How Far Are We From The Slippery Slope? The Laffer Curve Revisited

The goal of this paper is to examine the shape of the Laffer curve quantitatively in a simple neoclassical growth model calibrated to the US as well as to the EU-15 economy. We show that the US and the EU-15 area are located on the left side of their labor and capital tax Laffer curves, but the EU-15 economy being much closer to the slippery slopes than the US. Our results indicate that since 1975 the EU-15 area has moved considerably closer to the peaks of their Laffer curves. We find that the slope of the Laffer curve in the EU-15 economy is much flatter than in the US which documents a much higher degree of distortions in the EU-15 area. A dynamic scoring analysis shows that more than one half of a labor tax cut and more than four fifth of a capital tax cut are self-financing in the EU-15 economy.Laffer curve, US and EU-15 economy

How far are we from the slippery slope? The Laffer curve revisited

We characterize the Laffer curves for labor taxation and capital income taxation quantitatively for the US, the EU-14 and individual European countries by comparing the balanced growth paths of a neoclassical growth model featuring ”constant Frisch elasticity” (CFE) preferences. We derive properties of CFE preferences. We provide new tax rate data. For benchmark parameters, we find that the US can increase tax revenues by 30% by raising labor taxes and 6% by raising capital income taxes. For the EU-14 we obtain 8% and 1%. Denmark and Sweden are on the wrong side of the Laffer curve for capital income taxation. JEL Classification: E0, E60, H0dynamic scoring, incentives, Laffer curve, US and EU-14 economy

Essays in macroeconomics

Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Aufsätzen, welche die Effekte von Geld- und Fiskalpolitiken für die Makroökonomie untersuchen. Der erste Aufsatz analysiert, wie das Verhalten der Inflation nach z.B. geldpolitischen Veränderungen erklärt werden kann. Mankiw und Reis (2002) propagieren klebrige Information als eine Alternative zu Calvo klebrigen Preisen, um drei konventionelle Sichtweisen über die Inflation zu modellieren. Ich verwende ein DSGE Modell mit klebriger Information und vergleiche es mit Calvo klebrigen Preisen mit dynamischer Inflationsindexierung wie in Christiano et al. (2005). Ich zeige, dass beide Modelle in meinem DSGE Rahmen gleich gut geeignet sind, die konventionellen Sichtweisen zu erklären. Der zweite Aufsatz untersucht, wie sich das Verhalten von Haushalten und Firmen in den USA und EU-15 infolge von Steuerveränderungen anpasst. Mittels eines neoklassischen Wachstumsmodells zeigt sich, dass die USA und EU-15 auf der linken Seite der Lohn- und Kapitalsteuer Laffer Kurve liegen. Die EU-15 befindet sich jedoch viel näher an der rutschigen Steigung als die USA. Eine dynamische Scoring-Analyse zeigt, dass Steuersenkungen in der EU-15 stärker selbstfinanzierend sind als in den USA. Es folgt, dass es in der EU-15 grössere Anreize durch Steuersenkungen als in den USA gibt. Der dritte Aufsatz analysiert, ob die Fiskalpolitik Steuerreformen vor deren Implementierung vorankündigen soll, um die Wohlfahrt zu maximieren. Domeij und Klein (2005) zeigen, dass Vorankündigung einer optimalen Steuerreform mit Wohlfahrtskosten verbunden ist. Ich prüfe diese Behauptung unter zusätzlicher Berücksichtigung von öffentlichen Gütern und Kapital nach. Ich zeige, dass nutzenbringende und produktive Staatsausgaben die Wohlfahrtskosten durch Vorankündigungen höchstwahrscheinlich reduzieren. Es zeigt sich weiter, dass kurzfristige Konfiszierung und/oder Subvention von Kapital und Löhnen nicht wichtig für die Wohlfahrsgewinne einer hinreichend vorangekündigten Steuerreform sind.This dissertation consists of three essays which investigate the economic implications of monetary and fiscal policies on the macroeconomy. The first essay focuses on the question: how can we explain the behavior of inflation in response to e.g. monetary policy changes? Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose sticky information as an alternative to Calvo sticky prices to model three conventional views about inflation. We use a fully-fledged DSGE model with sticky information and compare it to Calvo sticky prices, allowing also for dynamic inflation indexation as in Christiano et al. (2005). We find that both models do equally well in our DSGE framework in delivering the conventional views. The second essay analyzes the question: how does the behavior of households and firms in the US compared to the EU-15 adjust if fiscal policy changes taxes? Using a calibrated neoclassical growth model we show that the US and the EU-15 are located on the left side of their labor and capital tax Laffer curves, but the EU-15 being much closer to the slippery slopes than the US. A dynamic scoring analysis shows that tax cuts in the EU-15 are much more self-financing than in the US. We conclude that there are higher incentive effects in the EU-15 compared to the US in response to tax cuts. Finally, the third essay focuses on the question: should fiscal policy pre-announce tax reforms before their implementation from a welfare point of view? Domeij and Klein (2005) show that pre-announcement of an optimal tax reform is costly in terms of welfare. We reexamine their claim by taking two additional features of government spending into account: public goods and public capital. We show that valuable and productive government spending is likely to reduce the welfare costs of preannouncement. As a further contribution, we show that short-run confiscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income is not important for the welfare gains of pre-announced reforms with sufficiently long pre-announcement duration

Optimal Pre-Announced Tax Reform Revisited

Domeij and Klein (2005) have shown that the welfare gains of an optimal capital and labor income tax reform decline the longer the reform is pre-announced before its implementation. In other words, pre-announcement is costly in terms of welfare. I reexamine their claim by taking two additional features of government spending into account: public goods and public capital. In my baseline optimal reform, I show that valuable and productive government spending is likely to reduce the welfare costs of pre-announcement. Further, the baseline optimal pre-announced reform displays short-run confiscation and/or subsidy of capital and labor income. As a further contribution, I show that these short-run properties are not important for the welfare gains of pre-announced reforms with sufficiently long pre-announcement duration. In particular, a 4 years pre-announced suboptimal reform in which taxes move - without confiscation and subsidy - directly to their endogenous long-run values at the implementation date generates similar welfare gains as the 4 years preannounced baseline optimal reform. The underlying tax structure of both reforms, however, appears to be very different.pre-announced optimal tax reform, public goods, public capital, confiscation, subsidy, welfare

Involuntary unemployment and the business cycle

We propose a monetary model in which the unemployed satisfy the official US definition of unemployment: they are people without jobs who are (i) currently making concrete efforts to find work and (ii) willing and able to work. In addition, our model has the property that people searching for jobs are better off if they find a job than if they do not (i.e., unemployment is ‘involuntary’). We integrate our model of involuntary unemployment into the simple New Keynesian framework with no capital and use the resulting model to discuss the concept of the ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’. We then integrate the model into a medium sized DSGE model with capital and show that the resulting model does as well as existing models at accounting for the response of standard macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks and two technology shocks. In addition, the model does well at accounting for the response of the labor force and unemployment rate to the three shocks. JEL Classification: E2, E3, E5, J2, J6Bayesian estimation, business cycles, DSGE, monetary policy, Unemployment

Involuntary unemployment and the business cycle

Can a model with limited labor market insurance explain standard macro and labor market data jointly? We construct a monetary model in which: i) the unemployed are worse off than the employed, i.e. unemployment is involuntary and ii) the labor force participation rate varies with the business cycle. To illustrate key features of our model, we start with the simplest possible framework. We then integrate the model into a medium-sized DSGE model and show that the resulting model does as well as existing models at accounting for the response of standard macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks and two technology shocks. In addition, the model does well at accounting for the response of the labor force and unemployment rate to these three shocks

Fiscal policy and the Great Recession in the euro area

How much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real GDP growth during the Great Recession? We estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized quarterly real GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6 percentage points. We obtain our result by using an extended version of the European Central Bank’s New Area- Wide Model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector. A detailed modeling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of as many as eight fiscal time series appear pivotal for our result

Fiscal policy and the Great Recession in the euro area

How much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real GDP growth during the Great Recession? We estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized quarterly real GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6 percentage points. We obtain our result by using an extended version of the European Central Bank’s New Area- Wide Model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector. A detailed modeling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of as many as eight fiscal time series appear pivotal for our result