Step Right Up: Using Consumer Decision Making Theory to Teach Research Process in the Electronic Age

The legal academy has framed legal research as a professional skill, and much research pedagogy centers around replicating a controlled professional environment to allow students to learn how to do research by simulating legal practice. Although this is a valid way to conceptualize research, it is not the only way. Another way to conceptualize research is as a consumer transaction. Legal information is, in many ways, a product that information providers market to lawyers and students, as the promotions and contests that LexisNexis and Westlaw sponsor demonstrate. Once legal information is understood as a product, the process of research can be seen as a purchase transaction, and research instruction can be seen as a form of consumer education. This article approaches research from a consumer perspective. It sets the stage by explaining why legal information is a consumer product and analyzing changes in the information marketplace that have affected research process. The article then explains consumer decision making theory. It demonstrates why this is an appropriate vehicle for describing the research process and explains the marketing, cultural, psychological, situational, personal, and social influences that affect consumer choice in the research context. The advantages of approaching research from a consumer perspective are addressed next, followed by an exploration of ways to incorporate consumer decision making theory into research pedagogy. The article concludes that making students better consumers of legal information will help them become better professionals

Setting a Precedent about Precedent: William Richman on Federal Appellate Justice

This paper is a tribute to Professor William Richman\u27s scholarship on appellate practice in honor of his retirement

A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule

Non-precedential judicial opinions issued by the federal appellate courts have generated significant controversy. Given that the federal appellate courts are unlikely to abandon the practice of issuing non-precedential opinions on their own, what other options exist for prohibiting the practice? This article discusses the constitutionality of a procedural rule or statute prohibiting the federal appellate courts from prospectively designating selected opinions as non-precedential. It explains how the rules governing non-precedential opinions allow federal appellate courts to opt out of their own rules of precedent. It then examines the rulemaking process, showing how the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are promulgated pursuant to delegated legislative authority and can, therefore, regulate only matters that Congress could regulate by statute. With those premises in mind, the article then explores the constitutional limits of Congress\u27s ability to regulate the courts\u27 use of precedent. It shows that a federal statute or procedural rule prohibiting prospective designation of selected opinions as non-precedential would be constitutional using both formalist and functionalist reasoning. As long as the statute or rule did not specify the weight federal appellate courts must accord to their own opinions, it would not encroach impermissibly on the courts\u27 Article III judicial power

No Magic Formula: A New Approach for Calculating the Ten Year Time Period for Admission of Prior Conviction Evidence

Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 609 governs admission of prior conviction evidence. Under this rule, it is easier to admit evidence of a prior conviction that is less than ten years old than to admit evidence of older convictions. The ten year period is measured from the later of either the date of conviction or the date of release from confinement. Calculating the ten year period is fairly straightforward in most cases but becomes confusing when the witness has been confined for violating the terms of probation, parole, or some other period of conditional release. Does the confinement for violation of conditional release (VOCR) constitute confinement for the original crime? Should the nature of the violation affect whether the VOCR confinement constitutes confinement for the original crime? Should the ten year clock start over upon release from VOCR confinement? FRE 609 does not answer these questions. This article proposes treating the ten year time period as a statute of limitations which should be tolled for any periods of VOCR confinement. Part I traces the history of FRE 609. Part II evaluates different approaches that have been used to calculate the time period. Part III proposes the statute of limitations approach, illustrating how it avoids the harsh results and inconsistencies that occur with the other approaches. This article concludes that the statute of limitations approach will be easier for courts to apply and is more consistent with the policies underlying the rule than other approaches