessunder cognitive load

When making inferences about another person (the target), perceivers often have to integrate multiple sources of informa-tion. This can include stereotypes about the targets groups (e.g., age, race, occupation) as well as other information aboutthe target (individuating information). In simple situations, perceivers approximate ideal Bayesian information integra-tion, relying more heavily on information that is more informative for the judgement. However under cognitive load withcognitive resources taken up by other demands people may instead rely on simplifying heuristics. We investigate severalpossible heuristics that people may use under load, including relying primarily on stereotypes rather than individuatinginformation, as suggested by previous research, and we test if and how these heuristics depend on how informative eachsource of information is. By clarifying how stereotypes are used in less-than-ideal cognitive conditions, this work hasimplications for when stereotypes will tend to be overused in real-world situations

Simplicity beyond probability: Simplicity’s role in evaluating explanations goes beyond providing cues to priors and likelihoods

People often evaluate explanations by considering various ‘explanatory virtues’, such as an explanation’s simplicity (i.e. the number of unexplained causes referred to). Simplicity has been thought to guide these evaluations by providing a cue to the inputs of Bayesian inference (priors and likelihoods), thus indirectly helping compute the outputs: the posterior probability of an explanation being true. Yet simplicity may also play other, more direct, roles in explanation evaluations. While study 1 supported the mediating role of priors and likelihoods in people’s simplicity preferences, study 1 and 2 found that participants still preferred simpler explanations after statistically controlling for priors and likelihoods (either elicited or provided). These results suggest that simplicity guides explanation evaluations not just by providing cues to the inputs of Bayesian inference, but also by serving as a direct cue to the outputs of these inferences – perhaps providing a simplifying heuristic for these evaluations

The Effect of Knowledge about a Group on Perceived Group Variability and Certainty about Stereotype-Based Inferences

People often learn about categories, particularly social categories, based on biased information. Unless people are able to correct for this, they may develop biased beliefs and inferences about these categories. The current research examines if potentially biased information about social groups makes groups appear more homogeneous, and makes people more confident in their inferences about group members. Two sources of biases are considered: due to lacking first-hand experience with a group, or due to having second-hand information from the media or other people. Both sources made groups appear more homogeneous, suggesting that information biases were present and not corrected for. However, only second-hand knowledge led to greater confidence about group members, because, when people lacked first-hand knowledge, their uncertainty about the group average counteracted this effect. This highlights the importance of understanding biases present in people’s information, and corrective processes that may allow people to continue to make unbiased inferences