Democracy under uncertainty: The ‘wisdom of crowds’ and the free-rider problem in group decision making

We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free-riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group production as a function of aggregate individual contributions. This diminishing marginal returns assumption is more realistic and generates starkly different predictions compared to the linear model. One important implication is that, under most conditions, there exist equilibria where some, but not all members of a group contribute, even with completely self-interested motives. An agent-based simulation confirms the individual and group advantages of the equilibria in which behavioral asymmetry emerges from a game structure that is a priori perfectly symmetric for all agents (all agents have the same payoff function and action space, but take different actions in equilibria). And a behavioral experiment demonstrates that cooperators and free-riders coexist in a stable manner in groups performing with the non-linear production function. A collateral result demonstrates that, compared to a ―dictatorial‖ decision scheme guided by the best member in a group, the majority-plurality decision rules can pool information effectively and produce greater individual net welfare at equilibrium, even if free-riding is not sanctioned. This is an original proof that cooperation in ad hoc decision-making groups can be understood in terms of self-interested motivations and that, despite the free-rider problem, majority-plurality decision rules can function robustly as simple, efficient social decision heuristics.group decision making under uncertainty, free-rider problem, majority-plurality rules, marginally-diminishing group returns, evolutionary games, behavioral experiment

Democracy under uncertainty: The ‘wisdom of crowds’ and the free-rider problem in group decision making

We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free-riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group production as a function of aggregate individual contributions. This diminishing marginal returns assumption is more realistic and generates starkly different predictions compared to the linear model. One important implication is that, under most conditions, there exist equilibria where some, but not all members of a group contribute, even with completely self-interested motives. An agent-based simulation confirms the individual and group advantages of the equilibria in which behavioral asymmetry emerges from a game structure that is a priori perfectly symmetric for all agents (all agents have the same payoff function and action space, but take different actions in equilibria). And a behavioral experiment demonstrates that cooperators and free-riders coexist in a stable manner in groups performing with the non-linear production function. A collateral result demonstrates that, compared to a ―dictatorial‖ decision scheme guided by the best member in a group, the majority-plurality decision rules can pool information effectively and produce greater individual net welfare at equilibrium, even if free-riding is not sanctioned. This is an original proof that cooperation in ad hoc decision-making groups can be understood in terms of self-interested motivations and that, despite the free-rider problem, majority-plurality decision rules can function robustly as simple, efficient social decision heuristics

Democracy under uncertainty: The ‘wisdom of crowds’ and the free-rider problem in group decision making

We introduce a game theory model of individual decisions to cooperate by contributing personal resources to group decisions versus by free-riding on the contributions of other members. In contrast to most public-goods games that assume group returns are linear in individual contributions, the present model assumes decreasing marginal group production as a function of aggregate individual contributions. This diminishing marginal returns assumption is more realistic and generates starkly different predictions compared to the linear model. One important implication is that, under most conditions, there exist equilibria where some, but not all members of a group contribute, even with completely self-interested motives. An agent-based simulation confirms the individual and group advantages of the equilibria in which behavioral asymmetry emerges from a game structure that is a priori perfectly symmetric for all agents (all agents have the same payoff function and action space, but take different actions in equilibria). And a behavioral experiment demonstrates that cooperators and free-riders coexist in a stable manner in groups performing with the non-linear production function. A collateral result demonstrates that, compared to a ―dictatorial‖ decision scheme guided by the best member in a group, the majority-plurality decision rules can pool information effectively and produce greater individual net welfare at equilibrium, even if free-riding is not sanctioned. This is an original proof that cooperation in ad hoc decision-making groups can be understood in terms of self-interested motivations and that, despite the free-rider problem, majority-plurality decision rules can function robustly as simple, efficient social decision heuristics

Japan Prosthodontic Society position paper on “occlusal discomfort syndrome”

Purpose: Dentists may encounter patients who present with a sense of a malocclusion but in whom no objective findings can be detected. For the patient who insists that there is occlusal discomfort, in the absence of evidence some dentists elect to perform an occlusal adjustment that not only fails to alleviate symptoms, and may, in fact, exacerbate the discomfort. The patient–dentist relationship is then likely compromised because of a lack of trust. Study selection: In 2011, the Clinical Practice Guidelines Committee of the Japan Prosthodontic Society formulated guidelines for the management of occlusal discomfort. When formulating clinical practice guidelines, the committee bases their recommendations on information derived from scientific evidence. For ‘‘occlusal dysesthesia,’’ however, there are an insufficient number of high-quality papers related to the subject. Therefore, a consensus meeting was convened by the Japan Prosthodontic Society to examine evidence in the Japanese- and English-language literature and generate a multi-center survey to create an appropriate appellation for this condition. Results: As a result of the consensus meeting and survey findings, this condition may be justifiably termed ‘‘occlusal discomfort syndrome.’’ Conclusions: The Japan Prosthodontics Society believes that identification of an umbrella term for occlusal discomfort might serve as a useful guide to formulating clinical practice guidelines in the future. This position paper represents summary findings in the literature combined with the results of a multicenter survey focused on dental occlusal treatment and the condition of patients who present with occlusal discomfort syndrome

Running Head: Cultural transmission and human adaptability

It is often taken for granted that social/cultural learning increases human adaptability, because it allows us to acquire useful information without costly individual learning by trial and error. Rogers (1988) challenged this common view by a simple analytic model. Assuming a “cultural ” population composed of individual learners engaging in costly information search and imitators who just copy another member’s behavior, Rogers showed that mean fitness of such a mixed “cultural ” population at the evolutionary equilibrium is exactly identical to the mean fitness of an “acultural ” population consisting only of individual learners. Rogers ’ result implies that no special adaptive advantage accrues from social/cultural learning. We revisited this counter-intuitive argument through use of an experiment with human subjects, and by a series of evolutionary computer simulations that extended Kameda & Nakanishi (2002). The simulation results indicated that, if agents can switch the individual learning and imitation selectively, a "cultural " population indeed outperforms an "acultural " population in mean fitness for a broad range of parameters. An experiment that implemented a non-stationary uncertain environment in a laboratory setting provided empirical support for this thesis. Implications of these findings for cultural capacities and some future directions are discussed. Key Words: social learning, cultural transmission, non-stationary uncertain environment, mean fitness, producer-scrounger dilemm