Quantum Risk Preferences in a Laboratory Experiment

   This paper presents a quantum model of risk preferences that seeks to provide an explanation of the experimental results reported in Berninghaus, Todorova & Vogt (2012). The finding that subjects choose the risk-dominant strategy in a 2× 2 coordination game, on the average, more often, when they have previously completed a risk questionnaire, is not anticipated by the standard economic theory. The model presented in this paper demonstrates that the coordination game and the risk questionnaire can be analyzed as two decisions situations that do not commute and predicts that the order in which decisions are made will influence behavioral choices. &nbsp

Are Behavioral Choices in the Ultimatum and Investment Games Strategic?

This paper experimentally examines the relationship between self-reporting risk preferences and behavioral choices in the subsequently played dictator, ultimatum and investment games. The results from these experiments are used to discern the motivational bases of behavioral choices in the ultimatum and investment games. The focus is on investigating whether strategic considerations are important for strategy selection in the two games. We find that self-reporting risk preferences does not alter the dictators\u27 offers and trusters\u27 investments, while it significantly decreases the proposers\u27 offers and leads to a substantial decrease in the amount trustees give back to their partners. We interpret these results as evidence that the decisions of proposers in the ultimatum game and trustees in the investment game are strategic

Herding in a Laboratory Asset Market with a Rich Action Set

This paper experimentally examines the efficiency of information aggregation in a simple asset market. Traders decide how to allocate an endowment of 1000 eurocent between two assets. Only one asset will be successful and that will pay back the amount invested in it. The experiment carried out here is original in that it considered a very rich action set. We find that when the action set is sufficiently rich, traders\u27 actions, most of the time, perfectly reveal their private information. Further, the participants in the experiment performed probability matching and took such actions, which were broadly consistent with Bayesian learning

A Simple Questionnaire Can Change Everything: Are Strategy Choices in Coordination Games Stable?

This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2× 2 coordination game.The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one\u27s own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects\u27 risk aversion while keeping their beliefs unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the stability of strategy choices in coordination games

How Sensitive is Strategy Selection in Coordination Games?

This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to study the effect produced on strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences on a risk scale before engaging in a 2x2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of stating one\u27s own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. In particular, subjects tend to choose the risk dominant strategy more often when they have previously stated their attitudes to risk. Within a best-response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self-reporting risk preferences does not induce a change in subjects\u27 beliefs. We argue that the behavioral arguments of strategy selection, such as focal points, framing and uncertain preferences can explain our results

A Simple Questionnaire Can Change Everything - Are Strategy Choices in Coordination Games Stable?

This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2× 2 coordination game.The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects' risk aversion while keeping their beliefs unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the stability of strategy choices in coordination games.coordination game, questionnaire, risk preferences, beliefs, best response correspondence

The genetic history of the Southern Arc: a bridge between West Asia and Europe

By sequencing 727 ancient individuals from the Southern Arc (Anatolia and its neighbors in Southeastern Europe and West Asia) over 10,000 years, we contextualize its Chalcolithic period and Bronze Age (about 5000 to 1000 BCE), when extensive gene flow entangled it with the Eurasian steppe. Two streams of migration transmitted Caucasus and Anatolian/Levantine ancestry northward, and the Yamnaya pastoralists, formed on the steppe, then spread southward into the Balkans and across the Caucasus into Armenia, where they left numerous patrilineal descendants. Anatolia was transformed by intra–West Asian gene flow, with negligible impact of the later Yamnaya migrations. This contrasts with all other regions where Indo-European languages were spoken, suggesting that the homeland of the Indo-Anatolian language family was in West Asia, with only secondary dispersals of non-Anatolian Indo-Europeans from the steppe

Genome-wide DNA methylation signatures to predict pathologic complete response from combined neoadjuvant chemotherapy with bevacizumab in breast cancer.

TRIAL REGISTRATION:ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT00203502

Abstracts Of The Proceedings And The Posters From The Third Scientific Session Of The Medical College Of Varna

October 2-3, 201