The Rise and Fall of Historic Chief Justices: Constitutional Politics and Judicial Leadership in Indonesia

In the decade following its inception, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has marked a new chapter in Indonesian legal history, one in which a judicial institution can challenge the executive and legislative branches. This article argues that judicial leadership is the main contributing factor explaining the emergence of judicial power in Indonesia. This article posits that the newly established Indonesian Constitutional Court needed a strong and skilled Chief Justice to build the institution because it had insufficient support from political actors. As the Court lacked a well-established tradition of judicial review, it needed a visionary leader who could maximize the structural advantage of the Court. Finally, the Court needed a heroic leader able to deal with the challenges and pressures from the government. This article examines the role of the four Chief Justices of the Indonesian Constitutional Court: Jimly Asshiddiqie (2003–2008), Mohammad Mahfud (2008–2013), Akil Mochtar (2013), and Hamdan Zoelva (2013–2015). Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie and Muhmmad Mahfud set a high bar by playing the role of heroic Chief Justices. The departure of Asshiddiqie and Mahfud, however, marked the end an era of heroic Chief Justices. Both Chief Justices Akil Mochtar and Hamdan Zoelva could not maintain the role of heroic Chief Justice

Convergence or Borrowing: Standing in the Indonesian Constitutional Court

This Article addresses the constitutional convergence theory by examining the standing rule in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. The central investigation of this paper is whether the application of standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is evidence of constitutional convergence or of borrowing? This paper argues that the Constitutional Court jurisprudence on standing indicates that constitutional convergence has never taken place but rather the Court has engaged in constitutional borrowing. Legal borrowing on standing is limited to the carbon copy of the five-prong standing tests of the U.S. model, but in reality standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is not based on the private rights model of adjudication. Although the Court allows individuals to bring cases before the Court, it is rather a quasi-public model of standing, in which claimants no longer have standing only to vindicate their own private rights but can also sue to vindicate public interests. Standing requirements also allow the judges to review many highly sensitive political cases, and to some extent it enables the Court to second guess the decisions of the different branches of government

Convergence or Borrowing: Standing in The Indonesian Constitutional Court

This Article addresses the constitutional convergence theory by examining the standing rule in the Indonesian Constitutional Court. The central investigation of this paper is whether the application of standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is evidence of constitutional convergence or of borrowing? This paper argues that the Constitutional Court jurisprudence on standing indicates that constitutional convergence has never taken place but rather the Court has engaged in constitutional borrowing. Legal borrowing on standing is limited to the carbon copy of the five-prong standing tests of the U.S. model,  but in reality standing doctrine in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is not based on the private rights model of adjudication. Although the Court allows individuals to bring cases before the Court, it is rather a quasi-public model of standing, in which claimants no longer have standing only to vindicate their own private rights but can also sue to vindicate public interests. Standing requirements also allow the judges to review many highly sensitive political cases, and to  some extent it enables the Court to second guess the decisions of the different branches of government