Sāṃkhya-Yoga Philosophy and the Mind-Body Problem

The relationship between the physical body and the conscious human mind has been a deeply problematic topic for centuries. Physicalism is the 'orthodox' metaphysical stance in contemporary Western thought, according to which reality is exclusively physical/material in nature. However, in the West, theoretical dissatisfaction with this type of approach has historically lead to Cartesian-style dualism, wherein mind and body are thought to belong to distinct metaphysical realms. In the current discussion I compare and contrast this standard Western approach with an alternative form of dualism developed in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophical tradition, where matter and pure consciousness are held to belong to distinct and independent realms, but where the mind is placed on the material side of the ontological divide. I argue that this model possesses a number of theoretical advantages over Cartesian-style dualism, and constitutes a compelling theoretical framework for re-conceptualizing the mind-body problem

Advaita and the philosophy of consciousness without an object

The paper explores Śaṅkara's position on autonomous consciousness, or cit, as the fundamental reality. As such, cit transcends subject/object duality, and Śaṅkara holds that consciousness is ultimately nirviṣayaka or non-intentional. I compare and contrast the Advaita view with the contemporary Phenomenological account, wherein consciousness is held to be essentially intentional, so that consciousness is always of or about some object or content, and where consciousness without an object is deemed conceptually impossible

The fluorine-NHC gauche effect: a structural and computational study

Herein, we report the synthesis and X-ray structural analysis of a collection of fluorinated metal N-heterocyclic carbenes (Ag, Au, Pd, Rh, Ir) and their precursor salts. The common structural feature of these species is a flanking fluoroethyl group which is either freely rotating or embedded within a bicyclic framework. Solid state analysis confirmed a gauche conformational preference in all cases with the fluorine adopting a syn clinal arrangement (ϕ[NCCF] ~ 60°) with respect to the triazolium nitrogen at the vicinal position of the NHC. A density functional theory analysis was employed to quantify these effects and evaluate the influence of electronic modulation of the carbenic carbon [(C=N+); neutral carbene (C:); metal-bound carbene (C=M)], on the relative gauche / anti preference, thus highlighting the potential of this conformational phenomenon as a useful molecular design strategy for controlling the topology of organometallic complexes

Causal and Communal Factors in a Comprehensive Test of Intelligence

The paper traces a pathway through the existing space of argumentation surrounding the original Turing Test (TT) and the discipline of ‘Strong’ Artificial Intelligence that followed on from Turing’s work, and extends this path to motivate a strengthened conclusion regarding what would be required by a truly Comprehensive Intelligence Test (CIT). The paper begins by examining the initial ‘intelligence test’ as proposed by Turing, and Searle’s high profile critique of both the TT and Strong AI. In tracing the ensuing dialectic between Searle and his own critics, I support Searle’s rejection of the ‘Systems Reply’, and for reasons based more on the philosophical views of Putnam agree that the original Turing Test is fundamentally inadequate. The situation becomes more complex with the ‘Robot Reply’ and allied Total Turing Test (TTT), and I argue that Searle’s attempted refutation of the combined Robotic-Systems reply is unconvincing. However, this is not to say that the position expressed by Searle’s opponents is itself confirmed, and I argue that externalist views in the philosophy of language first put forward by Kripke and Putnam cast serious doubt on the issue. In turn, the causal and communal factors highlighted by externalist views in the philosophy of language point to the need for a fundamental shift in conceptual perspective and a strengthening of criteria in a truly Comprehensive Intelligence Test. I argue that an ideal CIT should focus on the category of cognitive system as a whole, rather than on the performance of individual artefacts. From this expanded perspective, the central question is not whether an isolated agent could simulate human performance within the context of a preexisting sociolinguistic culture developed by the human cognitive type. Instead the key issue is whether the artificial cognitive type itself is capable of producing a comparable sociolinguistic medium of intelligence, where this essential medium is simply taken for granted as a precondition of the individual performances evaluated in the TT and TTT