The Kyoto Protocol and Global Environmental Strategies of the EU, the U.S. and Japan: A Perspective from Japan,

Despite the objection of the Bush administration to the U.S.'s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, its entry into force has come to be realistic due to the Bonn Agreement in July. The purpose of this paper is first to survey the framework of the Protocol, and then to analyze the strategic positions of the EU, the U.S., and Japan in negotiations for designing the details of the Protocol. Finally, this paper intends to consider the due strategy of Japan, as well as to identify the problems of the Protocol, which will be a help for designing a new framework that will enable the participation of developing countries.

The Kyoto Protocol and Global Environmental Strategies of the EU, the U.S. and Japan: A Perspective from Japan

Despite the objection of the Bush administration to the U.S.'s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, its entry into force has come to be realistic due to the Bonn Agreement in July. The purpose of this paper is first to survey the framework of the Protocol, and then to analyze the strategic positions of the EU, the U.S., and Japan in negotiations for designing the details of the Protocol. Finally, this paper intends to consider the due strategy of Japan, as well as to identify the problems of the Protocol, which will be a help for designing a new framework that will enable the participation of developing countries.

Does energy efficiency label alter consumersf purchase decision? A latent class approach on Shanghai data

In this paper we apply hypothetical choice experiments through a field survey in Shanghai of China to examine whether China Energy Efficiency Label affects consumersf choices of air conditioner and refrigerator. A latent class approach is used to observe both heterogeneities among the respondents and product brands. The results suggest that the effect of energy efficiency label on consumersf preferences is twofold. First, more energy efficient air conditioners or refrigerators are preferred by consumers, no matter whether they are with foreign brands or domestic brands and whether they are new or second-hand. Second, energy efficiency label per se is recognized by consumers. In addition, presence of a (hypothetical) label that indicates the electricity billfs difference comparing to a standard model is significantly preferred by the respondents in most of the cases, suggesting that more information provided to consumers makes them much happier. Finally, the class probability weighted willingness to pay values for one rank upgrading in energy efficiency of refrigerator are higher than those of air conditioner, implying that consumers have an incentive to pay more for appliances used more frequently.Energy efficiency label, Consumersf purchase decision, Latent class model, Willingness to pay, China

The Socioeconomic Determinants of Individual Environmental Concern: Evidence from Shanghai Data

This study examines the influence of socioeconomic characteristics on eleven measures of environmental concern by applying a pooled sample of 1200 individuals in Shanghai, China. Previous studies, which made efforts to explain environmental concern as a function of social structure, suggest that there are traditionally five hypotheses (the age, gender, social class, residence, and political hypotheses) for socioeconomic determinants, which are associated with individual environmental concerns. Unlike those methodologies adopted in many previous studies, we apply an ordered probit model to test three hypotheses (the age, gender, and social class hypotheses) in this study. As a result, high income and high education level are found to be positively related to environmental concern as expected. However, we find that in contrast to most of the existing studies, the marginal effect of age on the probability of being environmentally concerned is positive in several measures, implying that the older are more concerned about the environment than the younger. In addition, weak evidences indicate that women are less concerned about the environment than men. Other socioeconomic characteristics such as employment status and household size are not significant in most of the environmental concern measures we defined.Socioeconomic determinants, Environmental Concern, Ordered Probit Model, Chinese

Strategy-proof Sharing

We consider the problem of sharing a divisible good, where agents prefer more to less. First, we prove that a sharing rule satisfies strategy proofness if and only if it has the quasi-constancy property: no one changes her own share by changing her announcements. Next, by constructing a system of linear equations in a manner that is consistent with quasi-constancy, we provide a way to find every strategy-proof sharing rule. Finally, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of non-constant, strategy-proof sharing rules, by examining the relationship between the constancy of strategy-proof sharing rules and the dimension of the solution space of the linear system.Strategy-proofness, Bossiness, Non-constancy, Quasi-constancy.

Secure Implementation

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible solution to this problem is to require double implementation in Nash equilibrium and in dominant strategies, i.e., secure implementation. We characterize securely implementable social choice functions, and compare our results with dominant strategy implementation. In standard quasi-linear environments with divisible private or public goods, there exist Pareto efficient (non-dictatorial) social choice functions that can be securely implemented. But in the absence of side-payments, secure implementation is incompatible with Pareto efficiency.

How Universal is Behavior? A Four Country Comparison of Spite, Cooperation and Errors in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.experimental economics, cooperation, public goods games