A Regional Power Promoting Democracy? India’s Involvement in Nepal (2005–2008)

According to the theory of “democratic peace,” India, as the largest democracy in the world and as South Asia’s predominant regional power, should be expected to promote democracy in neighboring countries. However, New Delhi lacks any official democracypromotion policy, and its past record on democracy in the region is mixed at best. Against this background, the paper analyzes the substantial role India came to play in the peace and democratization process in Nepal in the years 2005–2008, asking whether this constitutes a departure from New Delhi’s traditional policy of noninterference in its neighbors’ internal affairs and a move towards a more assertive approach to democracy promotion. The analysis shows that India’s involvement in Nepal was the product of short-term stability concerns rather than being an indicator of a long-term change in strategy with the intention of becoming an active player in international democracy promotion.democracy promotion, India, Nepal, regional power, peace process, democratization

Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership: Developing a Research Framework for the Study of Regional Powers

Regional powers are often conceived of as “regional leading powers,” states which adopt a cooperative and benevolent attitude in their international relations with their neighbors. The paper argues that regional powers can follow a much wider range of foreign policy strategies in their region. Three ideal-typical regional strategies are identified: empire, hegemony, and leadership. The paper is devoted to a theory-led distinction and clarification of these three terms, which are often used interchangeably in the field of international relations. According to the goals pursued, to the means employed, and to other discriminating features such as the degree of legitimation and the type of self-representation by the dominant state, the paper outlines the essential traits of imperial, hegemonic, and leading strategies and identifies subtypes for better classifying hegemony and leadership.regional powers, empire, hegemony, leadership, strategy

India and the Civil War in Sri Lanka: On the Failures of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia

The paper provides an assessment of India’s role in the final years of the civil war in Sri Lanka (2003-2009). In particular, it looks for explanations for India’s inability to act as a conflict manager in its own region, which is in contrast to predominant assumptions about the role of powerful regional states. It also seeks to explain the surprising turn in India’s approach to the conflict, when in 2007 New Delhi began to rather explicitly support the Sri Lankan government— in disregard of its traditional preference for a peaceful solution and its sensitivity for the fate of Sri Lankan Tamils. While historical and domestic pressures led to India’s indecisive approach during the years 2003-2007, starting from 2007 regional and international factors— most notably the skillful diplomacy of the Sri Lankan government and the growing Chinese presence there—induced New Delhi to support the government side in order to keep some leverage on Sri Lankan affairs. The analysis of the Sri Lankan case opens several avenues for further research in the fields of regional conflict management and foreign policy analysis.India, Sri Lanka, conflict management, civil war

A Regional Power Promoting Democracy? India's Involvement in Nepal (2005-2008)

According to the theory of 'democratic peace' India, as the largest democracy in the world and as South Asia's predominant regional power, should be expected to promote democracy in neighboring countries. However, New Delhi lacks any official democracypromotion policy, and its past record on democracy in the region is mixed at best. Against this background, the paper analyzes the substantial role India came to play in the peace and democratization process in Nepal in the years 2005-2008, asking whether this constitutes a departure from New Delhi's traditional policy of noninterference in its neighbors- internal affairs and a move towards a more assertive approach to democracy promotion. The analysis shows that India's involvement in Nepal was the product of short-term stability concerns rather than being an indicator of a long-term change in strategy with the intention of becoming an active player in international democracy promotion.Als größte Demokratie der Welt und gleichzeitig als dominierende Regionalmacht in Südasien, könnte man erwarten, dass Indien in seinen Nachbarstaaten Demokratieförderung betreibt. Die Theorie des demokratischen Friedens geht davon aus, dass es im Interesse einer Demokratie wie Indien liegt, von Demokratien umgeben zu sein, da somit die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Kriegen sinkt. Dies ist jedoch bei Indien nicht der Fall: Neu-Delhi geht pragmatisch mit autoritären Staaten um und hat keine offizielle Politik der Demokratieförderung. Das Papier geht der Frage nach, inwieweit Indiens substanzielles Engagement im Friedens- und Demokratisierungsprozess in Nepal in den Jahren 2005-2008 eine Abkehr von Neu-Delhis traditioneller Ablehnung von Demokratieförderung darstellt. Die Untersuchung ideeller und zielorientierter Grundlagen in Indiens Außenpolitik und die Analyse des indischen Engagements in Nepal führen zu dem Schluss, dass wir es mit keinem radikalen Wandel zu tun haben. Indiens Bemühungen in Nepal sind nicht als langfristiger Strategiewandel, sondern als reaktiver, kurzfristiger Politikwechsel zu verstehen, der primär auf die Stabilisierung des Nachbarstaats abzielte

A Regional Power Promoting Democracy? : India’s Involvement in Nepal (2005–2008)

According to the theory of “democratic peace,” India, as the largest democracy in the world and as South Asia’s predominant regional power, should be expected to promote democracy in neighboring countries. However, New Delhi lacks any official democracypromotion policy, and its past record on democracy in the region is mixed at best. Against this background, the paper analyzes the substantial role India came to play in the peace and democratization process in Nepal in the years 2005–2008, asking whether this constitutes a departure from New Delhi’s traditional policy of noninterference in its neighbors’ internal affairs and a move towards a more assertive approach to democracy promotion. The analysis shows that India’s involvement in Nepal was the product of short‐term stability concerns rather than being an indicator of a long‐term change in strategy with the intention of becoming an active player in international democracy promotion.Als größte Demokratie der Welt und gleichzeitig als dominierende Regionalmacht in Südasien, könnte man erwarten, dass Indien in seinen Nachbarstaaten Demokratieförderung betreibt. Die Theorie des demokratischen Friedens geht davon aus, dass es im Interesse einer Demokratie wie Indien liegt, von Demokratien umgeben zu sein, da somit die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Kriegen sinkt. Dies ist jedoch bei Indien nicht der Fall: Neu‐Delhi geht pragmatisch mit autoritären Staaten um und hat keine offizielle Politik der Demokratieförderung. Das Papier geht der Frage nach, inwieweit Indiens substanzielles Engagement im Friedens‐ und Demokratisierungsprozess in Nepal in den Jahren 2005‐2008 eine Abkehr von Neu‐Delhis traditioneller Ablehnung von Demokratieförderung darstellt. Die Untersuchung ideeller und zielorientierter Grundlagen in Indiens Außenpolitik und die Analyse des indischen Engagements in Nepal führen zu dem Schluss, dass wir es mit keinem radikalen Wandel zu tun haben. Indiens Bemühungen in Nepal sind nicht als langfristiger Strategiewandel, sondern als reaktiver, kurzfristiger Politikwechsel zu verstehen, der primär auf die Stabilisierung des Nachbarstaats abzielte

Regional powers and their strategies: empire, hegemony, and leadership

Regional powers are often conceived of as ‘regional leading powers’, states which adopt a cooperative and benevolent attitude in their international relations with their neighbours. The article argues that regional powers can follow a much wider range of foreign policy strategies in their region. Three ideal-typical regional strategies are identified: empire, hegemony, and leadership. The article is devoted to a theory-led distinction and clarification of these three terms, which are often used interchangeably in the field of International Relations. According to the goals pursued, to the means employed, and to other discriminating features such as the degree of legitimation and the type of self- representation by the dominant state, the article outlines the essential traits of imperial, hegemonic, and leading strategies and identifies sub-types for better classifying hegemony and leadership

India and the Civil War in Sri Lanka: On the Failures of Regional Conflict Management in South Asia

The paper provides an assessment of India's role in the final years of the civil war in Sri Lanka (2003-2009). In particular, it looks for explanations for India's inability to act as a conflict manager in its own region, which is in contrast to predominant assumptions about the role of powerful regional states. It also seeks to explain the surprising turn in India's approach to the conflict, when in 2007 New Delhi began to rather explicitly support the Sri Lankan government - in disregard of its traditional preference for a peaceful solution and its sensitivity for the fate of Sri Lankan Tamils. While historical and domestic pressures led to India's indecisive approach during the years 2003-2007, starting from 2007 regional and international factors - most notably the skillful diplomacy of the Sri Lankan government and the growing Chinese presence there induced New Delhi to support the government side in order to keep some leverage on Sri Lankan affairs. The analysis of the Sri Lankan case opens several avenues for further research in the fields of regional conflict management and foreign policy analysis.Der Aufsatz analysiert Indiens Rolle im Bürgerkrieg in Sri Lanka in den Jahren 2003 bis 2009. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung steht einerseits Indiens Unfähigkeit, als Konfliktmanager in seiner eigenen Region zu handeln; dies widerspricht den theoretischen Annahmen zur Rolle mächtiger Staaten bei der Beilegung von Gewaltkonflikten in ihrer eigenen Region. Andererseits erklärt der Beitrag den überraschenden Wandel in Neu-Delhis Politik gegenüber Sri Lanka: 2007 begann Indien, die srilankische Regierung zu unterstützen, und entfernte sich somit von seiner traditionellen Präferenz für eine friedliche Lösung des Konflikts und von seiner früheren Sensibilität in Bezug auf das Schicksal der Tamilen Sri Lankas. Die unentschlossene Haltung Indiens zwischen 2003 und 2007 lässt sich durch historische und innenpolitische Faktoren erklären, während von 2007 an regionale und internationale Faktoren - vor allem die geschickte Diplomatie der srilankischen Regierung und der wachsende Einfluss Chinas - Neu-Delhi dazu bewegten, die srilankische Regierung zu unterstützen, um ein gewisses Maß an Einfluss in Sri Lanka zu wahren. Die Fallstudie zu Sri Lanka wirft eine Reihe von Forschungsfragen auf den Gebieten regionales Konfliktmanagement und Außenpolitikanalyse auf

Empire, Hegemony, and Leadership: Developing a Research Framework for the Study of Regional Powers

Regional powers are often conceived of as regional leading powers, states which adopt a cooperative and benevolent attitude in their international relations with their neighbors. The paper argues that regional powers can follow a much wider range of foreign policy strategies in their region. Three ideal-typical regional strategies are identified: empire, hegemony, and leadership. The paper is devoted to a theory-led distinction and clarification of these three terms, which are often used interchangeably in the field of international relations. According to the goals pursued, to the means employed, and to other discriminating features such as the degree of legitimation and the type of self-representation by the dominant state, the paper outlines the essential traits of imperial, hegemonic, and leading strategies and identifies subtypes for better classifying hegemony and leadership.Regionalmächte werden oft als 'regionale Führungsmächte' aufgefasst, als Staaten, die sich ihren Nachbarn gegenüber kooperativ und wohlwollend verhalten. Dieses Working Paper geht davon aus, dass Regionalmächte durchaus eine breitere Palette außenpolitischer Strategien in ihrer Region verfolgen können. Dabei werden drei idealtypische regionale Strategien identifiziert: eine imperiale, eine hegemoniale und eine führende. Im Mittelpunkt dieses Beitrages steht eine theoriegeleitete Trennung und Klärung dieser drei Termini, die in der Disziplin der Internationalen Beziehungen oft verwechselt und synonym verwendet werden. Die Hauptmerkmale imperialer, hegemonialer und führender Strategien werden unter Berücksichtigung der verfolgten Ziele, der eingesetzten Mittel und anderer Unterscheidungsfaktoren wie des Legitimierungsgrades und der Selbstdarstellung des dominierenden Staates herausgearbeitet. Eine Präzisierung durch Subtypen erlaubt eine bessere Klassifizierung von Hegemonie und Leadership

Reluctant powers? Rising powers' contributions to regional crisis management

Rising powers have often been characterised as 'reluctant' when it comes to their contributions to global governance. However, also within their regions they have sometimes pursued indecisive, muddling-through policies, including in the field of security. This paper addresses the puzzling issue of rising powers' reluctant approach to regional crisis management. It conceptualises reluctance as entailing the two constitutive dimensions of hesitation and recalcitrance, and it seeks to approach a theorisation of reluctance that focuses on a combination of international expectations and domestic preference formation. The empirical analysis addresses instances of regional crisis management by the democratic rising powers India and Brazil during phases of domestic political stability under the Modi (2014–2018) and the Lula (2003–2011) governments, respectively. The analysis of India's crisis management efforts in Afghanistan and Nepal, and of Brazil's leadership of the MINUSTAH mission and its approach to the civil war in Colombia, reveal that reluctance emerges if a government is faced with (competing) expectations articulated by international actors as well as with a range of domestic factors that lead to unclear preference formation

The Consequences of Failed Mediation in Civil Wars: Assessing the Sri Lankan Case

While mediation efforts in violent conflicts often fail, the academic literature on mediation has long ignored both this phenomenon and its consequences. This paper aims to fill this significant knowledge gap by examining the conditions under which the failure of mediation leads to an escalation of civil war. Based on the literature on bargaining, we argue that the degree of negotiability of the conflict parties' strategic objectives, as well as the relative weight of hardliners and moderates within those conflict parties, influence the likelihood of escalation after mediation failure. A plausibility test carried out for Norway's failed mediation in the Sri Lankan civil war confirms the usefulness of our model. In particular, the suspension of negotiations in April 2003 led to a shift towards less negotiable strategic objectives for both conflict parties and to a strengthening of hardliners within the government. This contributed to the escalation of the conflict, up to its eventual termination in May 2009