Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy: Revisited

In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) show that the mode of competition (quantity or price) determines whether information sharing occurs between firms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the fims are located in different countries. In this paper, we show that the relative number of firms located in each country is also critical. In particular, we illustrate that with quantity competition and under the presence of demand and cost uncertainty information sharing does not occur when the number of firms in one country is higher than the number of firms in the other country. Moreover, we show that the informational prisoner's dilemma in the current context appears only when the number of firms across countries is equal.Information; uncertainty; strategic trade; multiple firms

Indirect Tax Reforms and Public Goods under Imperfect Competition

This paper examines, within an imperfectly competitive environment with public goods, the welfare effects of three popular indirect tax reforms: i) a tariff cut combined with an equal increase in the consumption tax, ii) a tariff cut combined with an increase in the consumption tax that leaves consumer price unchanged, and iii) an export tax reduction combined with an equal increase in the production tax. It is shown that the welfare effects of these reforms are ambiguous, in that they depend on the strength of the consumers’ valuation of the public goods. This result contrasts existing results in the literature that ignores public goods provision.Tariff Reform, Tax Reform, Imperfect Competition, Public goods

Trade and Tax Reforms in a Cash-in-Advance Economy

This paper investigates the determinants of longevity at a macroeconomic level, emphasizing the important role played by education. To analyze the determinants of longevity, we build a model where households intentionally invest in health and education, and where education exerts external effects on longevity. Performing an empirical analysis using data across 71 countries, we find that society’s tertiary education attainment rate is important for longevity, in addition to any role that basic education plays for life expectancy at the individual level. This finding uncovers a key externality of education, consistent with the theoretical hypothesis advanced in our macroeconomic model.Tariff reform, Tax reform, Cash-in-Advance Constraint

Information Disclosure Under Different Modes of Regulation

In this study we assume that the governments are uncertain about the future product demand in a standard eco-dumping model. Allowing the governments to obtain information from firms, we examine governments.and .rms.incentives to share information. We show that, when the governments regulate the polluting .rms through emission standards, then, the governments and the .rms will reach an agreement concerning information sharing. The opposite holds, when the governments regulate pollution through emission taxes.

A Carbon Leakage Mitigation Reform Strategy : The Role of Border Carbon Adjustments

Acknowledgements We graciously acknowledge the constructive comments and suggestions by Catia Montagna and Panos Hatzipanayotou. The authors are responsible for remaining errors and omissions

Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy: Revisited

In a recent paper, Creane and Miyagiwa (2008) show that the mode of competition (quantity or price) determines whether information sharing occurs between firms and governments within an international duopoly context in which the fims are located in different countries. In this paper, we show that the relative number of firms located in each country is also critical. In particular, we illustrate that with quantity competition and under the presence of demand and cost uncertainty information sharing does not occur when the number of firms in one country is higher than the number of firms in the other country. Moreover, we show that the informational prisoner's dilemma in the current context appears only when the number of firms across countries is equal

Information Sharing and Environmental Policies

Based on the assumption that in a standard eco-dumping model governments are uncertain about future product demand and allowing governments to obtain information from firms, we examine governments’ and firms’ incentives to share information. We show that when governments regulate polluting firms through emission standards, then governments and firms will reach an agreement concerning information sharing. The opposite holds when governments regulate pollution through emission taxes

Trade and Tax Reforms in a Cash-in-Advance Economy

We examine the effects of both tariff-only and coordinated trade-tax reforms on market access, government revenue and welfare for a small monetary economy, under the assumption that a certain fraction of purchases of each good must be ?nanced with cash held in advance. We show that if the cash requirement ratio in the exportable sector is greater than that in the importable then, contrary to previous results: i) a uniform radial reduction of tariffs has ambiguous effects on both welfare and market access, ii) tariff and consumption tax reforms that leave consumer prices unchanged may be more efficient in improving market access and welfare than a reform that involves only tariffs and iii) export and production tax reforms that keep producer prices unchanged may be welfare deteriorating.Tariff and Tax Reforms; Export and Production Tax Reform;Cash-in-Advance Constraint.

www.mdpi.com/journal/ijerph Article Information Sharing and Environmental Policies

Abstract: Based on the assumption that in a standard eco-dumping model governments are uncertain about future product demand and allowing governments to obtain information from firms, we examine governments ’ and firms ’ incentives to share information. We show that when governments regulate polluting firms through emission standards, then governments and firms will reach an agreement concerning information sharing. The opposite holds when governments regulate pollution through emission taxes