1,858 research outputs found
Quantum Algorithm for the Collision Problem
In this note, we give a quantum algorithm that finds collisions in arbitrary
r-to-one functions after only O((N/r)^(1/3)) expected evaluations of the
function. Assuming the function is given by a black box, this is more efficient
than the best possible classical algorithm, even allowing probabilism. We also
give a similar algorithm for finding claws in pairs of functions. Furthermore,
we exhibit a space-time tradeoff for our technique. Our approach uses Grover's
quantum searching algorithm in a novel way.Comment: 8 pages, LaTeX2
A Protocol for Generating Random Elements with their Probabilities
We give an AM protocol that allows the verifier to sample elements x from a
probability distribution P, which is held by the prover. If the prover is
honest, the verifier outputs (x, P(x)) with probability close to P(x). In case
the prover is dishonest, one may hope for the following guarantee: if the
verifier outputs (x, p), then the probability that the verifier outputs x is
close to p. Simple examples show that this cannot be achieved. Instead, we show
that the following weaker condition holds (in a well defined sense) on average:
If (x, p) is output, then p is an upper bound on the probability that x is
output. Our protocol yields a new transformation to turn interactive proofs
where the verifier uses private random coins into proofs with public coins. The
verifier has better running time compared to the well-known Goldwasser-Sipser
transformation (STOC, 1986). For constant-round protocols, we only lose an
arbitrarily small constant in soundness and completeness, while our public-coin
verifier calls the private-coin verifier only once
A Framework for Evaluating Security in the Presence of Signal Injection Attacks
Sensors are embedded in security-critical applications from medical devices
to nuclear power plants, but their outputs can be spoofed through
electromagnetic and other types of signals transmitted by attackers at a
distance. To address the lack of a unifying framework for evaluating the
effects of such transmissions, we introduce a system and threat model for
signal injection attacks. We further define the concepts of existential,
selective, and universal security, which address attacker goals from mere
disruptions of the sensor readings to precise waveform injections. Moreover, we
introduce an algorithm which allows circuit designers to concretely calculate
the security level of real systems. Finally, we apply our definitions and
algorithm in practice using measurements of injections against a smartphone
microphone, and analyze the demodulation characteristics of commercial
Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs). Overall, our work highlights the
importance of evaluating the susceptibility of systems against signal injection
attacks, and introduces both the terminology and the methodology to do so.Comment: This article is the extended technical report version of the paper
presented at ESORICS 2019, 24th European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security (ESORICS), Luxembourg, Luxembourg, September 201
Securing computation against continuous leakage
30th Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 15-19, 2010. ProceedingsWe present a general method to compile any cryptographic algorithm into one which resists side channel attacks of the only computation leaks information variety for an unbounded number of executions. Our method uses as a building block a semantically secure subsidiary bit encryption scheme with the following additional operations: key refreshing, oblivious generation of cipher texts, leakage resilience re-generation, and blinded homomorphic evaluation of one single complete gate (e.g. NAND). Furthermore, the security properties of the subsidiary encryption scheme should withstand bounded leakage incurred while performing each of the above operations.
We show how to implement such a subsidiary encryption scheme under the DDH intractability assumption and the existence of a simple secure hardware component. The hardware component is independent of the encryption scheme secret key. The subsidiary encryption scheme resists leakage attacks where the leakage is computable in polynomial time and of length bounded by a constant fraction of the security parameter.Israel Science Foundation (710267)United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (710613)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (6914349)Weizmann KAMAR Gran
New efficient and secure protocols for verifiable signature sharing and other applications
Revocation in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation
The combination of software-as-a-service and the increasing use of mobile devices gives rise to a considerable difference in computational power between servers and clients. Thus, there is a desire for clients to outsource the evaluation of complex functions to an external server. Servers providing such a service may be rewarded per computation, and as such have an incentive to cheat by returning garbage rather than devoting resources and time to compute a valid result. In this work, we introduce the notion of Revocable Publicly Verifiable Computation (RPVC), where a cheating server is revoked and may not perform future computations (thus incurring a financial penalty). We introduce a Key Distribution Center (KDC) to efficiently handle the generation and distribution of the keys required to support RPVC. The KDC is an authority over entities in the system and enables revocation. We also introduce a notion of blind verification such that results are verifiable (and hence servers can be rewarded or punished) without learning the value. We present a rigorous definitional framework, define a number of new security models and present a construction of such a scheme built upon Key-Policy Attribute-based Encryption.
On formal verification of arithmetic-based cryptographic primitives
Cryptographic primitives are fundamental for information security: they are
used as basic components for cryptographic protocols or public-key
cryptosystems. In many cases, their security proofs consist in showing that
they are reducible to computationally hard problems. Those reductions can be
subtle and tedious, and thus not easily checkable. On top of the proof
assistant Coq, we had implemented in previous work a toolbox for writing and
checking game-based security proofs of cryptographic primitives. In this paper
we describe its extension with number-theoretic capabilities so that it is now
possible to write and check arithmetic-based cryptographic primitives in our
toolbox. We illustrate our work by machine checking the game-based proofs of
unpredictability of the pseudo-random bit generator of Blum, Blum and Shub, and
semantic security of the public-key cryptographic scheme of Goldwasser and
Micali.Comment: 13 page
Periodic harmonic functions on lattices and points count in positive characteristic
This survey addresses pluri-periodic harmonic functions on lattices with
values in a positive characteristic field. We mention, as a motivation, the
game "Lights Out" following the work of Sutner, Goldwasser-Klostermeyer-Ware,
Barua-Ramakrishnan-Sarkar, Hunzikel-Machiavello-Park e.a.; see also 2 previous
author's preprints for a more detailed account. Our approach explores harmonic
analysis and algebraic geometry over a positive characteristic field. The
Fourier transform allows us to interpret pluri-periods of harmonic functions on
lattices as torsion multi-orders of points on the corresponding affine
algebraic variety.Comment: These are notes on 13p. based on a talk presented during the meeting
"Analysis on Graphs and Fractals", the Cardiff University, 29 May-2 June 2007
(a sattelite meeting of the programme "Analysis on Graphs and its
Applications" at the Isaac Newton Institute from 8 January to 29 June 2007
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