The Cholecystectomy As A Day Case (CAAD) Score: A Validated Score of Preoperative Predictors of Successful Day-Case Cholecystectomy Using the CholeS Data Set

Background Day-case surgery is associated with significant patient and cost benefits. However, only 43% of cholecystectomy patients are discharged home the same day. One hypothesis is day-case cholecystectomy rates, defined as patients discharged the same day as their operation, may be improved by better assessment of patients using standard preoperative variables. Methods Data were extracted from a prospectively collected data set of cholecystectomy patients from 166 UK and Irish hospitals (CholeS). Cholecystectomies performed as elective procedures were divided into main (75%) and validation (25%) data sets. Preoperative predictors were identified, and a risk score of failed day case was devised using multivariate logistic regression. Receiver operating curve analysis was used to validate the score in the validation data set. Results Of the 7426 elective cholecystectomies performed, 49% of these were discharged home the same day. Same-day discharge following cholecystectomy was less likely with older patients (OR 0.18, 95% CI 0.15–0.23), higher ASA scores (OR 0.19, 95% CI 0.15–0.23), complicated cholelithiasis (OR 0.38, 95% CI 0.31 to 0.48), male gender (OR 0.66, 95% CI 0.58–0.74), previous acute gallstone-related admissions (OR 0.54, 95% CI 0.48–0.60) and preoperative endoscopic intervention (OR 0.40, 95% CI 0.34–0.47). The CAAD score was developed using these variables. When applied to the validation subgroup, a CAAD score of ≤5 was associated with 80.8% successful day-case cholecystectomy compared with 19.2% associated with a CAAD score >5 (p < 0.001). Conclusions The CAAD score which utilises data readily available from clinic letters and electronic sources can predict same-day discharges following cholecystectomy

Evolutionary stability of auction and supply chain contracting: An analysis based on disintermediation in the Indian tea supply chains

The purpose of this paper is to show that evolutionary stable market equilibrium is achievable through complete disintermediation of auctioneers if the option of bargaining-based supply chain contracting exists. The paper analyzes the evolutionary dynamics of a market that caters both the scopes of auction-intermediation and supply chain contracting to a set of homogeneous buyers and sellers. The motivation of this work developed from the contradiction between the theoretical framework of Lu and McAfee (1996) that identifies auction to be evolutionary stable over bargaining and the real instance of sustained disintermediation of auctioneers in the world's largest tea industry in India where supply chain contracting is the other option of trading.Auction Bargaining Supply chain contract Disintermediation Indian tea industry