The Role of Civil Society in Monitoring the Executive in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights:Recasting the Rule of Law

This article explores the role of civil society in checking the executive as reflected in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Although this role is traditionally associated with the judiciary and the legislative, in light of the institutional mutations in modern States, the ECtHR case-law envisages a multitude of forms through which civil society can check the government and thus uphold the ‘rule of law from below’. In addressing this recasting of the rule of law, the article discusses in particular the role of good and bad faith. The ECtHR case-law on the 'mala fides' restrictions of rights under Article 18 ECHR highlights the idea that the checking of the executive by civil society is even more crucial in States where the rule of law is systematically suffering and thus the civil society is the only entity within the State that can genuinely check the executive. The civil society, on its part, should exercise these checking functions in good faith

The principle of separation of powers in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights

Quid d’un principe constitutionnel concernant l’organisation institutionnelle de l’État, tel que la séparation des pouvoirs, dans la jurisprudence d’une cour internationale des droits de l’homme, telle que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ? S’il serait audacieux de prouver que le juge de Strasbourg applique une certaine théorie de séparation des pouvoirs, il est pourtant pertinent de répondre à la question de savoir si les solutions adoptées par le juge européen des droits de l’homme dessinent une vision cohérente de ce que doivent, selon lui, être les relations entre les pouvoirs. En outre, il ne faut pas faire abstraction du fait que la théorie de la séparation des pouvoirs telle qu’elle est conçue dans l’État libéral contemporain n’implique la consécration que d’un socle minimal de solutions soit acquis.What of the idea that a constitutional principle concerning the institutional organization of the State, such as the separation of powers, could be found in the jurisprudence of an international court of human rights, namely the European Court of Human Rights ? Even if it were to be audacious to prove that the judges of the Strasbourg Court apply a precise theory of separation of powers, it, nonetheless remains relevant to answer the question whether the solutions adopted by the aforementioned judges outline a coherent vision of what should be, in their view, the relations between the branches of government. Yet, one should always bear in mind that the theory of the separation of powers, as conceived in the contemporary liberal State, implies the consecration of only a minimum nucleus of solutions

Le principe de séparation des pouvoirs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme

What of the idea that a constitutional principle concerning the institutional organization of the State, such as the separation of powers, could be found in the jurisprudence of an international court of human rights, namely the European Court of Human Rights ? Even if it were to be audacious to prove that the judges of the Strasbourg Court apply a precise theory of separation of powers, it, nonetheless remains relevant to answer the question whether the solutions adopted by the aforementioned judges outline a coherent vision of what should be, in their view, the relations between the branches of government. Yet, one should always bear in mind that the theory of the separation of powers, as conceived in the contemporary liberal State, implies the consecration of only a minimum nucleus of solutions. Withins the context, the primary aspiration of the separation of powers lies in the protection of the judicial and legislative branches against the executive. The European Court of Human Rights shares this view. Even if the principle of the separation of powers is not a principle enunciated by the Court, at least not with the required precision, it is, nonetheless, a principle already present in the Strasbourg jurisprudence and its future cannot but be regarded as promising

The principle of separation of powers in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights

Quid d’un principe constitutionnel concernant l’organisation institutionnelle de l’État, tel que la séparation des pouvoirs, dans la jurisprudence d’une cour internationale des droits de l’homme, telle que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ? S’il serait audacieux de prouver que le juge de Strasbourg applique une certaine théorie de séparation des pouvoirs, il est pourtant pertinent de répondre à la question de savoir si les solutions adoptées par le juge européen des droits de l’homme dessinent une vision cohérente de ce que doivent, selon lui, être les relations entre les pouvoirs. En outre, il ne faut pas faire abstraction du fait que la théorie de la séparation des pouvoirs telle qu’elle est conçue dans l’État libéral contemporain n’implique la consécration que d’un socle minimal de solutions soit acquis.What of the idea that a constitutional principle concerning the institutional organization of the State, such as the separation of powers, could be found in the jurisprudence of an international court of human rights, namely the European Court of Human Rights ? Even if it were to be audacious to prove that the judges of the Strasbourg Court apply a precise theory of separation of powers, it, nonetheless remains relevant to answer the question whether the solutions adopted by the aforementioned judges outline a coherent vision of what should be, in their view, the relations between the branches of government. Yet, one should always bear in mind that the theory of the separation of powers, as conceived in the contemporary liberal State, implies the consecration of only a minimum nucleus of solutions